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Abstract: The behavioral sciences have come under attack for writings and speech that affront sensitivities. At such times, academic
freedom and tenure are invoked to forestall efforts to censure and terminate jobs. We review the history and controversy surrounding
academic freedom and tenure, and explore their meaning across different fields, at different institutions, and at different ranks.
In a multifactoral experimental survey, 1,004 randomly selected faculty members from top-ranked institutions were asked
how colleagues would typically respond when confronted with dilemmas concerning teaching, research, and wrong-doing. Full
professors were perceived as being more likely to insist on having the academic freedom to teach unpopular courses, research
controversial topics, and whistle-blow wrong-doing than were lower-ranked professors (even associate professors with tenure).
Everyone thought that others were more likely to exercise academic freedom than they themselves were, and that promotion to full
professor was a better predictor of who would exercise academic freedom than was the awarding of tenure. Few differences
emerged related either to gender or type of institution, and behavioral scientists’ beliefs were similar to scholars from other fields.
In addition, no support was found for glib celebrations of tenure’s sanctification of broadly defined academic freedoms. These
findings challenge the assumption that tenure can be justified on the basis of fostering academic freedom, suggesting the need for a
re-examination of the philosophical foundation and practical implications of tenure in today’s academy.
Keywords: academia; academic freedom; ethical issues; faculty beliefs; professoriate; promotion; scientific misconduct; tenure;
whistle-blowing

1. Introduction: History and controversy
surrounding academic freedom and tenure
Tenure is said to represent the crown jewel of academic
life. It confers on those lucky enough to have it a lifetime
of financial security and, purportedly, substantial freedom
to teach and conduct research. Despite the modest pay
and long probationary period, in those countries that
still award tenure, once a scholar achieves this rank, his
or her professional life can seem to be set. Because such
security is uncommon among professionals, those who
have tenure jealously guard it against proposals to limit
its scope (e.g., post-tenure reviews, limited-term contracts,
and the decoupling of tenure from guaranteed salary, as is
becoming more common in medical schools).
From the beginning, however, academic freedom and
tenure have been attacked, often for political reasons
(e.g., Sykes 1988; see also Kimball 1990). This has been
especially true in the behavioral sciences, in which topics
# 2007 Cambridge University Press
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sometimes engender great controversy and demands for
censure, tenure revocation, and job termination (see,
e.g., Morton Hunt’s 1999 book describing social and behavioral scientists’ careers that have been impaired, including threats of tenure revocation). Slaughter (1980)
provides a historical analysis of the reasons behind job
termination during the early years following the onset of
academic freedom and tenure, cataloguing numerous
examples, and Hunt (1999), Gottfredson (2005a), and
others make the case that these pressures to reprimand
and terminate tenured positions are still present.
Recently, Gottfredson (2005a) reviewed the attacks on a
number of behavioral scientists conducting controversial
IQ research, observing that:
the farther one goes into forbidden territory, the more numerous and more severe the sanctions become: first the looks of
disapproval and occasional accusations of racism, then greater
difficulty getting promoted, funding, or papers published, and
eventually being shunned, persecuted, or fired. (p. 159)
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There are numerous examples of demands for censure,
tenure revocation, and job termination in response to
writings and teachings that offend conservative or liberal
audiences. Concerning the former, leftist professors have
repeatedly offended conservative colleagues, students,
parents, and lawmakers. They have been threatened with
censure and the revocation of tenure because of Marxist
interpretations in their teaching or writings (see Chronicle
of Higher Education 1987), for promulgating pro-choice
abortion views, and for expressing skepticism about organized religions (see examples in Sykes 1988). Liberal professors have been fired for advocating against involvement
in the United States’ war efforts, for criticizing the “reform
capitalism” of the New Deal, and for advocating against
corporate interests of university benefactors (Slaughter
1980). Recently, incendiary remarks about the culpability
of victims of the attack on the World Trade Center towers
resulted in a legislative initiative to limit a University
of Colorado professor’s tenure and academic freedom,
which, according to a Time Magazine story describing
similar legislative initiatives in other states, is “indicative
of a broader trend among lawmakers’ chipping away at
the traditional insularity of the ivory tower” (Chu 2005,
p. 38). And, comments considered anti-Semitic made
by Black Studies Professor and Chair, Leonard Jeffries,
resulted in the termination of his chairmanship and an
inquiry into whether his tenure should be revoked; this
in turn prompted Jeffries to sue, alleging a violation of
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his First Amendment rights (see Leonard Jeffries vs.
Bernard Harleston [1995]). Finally, Hunt (1999) describes
attacks made by religious fundamentalist groups to cripple
research they regard as intrinsically liberal, such as surveys
dealing with adolescent sexuality.
On the other side of the political spectrum (i.e., conservative writings and teachings that offend liberal
audiences), the writings and teachings of Arthur Jensen
and J. Philippe Rushton were met with outcries
and demands for job termination, as were the writings of
Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray (see Gottfredson
[2005b] and Hunt [1999, p. 86] for details of the threat of
tenure revocation against Rushton). More recently, the
views of evolutionary psychologist Kevin MacDonald
(1994; 1998a; 1998b) about the alleged evolutionary strategies of Judaism that led to its putative genetic sameness
(urge to remain endogamous) resulted in protests and
calls for reprimand and McDonald’s resignation (Ortega
2000).
At present, Hans-Hermann Hoppe is suing the University of Nevada for abridgment of his academic freedom.
Hoppe opined during two lectures that some groups
have a short-term time frame whereby they attempt
to maximize rewards over the near term because they
either have no long-term perspective or their gene pools
end with their life. He listed children, the elderly, and
homosexuals as groups preferring present-day consumption to long-term investment. “Because homosexuals
generally do not have children,” Hoppe said, “they feel
less need to look toward the future. . . . Homosexuals
have higher time preferences, because life ends with
them” (Glenn 2005, p. 2). A student in Hoppe’s class complained to the administration, resulting in a “letter of
instruction” being placed in Hoppe’s personnel file that
declared Hoppe had created a “hostile learning environment” and instructed him to “cease mischaracterizing
opinion as objective fact.”
Numerous other examples of abridgment of speech or
writings also can be given. For example, Michael Levin, a
tenured professor, expressed in his writings and public statements controversial ideas about feminism, homosexuality,
and race. Levin’s writings and statements led to protests
and demonstrations in his classes. In response to the resulting campus unrest, the university president named a faculty
committee “to review the question of when speech . . .
may go beyond the protection of academic freedom or
become conduct unbecoming a member of the faculty, or
some other form of misconduct.” In addition, the dean of
Levin’s college established “shadow sections” for Levin’s
required introductory course because of his controversial
and, to some, offensive views. Students were given the
option of enrolling in a newly opened second section of
Levin’s course taught by a different professor. Levin
brought suit on first amendment freedom of speech
grounds (see Michael Levin v. Bernard Harleston [1990]).
1.1. Attacks on tenure

Although the behavioral and social sciences appear more
likely to engender political criticisms, tenure and academic
freedom in all fields of scholarship have come under attack
for financial and conceptual reasons. This assault has
prompted the argument that the very ideas of tenure
and academic freedom are conceptually problematic and
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can result in inflexibility and inefficiency (see Hohm &
Shore 1998; Olswang 2003). Taken together, these political, financial, and conceptual criticisms have reached a
thunderous chorus, leading scholars in a special issue of
the American Behavioral Scientist to remark that “at no
other time throughout this century has tenure been as
much under attack as it is today” (Tierney 1998, p. 627),
and “external critics [are] reaching a crescendo of complaint that may trivialize tenure” (Plate 1998, p. 680),
which many view as a sinecure for the lazy and incompetent (Olswang 2003).
Defenders of academic freedom and tenure have
responded to criticisms by noting the many benefits they
convey. For instance, defenders of tenure and academic
freedom have noted their usefulness in attracting a highquality workforce, the protection they confer against
McCarthy-type intrusions into research (historically,
professors lost their jobs for teaching evolutionary
theory and for criticizing free trade, monopolies, child
labor, and military matters during wartime; Slaughter
1980), and their positive effects on students, such as
higher graduation rates at institutions that have higher proportions of tenure-track faculty (Ehrenberg & Zhang 2004;
Hohm & Shore 1998).
However, one issue currently lacking attention from
both defenders and detractors is whether tenure and academic freedom continue to serve their original mission.
From the inception of tenure in 1940 (American Association of University Professors, 1940), the case was made
that “the common good depends on the free search for
truth and its free expression . . . academic freedom
applies to both teaching and research” (Fuchs 1997,
p. 138). Since then, commentators have repeatedly
echoed this sentiment (Huer 1991). For example:
[tenure] enables a faculty member to teach, study, and act free
from . . . restraints and pressures which otherwise would
inhibit thought and action.’ (Byse & Joughin 1959, p. 128)

and
“the professor must follow any bold, vigorous, independent
train of thought to produce honest judgment and independent
criticism.” (Machlup 1958, p. 130)

In view of its original mission, and the subsequent re-echoing of this mission by numerous commentators, it is
curious that there exist no data illuminating the extent to
which tenure and academic freedom serve their original
purpose. To examine this question, we conducted the
first survey of faculty opinions about whether tenure continues to promote “honest judgment and independent criticism,” key elements of the essence of academic freedom.

1.2. Is academic freedom deﬁned differently across
ﬁelds and ranks?

In the present study, we have sought to answer a set of
related questions, such as whether tenured professors
are more likely than untenured ones to believe their colleagues will insist on the right to teach and research controversial topics and to criticize senior colleagues who
violate ethical standards. We ask: Are tenured associate
professors as likely as full professors to believe this, or
are they wary of offending full professors lest their own
promotion to full professor be jeopardized? Do fields of
research and types of institutions make a difference in

one’s willingness to insist on academic freedom? Are
there unanticipated negative consequences that arise
from the present system of tenure and academic
freedom, at least under some circumstances? Finally, is
academic freedom defined differently by junior and
senior faculty, or are its tenets universally appreciated
and applied?
To address these questions, we asked faculty from the
academic fields of the arts/humanities, behavioral/social
sciences, and physical/engineering sciences to answer
questions about hypothetical colleagues who encountered
dilemmas concerning (a) the freedom to teach unpopular
courses, (b) the freedom to research controversial topics,
and (c) the freedom to expose wrong-doing by senior colleagues (i.e., sexual harassment, inappropriate use of grant
funds, falsification of data). The hypothetical colleagues
were depicted as being either tenured full and associate
professors, or untenured assistant professors. Respondents were asked to indicate how their typical colleagues
at this rank would behave, rather than how they themselves might behave. A number of variables were manipulated in an effort to examine the roles of gender, rank of
respondent, type of institution, and academic field.
1.3. Ratings of others versus ratings of one’s self

The decision to ask respondents to indicate how their colleagues would behave versus asking them how they personally would behave was one we discussed with survey
methodologists during the design phase of the survey.
On the one hand, asking respondents how they believed
their colleagues would behave requires that they have an
accurate idea of how their colleagues would behave,
whereas it could be argued that they possess a more accurate idea of how they themselves would behave. Research
on behavioral forecasting and personal biases demonstrates, however, that often this is not the case. A graver
problem is that in moral, emotion-laden, and performance
domains, respondents underestimate their shortcomings
(e.g., Tenbrunsel 1998), and tend to underreport negative
information about themselves to researchers. Researchers
who study biases of various sorts have long noted that
people judge themselves as more ethical than the rest
of the population. When respondents are asked to estimate
their own behavior, as opposed to the behavior of others,
they tend to inflate their own status or behavior. For
example, students report that their SAT scores are
higher than they are – a finding similar to that found for
reports of health status, criminal acts, and illicit sexual
behavior (Shepperd 1993; for review, see Taylor &
Brown 1988). In a series of studies, Epley and Dunning
(2000; 2004) demonstrated that people inflate estimates
of their own ethical behavior but accurately estimate
other people’s ethical behavior. They found that people’s
self-predictions of whether they would cooperate, donate
money to a charity, or sacrifice their time were inflated.
Predictions of others, in general, were largely accurate, a
finding that replicates classic work by social psychologists
showing that people predict the behavior of others quite
well (Nisbett & Kunda 1985), and often better than they
predict their own behavior (e.g., Bass & Yammarino
1991; Fussell & Krauss 1991; MacDonald & Ross 1999).
A final reason for preferring respondents’ beliefs about
how their colleagues would behave is that beliefs
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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themselves, even if inaccurate, are nevertheless important:
one’s beliefs signal implicit theories about the likelihood
that ethical misconduct will or will not be tolerated by
colleagues, whether or not the culture of the academy is
one in which academic freedom is invoked, and so on. In
short, beliefs about our colleagues tell us a great deal
that is of interest to the present question.
2. Methodology
2.1. Sample

Twenty-five institutions were randomly selected from the
2003 U.S. News and World Report’s list of the top 50
liberal arts colleges, and 25 institutions were randomly
selected from the same list’s top 50 research universities.
The former colleges are regarded as elite and competitive
educational establishments, and the latter universities are
all classified as doctoral-extensive institutions by the
Carnegie Foundation and are regarded as being among
the top U.S. research institutions. We focused exclusively
on U.S. institutions because the justification of tenure as a
means of fostering academic freedom is most explicit in
the United States. However, as we argue in the Discussion,
we believe the findings are relevant to other national
systems that endorse academic freedom in the absence
of tenure, or provide tenure in the absence of an explicit
endorsement of academic freedom.
For each of these 50 institutions, we compiled a list of
18 academic fields. We based our choice of these 18
fields on pragmatic grounds: we began with the National
Research Council’s (NRC’s) 1995 listing of “Research Programs in the United States,” which lists 41 major fields; we
then deleted from this list those fields that appeared too
infrequently across the sample of 50 colleges and universities (e.g., classics, art history, oceanography, geography,
pharmacology). For similar reasons, we combined the biological sciences into a “super field” that included all seven
biological science fields listed by the NRC, and we did the
same for the eight engineering fields listed by the NRC.
This division was done because some of the individual
fields appeared too infrequently across our sample to
enable statistical analysis. Table 1 shows the resultant 18
fields; they represent six fields from the humanities/arts,
six from the sciences/engineering, and six from the
social/behavioral sciences.
For each of the 50 institutions, we selected three faculty
members from each of the 18 fields in Table 1: one from
the assistant professor rank, one from the associate professor rank, and one from the full professor rank. This
was done randomly within ranks, without regard to
gender or years in rank.

2.2. Instrument

We sent, via the Internet, one of three versions of a letter
requesting respondents to answer questions related to five
scenarios, each containing four parts, on a 9-point Likert
scale, with half formatted as 1 ¼ NEVER, 3 ¼ RARELY,
5 ¼ SOMETIMES, 7 ¼ OFTEN, and 9 ¼ ALWAYS,
and the other half with the numerals and ratings reflexed
to avoid response bias. The three versions of the letter
were constructed by varying the rank of the professor
described in the questions (assistant, associate, or full professor). We requested respondents’ confidential opinions
about the way their colleagues would typically behave in
the five scenarios offered, pledging anonymity for the professors and their institutions. No personally identifying
information was requested of the participants other than
their own rank, the number of years they had been in
that rank, their primary field of study, and their gender.
Respondents were asked to rate each option on the following 1-to-9 scale, using intermediate numbers to indicate
intermediate responses.
How frequently would the typical assistant [associate/
full] professor do what is described in each option?
1 ¼ would
3 ¼ would
5 ¼ would
7 ¼ would
9 ¼ would

NEVER do
RARELY do
SOMETIMES do
OFTEN do
ALWAYS do

If after several weeks we received no reply to our initial
e-mail, we sent a reminder to that individual. If there
was still no response after 2 months, we sent the second
and final reminder. Table 2 shows the five scenarios,
with four subparts in each.
Thus, we sent the 20-item questionnaire (five scenarios
with four parts each) to 2,700 potential respondents
(50 institutions  3 ranks  18 academic fields). Nine
hundred and sixty-one of those who were sent our
survey responded with complete data, yielding an overall
response rate of 36%. Response rates varied by academic
field, with the highest rates coming from the arts/humanities and social sciences (both 38%) and the lowest rate
from physical sciences/engineering (31%). Full professors
(43%) were more likely to respond than were associate
professors (35%), who, in turn, were more likely to
respond than were assistant professors (28%). Respondents from large universities and small colleges did not
differ in response rate (both 36%).
Next we discuss three potential sources of response bias,
any one of which could call into question our interpretation of the main findings of the experimental survey. Following this discussion, we turn to the results of the survey.
The results are organized in terms of the four options for

Table 1. Three major fields with six academic areas that were sampled within each

Arts/humanities

English

History

Linguistics/
languages

Philosophy

Literature

Music

Social sciences

Psychology

Sociology

Economics

Anthropology

Political science

Physical/engineering

Physics

Chemistry

Biology

Computer science

Mathematics

Supplemental social
sciences
Supplemental physical/
engineering sciences
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Table 2. Respondents were asked what the typical colleague would do in each of the following five scenarios, rating the likelihood of the
four options beneath each dilemma
Question 1
Questions Assistant (Associate/
Full) Professor B is
considering
teaching a new
course that several
of B’s senior
colleagues frown
upon. What would
the typical assistant
(associate/full)
professor in B’s
position do?

Options

Try to make content
more acceptable to
senior colleagues.
Teach the course as
originally planned.
Try to reach
compromise with
senior faculty.
Forget about teaching
the unpopular
course.

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Assistant (Associate/
Assistant (Associate/
Assistant (Associate/
Full) Professor Y
Full) Professor K is
Full) Professor S
heard a senior
considering
has credible
colleague boast that
submitting an
evidence that a
she had relocated a
article on a
senior colleague has
$700 espresso
controversial,
been having a sexual
maker, purchased
unpopular,
relationship with a
with grant funds for
politically-charged
woman in his
office use, to her
topic about which K
undergraduate
home. What would
has been discreetly
class. What would
the typical assistant
collecting data.
the typical assistant
What would the
(associate/full)
(associate/full)
professor in S’s
professor in Y’s
typical assistant
position do?
position do?
(associate/full)
professor in K’s
position do?
Report colleague to
Reframe the approach
Put pamphlet in his
the grants oversight
to make it less
mailbox on the
officer.
objectionable to
university sexual
critics.
abuse policy.
Keep quiet.
Keep quiet.
Forget about it and
stop further work
on the topic.
Tell federal grant
Hold onto it until
Make a formal
officer.
some later time.
complaint to the
chair.
Confront him.
Confront him.
Submit it.

each of the five scenarios. Each of these 20 findings is
preceded by a synopsis before we delve into the myriad
specific statistical findings.
2.3. Evaluation of two potential sources
of response bias

Before describing the main findings of this experimental
survey, we address two aspects of the methodology that
could have led to biases in the results. First, as a check
on the possibility that the 36% of faculty who responded
were somehow different from the 64% who did not, we
also surveyed a group of 48 faculty (half assistant professors and half full professors), chosen randomly from
the same pool of institutions and in the same randomized
manner as the larger sample was chosen. We offered each
of these 48 faculty $35 to answer the same 20 questions,
and this survey yielded a response rate of 90% (43 out of
48). This paid sample was recruited to assess whether
the 961 professors who responded to the first wave of
our survey were different in their attitudes regarding the
questions on this survey compared with the 64% who
did not respond. The 90% response rate among the paid
sample enabled us to compare the values derived from
the non-paid sample of 961 persons with values that
approximated the statistics in the event that all 100%
responded.

Question 5
Assistant (Associate/
Full) Professor G
has discovered that
a senior colleague in
G’s department has
published falsified
data. What would
the typical assistant
(associate/full)
professor in G’s
position do?

Report it to the
university’s
research officer.
Tell the chair.

Ignore it.

Confront the
colleague.

The two distributions (the one based on the 36%
response rate, and the one based on the 90% response
rate) for each of the 20 question-means were almost identical. This indicates that there was little or no response bias
relevant to our questions in the 36% sample, because very
similar values would be obtained as the response rate
approached 100%. There were 40 values derived from
the 90% sample – 20 for assistant professors and 20 for
full professors, means for answering 20 questions. The
40 values were, in all but one case, very similar to the 40
distributions derived from the 36% sample: 39 of the 40
sample means fell within the 95% confidence intervals of
the means from the 36% sample, differing in all cases by
less than .3 scaled score. (The sole value that fell outside
the 95% confidence intervals differed by .6 scaled score,
t(39, 55) ¼ 2.448, p ¼ .019, but even this value fell
short of the p , .0025 Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons, resulting in no exceptions differing significantly from the 36% distribution.)
Moreover, as a very conservative adjustment, we
replaced the missing 10% of respondents from the 90%
paid sample with the most extreme values possible if
those missing 10% had responded (1’s and 9’s) and
found that 39 out of 40 adjusted means continued to fall
within the 95% confidence intervals of the non-paid
sample. This provides evidence that the 36% response
rate reflected the same attitudes that would be found
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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if the response rate was 100%. Thus, the 36% sample did
not appear to reflect response biases because it resembled
what would be found if all potential respondents had responded. Because of this, we folded these 43 responses in
with the original 961, yielding a final sample size of 1,004.
Second, we examined another potential source of bias,
this one having to do with assumptions about the relationship between rank and tenure. All assistant professor
respondents were untenured (we were able to verify
this), whereas all full professors were tenured. Although
we assume that almost 100% of associate professors were
tenured, we were not able to verify this because at some
institutions associate professors may still be untenured.
However, if any associate professors in the sample were
still untenured, they had to be very few because untenured
faculty in the academic departments (all respondents were
from “named” disciplinary departments rather than
research centers or institutes within the universities) at
these universities are almost never kept in their jobs
after 10 years, five or more of which are spent as assistant
professors. By taking the subsample of institutions that
have untenured associate professors, and within this subsample, those at the associate professor rank, and deleting
those with more than five years at the rank of associate
professor, we are left with only 6 out of 351 respondents
at the associate professor rank who could possibly be untenured. Recoding these six respondents as untenured did
not alter any of the results that follow. Thus, for ease of
exposition, in all of the analyses that follow it is assumed
that assistant professors were untenured, and associate
and full professors were nearly always tenured.
3. Results
Two of the scenarios in the questionnaire address potential
associations among tenure, rank, and discipline, on the one
hand, and faculty members’ beliefs about the willingness of
their colleagues to exercise their academic freedom, on the
other hand. Specifically, these scenarios concern faculty
members’ (1) willingness to teach a class that is unpopular
with senior colleagues, and (2) willingness to publish
unpopular opinions. Both of these issues are at the heart
of the historical rationale for academic freedom (Byse &
Joughin 1959; Fuchs 1997). The three remaining dilemmas
go beyond the concept of academic freedom and assess
faculty members’ (3) willingness to report ethical violations
in the use of federal grant funds, (4) willingness to whistleblow a senior colleague’s falsification of data, and (5) willingness to report a senior colleague’s sexual misconduct
with an undergraduate student in his or her class. These
latter three topics were included to determine whether
the granting of tenure, professorial rank, and/or academic
field are associated with a greater versus lesser willingness
to whistle-blow upon the discovery of ethical misconduct,
or if in fact tenure was associated with the “renegade professor” claims put forward by some critics. For example,
Sykes (1988) argues that tenured professors hold the
university in “a petrified grip” to protect their self-interests
against those of students, untenured faculty, and society:
“tenure corrupts, enervates, and dulls higher education.
It is, moreover, the academic culture’s ultimate control
mechanism to weed out the idiosyncratic, the creative,
and the nonconformist” (p. 258).
558
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Each of the five scenarios offered was followed by 7 to 9
options, of which 4 were tests of the hypothesis that the
granting of tenure/rank is associated with changes in
professional and personal behaviors, with the remaining
options serving as distractors. As noted, this strategy
resulted in 20 questions overall.
We turn now to the major findings for each of these five
scenarios, supported by both linear and logistic models,
with simple effects within each model buffered for
multiple contrasts.
4. Question 1: Willingness to teach a class
unpopular with senior colleagues
Assistant (Associate/Full) Professor B is considering teaching a new course that several of B’s senior colleagues frown
upon. What would the typical assistant (associate/full)
professor in B’s position do?
Courses can be unpopular for a variety of reasons,
including scholarly (e.g., the belief that such a course
does not embody suitable scholarship), pedagogical (e.g.,
the belief that the course does not fit in the departmental
major), and ideological (e.g., the belief that the course runs
counter to a desired ideology/philosophy). We purposely
left unspecified the basis for the unpopularity of the
hypothetical course because all of these reasons are
covered by the tenets of academic freedom.
Respondents’ beliefs about the willingness of their
colleagues to teach a new course that is frowned upon
by senior colleagues revealed several significant results.
Below we report their ratings for each option as a function
of their own rank, the type of institution, the field of study,
and the rank of the hypothetical colleague described in the
questionnaire. Prior to describing more in-depth results,
Figure 1 illustrates the main findings regarding the
perceived likelihood of each option by questionnaire
type and respondent rank.
4.1. Option 1: Try to make the content more
acceptable to senior colleagues

For this option the only statistically significant result was that
all respondents, regardless of their own rank, type of institution, or field of study, expressed the belief that full

Figure 1 (Ceci et al.). Question 1: Willingness to teach a class
unpopular with senior colleagues.
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professors would be less inclined to make the content of their
course more acceptable than would either associate or assistant professors [F(2,904) ¼ 9.6, p , .001, v2 ¼ .021], neither
of whom differed from each other. This difference between
ranks of respondents, although statistically significant, was
moderate in magnitude. The overall mean rating associated
with respondents’ belief that full professors would use this
option less than lower-ranked professors was .6 point (4.9
vs. 5.5, where 5.0 is “sometimes” and 7 is “often”).
4.2. Option 2: Teach the course as originally planned

The above option (“Try to make the content more acceptable”) is somewhat weaker than this one, because it is possible to adapt a new course to be more acceptable without
giving up the basic idea. Choosing the current option,
however, creates a confrontation between senior colleagues who do not want to see a course taught, and a colleague insisting on teaching it without adapting its content
to appease senior colleagues. For this option there were
pronounced differences both as a function of respondents’
rank and as a joint function of respondents’ rank and the
rank of the hypothetical faculty member described in the
dilemma. Regarding the rank of the respondents, full
professors were more likely to choose this strong option
than were lower-ranked professors [F(2, 904) ¼ 5.3,
p , .005, v2 ˙ ¼ .013]. Collapsing across the rank of the
˙
respondents,
the likelihood of teaching the course as
planned, without adapting its content to make it more
acceptable to senior colleagues, was believed to be much
higher if the faculty member in the dilemma was described
as a full professor than as an associate or assistant professor
[both Fs(2, 904)  108, p , .0001, v2 ¼ .193].
The means are telling, as seen in Figure 2: If the individual in the questionnaire was described as a full professor,
respondents opined that his or her likelihood of using this
option was 5.6. On the other hand, if the individual was
described as an associate professor, the likelihood
dropped a full scale point to 4.6, and if the individual
was described as an assistant professor, the likelihood of
using this option dropped to 3.4 (where 3 is “rarely”).
Each of these differences falls outside the upper and
lower 95% confidence bounds of the others, documenting
the chasm between the perceived power(lessness) associated with the three ranks.

Figure 2 (Ceci et al.).
planned.

Option 2: Teach the course as originally

Complicating the above main effects, however, was an
interaction between the rank of the respondent and the
rank of the hypothetical faculty member described in the
dilemma, F(4, 90) ¼ 11.7, p , .01, v2¼ ¼ .014. The
˙ for assistant and
source of this interaction was a tendency
associate professors to overestimate full professors’ willingness to teach the course as originally planned, without
making any changes to appease senior colleagues. Full
professor respondents believed that full professors would
use this strong option somewhat less often than lowerranked respondents believed full professors would use it.
Thus, the perception among lower-ranked respondents of
full professors’ willingness to insist on teaching an unpopular
course without adaptation is somewhat greater than full professors’ perception of their own rank’s willingness to teach
such a course. This same overestimation by lower-ranked
respondents of full professors’ insistence on asserting their
freedom was found repeatedly throughout the questions
that follow. It is not that full professors did not assert their
academic freedom more often than associate and assistant
professors, but rather, that they did not assert it quite as
strongly as the latter believed they would.
4.3. Option 3: Try to reach a compromise with senior
faculty

For this option, full professor respondents rated hypothetical
full professors to be significantly less likely to work toward a
compromise with their colleagues (mean ¼ 6.2, S.D. 1.8)
than they rated associate professors (mean ¼ 7.0, S.D.
1.53) or assistant professors (mean ¼ 7.0, S.D. 1.6), the
latter two groups not differing from each other. Associate
professors’ ratings mimicked this same belief in the lesser
willingness of hypothetical full professors to work toward a
compromise, but with slightly lower means (mean ¼ 6.0
for hypothetical full professors vs. 6.8 and 6.9 for lowerranked hypothetical professors). In contrast, assistant
professor respondents’ ratings showed a greater chasm
between their perception of full professors’ unwillingness
to compromise (mean ¼ 5.9, SD 1.98) and assistant
professors’ willingness (mean ¼ 7.3, SD 1.69): Thus, the
gap between the perceived willingness of professors to compromise was approximately .8 scale point higher than the
perception regarding perceived willingness of associate professors to do so (.9 gap) and 1.4 points higher than the
perception of assistant professors about other assistant
professors. Substantively, these mean differences are the
equivalent of stating that full professors are believed to exercise their freedom to teach an unpopular course “often,”
whereas lower-ranked professors are believed to do so only
somewhat more than “sometimes.” These findings were qualified by a higher-order interaction involving the rank of the
respondents and the rank of the hypothetical individual
described in the question, as well as the respondents’ disciplinary field, F(8,904) ¼ 2.54, p , .01, v2¼ ¼ .022. Simple
effects testing with a Bonferroni correction showed that
this three-way interaction was due to smaller disparities in
art/humanities respondents’ ratings of the likelihood of
using this option. Basically, there was less disparity among
the ratings of assistant professors in the arts/humanities,
who perceived full professors to be no less likely than
lower-ranked professors to use this option (mean ¼ 5.3,
5.1, 5.5, respectively, for their ratings of hypothetical full,
associate, and assistant professors), whereas assistant
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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professors in the sciences and the social sciences perceived
wide differences in the use of this option by full professors
versus lower-ranked professors (.9–1.4-point gaps).
4.4. Option 4: Forget about teaching the unpopular
course

For this option there were strong trends in the same direction seen in the three options above; namely, respondents
perceived senior colleagues as more likely to exercise their
academic freedom (i.e., less likely to forget about teaching
an unpopular course), F(2,904) ¼ 109, p , .001,
v2¼ ¼ .079). Overall, full professors were believed to be
much more likely to insist on their right to teach an unpopular course (mean ¼ 6.0) than were either of the two
hypothetical lower-ranked professors (mean ¼ 7.1 and
7.0, respectively), all p , .05 with Bonferroni correction.
There was also a main effect for disciplinary field
[F(2,904) ¼ 10.07, p , .001, v2¼.008]: Respondents
from the arts/humanities were slightly but reliably more
likely to insist on the right to teach an unpopular course
(mean ¼ 6.5) than were respondents from either the
sciences (mean ¼ 6.82) or social sciences (mean ¼ 6.81).
Finally, there was a statistically significant interaction
between the rank of the respondents and their disciplinary
field, F(2,904) ¼ 3.45, p , .01, v2¼ ¼ .015. Bonferroni
tests revealed that this interaction was the result of assistant professors in the arts/humanities differing significantly
from their counterparts in the sciences and social sciences;
overall, the arts/humanities professors were more likely to
perceive this option being chosen than were their counterparts (mean ¼ 6.2, 7.2, and 7.0, respectively).
5. Question 2: Willingness to report ethical
violations of senior colleagues
Assistant (Associate/Full) Professor Y overheard a senior
colleague boast that she had relocated a $700 espresso
maker, purchased with federal grant funds solely for
office use, to her home. What would the typical assistant
(associate/full) professor in Y’s position do?
5.1. Option 1: Report the colleague to the officer
responsible for oversight of federal grants
Few differences emerged on this option, as most respondents viewed it as low-frequency behavior. Full professor
and associate professor respondents chose this option
slightly more often (mean ¼ 2.72 and 2.63) than did assistant professors (mean ¼ 2.44; F[2,899] ¼ 3.84, p , .05,
v2¼ ¼ .008), but these differences were small. The only
other significant result was that respondents from small
colleges preferred this option more often than did those
from large research universities (mean ¼ 2.76 and 2.47,
respectively; F[1,899] ¼ 5.19, p , .05, v2¼ ¼ .006). No
other main effects or higher-order interactions were
significant.

Numerous differences emerged on this option. For ease
of exposition, we confine the reporting to a description
of a four-way interaction that qualified all of the statistically significant main effects and lower-order interactions.
The interaction involved the rank of respondent  rank of
person described in the dilemma  type of institution 
academic field [F(8,900) ¼ 2.15, p ¼ .029, v2¼ ¼ .019].
Simple-effects testing revealed the sources ˙of this interaction. Once again there was a tendency for the hypothetical full professors in the questionnaire to be rated as
being more likely to choose the strong option (i.e., not to
keep quiet) than hypothetical lower-ranked professors.
However, this tendency differed as a function of respondents’ own rank, type of institution, and academic field.
Respondents who were full professors opined that the
hypothetical assistant professors in the questionnaires
would be .8 of a scale point more likely to keep quiet
than hypothetical full professors in the questionnaires
(mean ¼ 4.7, 5.4, and 5.5, respectively for hypothetical
full, associate, and assistant professors). Associate and
assistant professor respondents also rated the likelihood
of keeping quiet to be greater among lower-ranked professors, but their ratings were in general higher than
those of full professors. This indicated that they believed
that colleagues of all ranks would be more reticent in a
situation such as this than did full professor respondents.
For example, assistant professor respondents rated the
likelihood of remaining quiet to be 5.9, 6.2, and 6.6,
respectively, for hypothetical full, associate, and assistant
professors. And associate professors rated these three
ranks with a mean of 5.5, 5.7, and 5.9, respectively.
Thus, assistant professors were of the opinion that all
ranks of professors would “often” remain quiet, whereas
full professors believed that all ranks would “sometimes”
remain silent. (Although the above results differed by
field of scholarship and type of institution, university
[but not small college] respondents from the social
sciences expressed the belief that their colleagues would
be more likely to remain quiet than did respondents
from either the arts/humanities or the physical sciences.
These contrasts failed to reach conventional levels of
significance when buffered for multiple contrasts.)
This is one of the few exceptions to the tendency for
lower-ranked respondents to overestimate the willingness
of full professors to assert themselves.
5.3. Option 3: Confront the colleague

The sole significant result for this option was that all
respondents, regardless of rank, type of institution, or
field of study, opined that all colleagues would be unlikely
to confront the wrong-doer. However, all expressed the
belief that full professors would be more likely to confront
a wrong-doer than would either of the lower ranks
[F(2,900) ¼ 71.7, p ¼ .0001, v2¼ ¼ .137]. Despite its statistical reliability, however, the magnitude of this difference
was rather small – only .3 to .4 of a scale point separating
full professors from associate and assistant professors.
5.4. Option 4: Tell the federal grant ofﬁcer

5.2. Option 2: Keep quiet

This option is the flip side of the strong option of confronting the wrong-doer – keeping one’s mouth shut.
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as quite unlikely, opining that their colleagues would
report the infraction to a grant officer with a frequency
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Figure 3 (Ceci et al.). Question 2: Willingness to report ethical
violations of senior colleagues.

between “rarely” and “never.” There was, however, a statistically significant institutional difference, F(1,899) ¼ 6.89,
p ¼ .009, v2¼ ¼ .008, with small college respondents using
this option slightly more often than large university respondents (mean ¼ 2.5 vs. 2.2). However, this main effect was
qualified by a significant interaction involving rank of
respondent  rank of hypothetical colleague described in
the questionnaire [F(4,899) ¼ 2.5, p ¼ .04, v2¼ ¼ .011]. In
˙
general, senior colleagues tended to believe
that lowerranked faculty would be more likely to exercise this strong
action (report the errant colleague) than did lower-ranked
faculty. However, associate professors were viewed by full
professor respondents as being significantly more likely
to report the infraction at small colleges (mean ¼ 2.82) compared to large universities (mean ¼ 1.79). Figure 3 summarizes responses for this question, showing that differences
tended to be small between ranks, almost always between
.25 and .75 scaled point.
6. Question 3: Willingness to report sexual
misconduct
Assistant (Associate/Full) Professor S has uncovered credible evidence that a senior colleague in S’s department has
been having a sexual relationship with an undergraduate
woman in his class. What would the typical assistant
(associate/full) Professor in S’s position do?
6.1. Option 1: Put a pamphlet in his mailbox describing
the university’s sexual harassment policy

In substantive terms, respondents believed that colleagues
would only rarely place a pamphlet describing the university’s policy of sexual misconduct in an errant colleague’s
mailbox (means fell within the 2.5–4.2 range). There was
a first-order interaction involving the rank of the hypothetical faculty member described in the dilemma  the
respondents’ academic field [F(4,899) ¼ 3.3, p ¼ .01,
v2¼ ¼ .015], and also a marginally statistically significant
interaction involving rank of respondent  respondents’
academic field [F(4,899) ¼ 2.2, p ¼ .07, v2¼ ¼ .01]. The
source of these interactions was a greater belief among
physical scientists/engineers and arts/humanities faculty
that full professors would put a pamphlet in the errant

colleague’s mailbox than was true of social science respondents (mean ¼ 4.1, 4.1, and 3.3, respectively). Assistant
professor respondents from the social sciences and
physical/engineering sciences opined that full professors
would be more likely to put a pamphlet in the mailbox
than did their counterparts from the arts/humanities
(mean ¼ 3.7, 3.7, and 3.3, respectively). Finally, there
was a marginal main effect of gender [F(1,933) ¼ 1.05,
p ¼ .056, v2¼ ¼ .004]. Male respondents rated the likelihood of putting a pamphlet in the wrong-doer’s mailbox
.3 scaled-score point lower than did female respondents
(mean ¼ 3.6 vs. 3.9). No other effects involving gender
were statistically significant. Note that although it would
have been interesting to contrast female and male respondents in their beliefs about the relative likelihood of
females versus males putting a pamphlet in the wrongdoer’s mailbox, we were unable to do this. Many fields in
science/engineering have too few females at each rank to
make the hypothetical rating exercise ecologically realistic.
6.2. Option 2: Keep quiet

Overall, respondents felt that their colleagues would “sometimes” keep quiet about the sexual misconduct (grand
mean ¼ 4.5). However, this finding was differentiated by
three factors: the rank of the respondent, the rank of the
hypothetical colleague described in the questionnaire, and
the respondent’s academic field [F(8,904) ¼ 2.6, p ¼ .008,
v2¼ ¼ .023]. This complex interaction can best be understood as two countervailing two-way interactions involving
the rank of the respondent  rank of the hypothetical colleague described in the questionnaire – one for arts/humanities respondents and a different one for science/
engineering and social science respondents. For respondents from the arts/humanities fields, there was a fairly pronounced disparity between the ratings of one’s own rank
versus other ranks. Assistant professors opined that it
would be unlikely for their junior colleagues to keep quiet
in the face of knowledge about sexual misconduct
(mean ¼ 3.2; i.e., “rarely keep quiet”), while simultaneously
opining that their senior colleagues would be more likely to
keep quiet (mean ¼ 6.0; i.e., between “sometimes keep
quiet” and “often keep quiet”). In contrast, full professors
tended to rate junior and senior colleagues more similarly,
though opining that junior would be slightly more likely
to keep quiet than would be their senior colleagues
(mean ¼ 5.2 and 4.3, respectively, for full professor ratings
of junior vs. senior colleagues). Respondents from the
fields of science/engineering and social science were more
likely to rate junior and senior colleagues similarly. Analysis
of gender showed a statistically significant main effect
[F(1,938) ¼ 4.0, p ¼ .045, v2¼ ¼ .004], as a result of male
˙
respondents choosing “keeping
quiet” .3 of a scaled-score
point higher than did female respondents (mean ¼ 4.7 vs.
4.4). No other differences involving gender were significant.
6.3. Option 3: Make a formal complaint to the chair

Overall, respondents opined that colleagues would file
a formal complaint with the chair somewhere in the
vicinity of “sometimes.” Analysis of this option revealed a
statistically significant higher-order interaction involving
the rank of the respondent, the rank of the hypothetical
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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colleague described in the questionnaire, the type of
institution (small college vs. large research university),
and the respondent’s academic field, F(8,906) ¼ 1.97,
p .05, v2¼ ¼ .017. Simple-effects tests showed that the
source of this interaction was a trend among some fields
for senior raters to rate senior colleagues as more willing
to file a formal complaint than were junior colleagues
when the wrong-doer was a senior member of the department. Science/engineering respondents from small colleges rated senior colleagues as significantly more likely
to make a formal complaint than were junior colleagues
(mean ¼ 1.4 scale point difference, p , .01); this was
also true of full professors in the arts/humanities from
small colleges (mean ¼ 1.3 scaled-point difference in the
perceived likelihood of a senior vs. junior colleague filing
a formal complaint). Social science respondents from
both small and large institutions did not differ, though
the disparity in social scientists’ perceptions of senior
versus junior behavior was not as large (.5 scaled score)
as the disparity in perceptions of senior versus junior behavior observed for science/engineering and arts/humanities respondents. Analysis of gender revealed that
female respondents, on average, believed that making a
formal complaint was approximately a half-scale point
more likely than did male respondents, F(1,940) ¼ 8.9,
p ¼ .003, v2¼ ¼ .009. No other effects involving gender
were statistically significant.
6.4. Option 4: Confront him

Confronting the wrong-doer is the strongest stance one can
take when a colleague has violated a code of ethics. Unsurprisingly, it is an option that respondents believed would be
used by their colleagues only between “rarely” and “sometimes.” Raters of all ranks expressed the opinion that junior
colleagues would be significantly less likely to confront a
senior colleague about sexual misconduct than would a
senior colleague, and the magnitude of these differences
was large, often as much as two entire scale points (for
junior colleagues ranging between “rarely” and “never,”
mean ¼ 2.3–2.7; for senior colleagues ranging between
“rarely” and “sometimes,” mean ¼ 3.9–4.7). This finding
was qualified by the presence a significant interaction
between of the rank of the person depicted in the
questionnaire  the rank of the rater  the type of institution (small vs. large)  the rank of the person depicted
in the questionnaire  rank of rater [F(4,905) ¼ 2.43,
p ¼ .05, v2¼ ¼ .011]. In short, this interaction resulted
from two instances in which the difference in associate professors’ ratings of the greater likelihood of senior colleagues
to confront than for junior colleagues to do so was relatively
smaller than was true of other ranks, both ps , .05 by
Tukey post hoc tests. Overall, men and women respondents
were quite similar in their belief that colleagues would confront a senior colleague who had engaged in sexual misconduct with a student between “rarely” and “sometimes,” with
means of 3.5 and 3.4 for men and women, respectively.
Although there was no main effect for gender of
respondent, there was a significant interaction involving
rank of respondent  rank of hypothetical colleague
described in the questionnaire  gender of respondent
[F(4,939) ¼ 2.6, p ¼ .04, v2¼ ¼ .011], resulting from a
number of uninteresting exceptions to the often-observed
trends reported throughout this manuscript (e.g., female
562
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misconduct.

Question 3: Willingness to report sexual

professor respondents rated confrontation as relatively
more likely by a hypothetical associate professor than by
either full professors or assistant professors, whereas
male professor respondents rated confrontation as relatively more likely by a hypothetical full professor than by
either associate professors or assistant professors).
Figure 4 depicts the magnitudes of the effects for all
four options. As can be seen, some of these effects were
quite large, particularly when contrasting hypothetical
assistant professors’ willingness to confront a sexual
miscreant with full professors’ willingness to do so.
7. Question 4: Willingness to publish unpopular
research
Assistant (Associate/Full) Professor K is considering
submitting for publication an article on a controversial,
unpopular, politically charged topic about which K has
been discreetly collecting data. What would the typical
assistant (associate/full) professor in K’s position do?
Research can be politically unpopular for a host of
reasons, some having to do with its actual political implications (liberal vs. conservative), and others having to do
with professional disagreements unrelated to politics in
the traditional sense. We purposely did not specify the
type of “politics” in the question because both invoke
the same academic freedom principle to speak and act
without constraint. Figure 5 illustrates the main findings.
As can be seen, full professors are seen as far more
likely to exercise strong options such as submitting the
work for publication (mean ¼ 4.3) than are assistant
professors (mean ¼ 2.6). Conversely, assistant professors
are perceived as far more likely to select weak options
such as forgetting about the work (mean ¼ 3.1) than are
full professors (mean ¼ 2.1). In the following subsections
we probe these main effects in greater detail.
7.1. Option 1: Hold onto it until some later time

In general, respondents believed that colleagues would only
“rarely” to “sometimes” hold onto a piece of scholarship
that was politically problematic. There were three main
results. First, collapsing across rank of the respondent,
when the questionnaire depicted a character who was an
assistant professor, he or she was opined to use this option
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7.3. Option 3: Reframe the approach to make it less
objectionable to potential critics

Figure 5 (Ceci et al.).
unpopular research.

Question 4: Willingness to publish

somewhat more frequently than when the questionnaire
depicted a character who was a more senior colleague
(means ¼ 3.5, 3.7, and 4.0, respectively, for full, associate, and assistant professors; F[2,881] ¼ 13.1, p ¼ .001,
v2¼ ¼ .029). Second, collapsing across rank of the character
depicted in the questionnaire, full professor and associate
professor respondents felt that their colleagues were less
receptive to using this option (means ¼ 3.4 and 3.6) than
were assistant professor respondents (mean ¼ 4.2). Thus,
there was a .8 scaled point separating the most senior and
junior colleagues on this option. Finally, respondents
working at small colleges believed this option would be
used more often than did their counterparts from large universities (means ¼ 3.9 and 3.6, respectively). Albeit small,
this difference was statistically significant, F(1,881) ¼ 5.5,
p ¼ .019, v2¼ ¼ .006.

7.2. Option 2: Forget about it and stop further work
on the topic

Once again we observed what was by now the expected
pattern; namely, the expressed belief that senior colleagues
are less willing to sacrifice their academic freedom than are
junior colleagues. When the character in the questionnaire
was depicted as an assistant professor, he or she was
believed to use this option (i.e., stop work on the topic)
more frequently than when the questionnaire character
was an associate or full professor [F(2,893) ¼ 14.8,
p ¼ .001, v2¼ ¼ .032]. In addition, respondents from
small colleges were marginally more likely to believe
that their colleagues would use this option than were
those from large universities [F(1,893) ¼ 14.8, p ¼ .054,
v2¼ ¼ .004]. These main effects were complicated by a
three-way interaction involving both factors with the
respondents’ field of research, F(4,893) ¼ 2.7, p ¼ .03,
v2¼ ¼ .012. Basically, this interaction was driven by
several aberrations from the above trends; specifically,
associate professors from scientific fields at large universities tended to rate this option higher than did both full
professors and assistant professors at large universities;
assistant professor respondents from arts/humanities
fields at small colleges also rated it higher than more
senior ranks at both small and large institutions, with
magnitudes ranging between .8 and 1.3 scaled points.

There were just two statistically significant trends for this
option: First, regardless of the rank of the respondent,
when the character in the questionnaire was depicted as
an assistant professor, he or she was believed to prefer
this option .5 scale point more than when the character
in the questionnaire was described as a full professor
(means ¼ 4.7 for full professor characters vs. 5.2 for
assistant professor characters; F[2,894] ¼ 4.9, p ¼ .008,
v2¼ ¼ .011). Second, independent of the rank of the character in the questionnaire, full professor respondents were
significantly less likely to choose this option (mean ¼ 4.7)
than were assistant professor respondents (mean ¼ 5.2;
F[2,894] ¼ 4.6, p ¼ .01, v2¼ ¼ .010). No other main
effects or interactions were statistically significant for
this option.
7.4. Option 4: Submit it

This is the strongest option for this question, and so it was
somewhat surprising that it was chosen relatively more
frequently than the strong options for other questions. For
this question, respondents believed that their colleagues
would choose this option close to “often.” There was a
significant interaction between rank of respondent  type
of institution (small college vs. large university)  academic
field, F(4,892) ¼ 4.0, p ¼ .01, v2¼ ¼ .018. The nature of
the interaction can be summarized as follows: Among
faculty at small colleges, choosing this option tended to
decrease as one moved from full-professor respondents
down to assistant-professor respondents, particularly
among those in the arts/humanities, where there was a
1.4 scale score difference between full professor respondents and assistant professor respondents (means ¼ 6.1
and 4.7, respectively). This tendency was smaller among
faculty respondents from large universities, where the
largest gap between full and assistant professors was .6.
8. Question 5: Blowing the whistle on data
falsification
Assistant (Associate/Full) Professor G has discovered that
a senior colleague in G’s department has published falsified
data. What would the typical assistant (associate/full)
professor in G’s position do?
As can be seen in Figure 6, the same pattern observed
for Question 4 is repeated here. Specifically, assistant professors are more likely to engage in weak behaviors such as
ignoring evidence of wrong-doing than are full professors,
and the reverse is true of strong tactics such as confronting
the wrong-doer, where the gap is slightly more than 2 full
scale points.
8.1 Option 1: Ignore it

There were a number of significant main effects and
lower-order interactions for this option, all of which
were qualified by a highly significant interaction involving
rank of respondent  rank of character depicted in the
questionnaire  type of institution  academic field,
F(8,903) ¼ 2.5, p ¼ .013, v2¼ ¼ .021. This interaction
was broken down with Tukey post hoc tests. The source
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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Tukey post hoc tests. The basis of this interaction was
that full professor respondents from the arts/humanities
fields at large universities were significantly less likely
to choose the option of telling their chair (mean ¼ 5.5)
than were respondents from the science/engineering
fields (mean ¼ 6.0) or social science fields (mean ¼ 6.7).
Full professor respondents at small colleges did not
differ by field (means ranging between 5.7 and 5.9).
8.3. Option 3: Report it to the university’s research
ofﬁcer

Figure 6 (Ceci et al.).
falsification.

Question 5: Blowing the whistle on data

of this four-way interaction was a host of significance tests
involving differences between various unsystematic combinations of levels of the four variables versus other combinations of levels. For example, associate professors from
the arts/humanities were less likely to choose this option
for characters depicted as associate professors than they
were for characters depicted as assistant professors,
whereas this was not the case for associate professors in
other fields, nor for full professors in any field with exception of those from small colleges; assistant professors from
large universities (but not small colleges) in scientific fields
chose this option significantly more often for other assistant professors than did assistant professors in other fields.
Once again we observed a strong trend for respondents
to believe that characters who were depicted as assistant
professors would choose this option significantly more
often than did associate and full professors (means ¼ 2.8,
3.3, and 3.9, respectively; all standard errors ranging
between .11 and .13, thus falling outside the 95% confidence intervals for each contrast). Similarly, collapsing
across all other variables, assistant professor respondents
were more likely to select this option than were associate
professors, who, in turn, were more likely to select it
than were full professors (means ¼ 2.9, 3.3, and 3.9, with
standard errors ranging between .11 and 14, all comparisons falling outside the 95% confidence intervals).
8.2. Option 2: Tell the chair

Once again there were a number of significant main effects
and lower-order interactions that resulted from the nonoverlapping means of full, associate, and assistant
professor respondents (all contrasts exceeding p , .05,
with full professors believed to be most likely to tell
the chair, independent of the rank of the character
depicted in the questionnaire), as well as the significantly
greater belief in the likelihood of telling the chair about a
senior colleague’s errant behavior when the character
depicted in the questionnaire was also a senior colleague
than if the character was depicted as belonging to
either of the lower ranks. These findings, however, were
qualified by a significant four-way interaction between
rank of respondents  rank in questionnaire  type of
institution  field of study, F(8,905) ¼ 2.2, p ¼ .025,
v2¼ ¼ .019. This interaction was broken down with
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There were three straightforward findings associated with
this option, two of which pointed to greater reluctance on
the part of junior colleagues to whistle-blow: First, as has
often been the case elsewhere in this survey, when the
character in the questionnaire was depicted as either an
assistant or associate professor, he or she was believed to
use this option less frequently (in this case by approximately .7 scaled score) than when the questionnaire character was depicted as a full professor [F(2,898) ¼ 9.9,
p ¼ .001, v2˙ ¼ .022]. (Assistant and associate professors
did not differ significantly from each other in choosing
this option.) Thus, junior colleagues were believed by
respondents to be reliably less likely to whistle-blow on a
senior colleague who falsified data than senior professors
would be. Second, collapsing across the rank of the
hypothetical character in the question, respondents who
were full professors were significantly more likely to
choose whistle-blowing than were either assistant or
associate
professor
respondents
[F(2,898) ¼ 7.2,
p ¼ .001, v2¼ ¼ .016]. Finally, respondents from large
universities were believed to be reliably less likely to
whistle-blow than were those from small colleges
(means ¼ 4.0 vs. 4.4, respectively; F[1, 898] ¼ 6.2,
p ¼ .013, v2¼ ¼ .007).
8.4. Option 4: Confront the colleague

As the strongest option, confronting an errant colleague
was deemed a tactic that would be chosen “sometimes.”
Two findings regarding this option were noteworthy.
First, respondents of all ranks opined that junior
colleagues would be far less likely to use this option
(“rarely”) than would senior colleagues (“sometimes”),
with nearly 2 entire scale points separating full professors
from the lower-ranked professors (means ¼ 5.1, 4.1,
and 3.2, respectively, in descending order of rank;
F[2,906] ¼ 85.2, p ¼ .001, v2¼ ¼ .158). Second, arts/
humanities respondents believed that their colleagues at
all ranks would be less likely to choose this option than
would respondents from the science/engineering and
social science fields, the latter of whom felt that this
was especially true of junior colleagues [F(2,898) ¼ 3.5,
p ¼ .032, v2¼ ¼ .008]. These two latter groups did not
differ from each other (F , 1.0). In addition, there was
an interaction between the rank of the character depicted
in the questionnaire  size of institution, F(2,898) ¼ 4.9,
p ¼ .008, v2¼ ¼ .011. This came about because, although
respondents from these two types of institutions did not
differ in their ratings of hypothetical full professors,
large university respondents rated the likelihood of
confrontation by associate and assistant professors as
lower than did small college respondents.
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9. Synopses of results
There were five main findings from this survey – the first
of its kind – of faculty beliefs about their colleagues’
attitudes toward academic freedom and misconduct.
9.1. Untenured assistant professors and tenured
associate professors believed their cohort
was less likely to insist on academic freedom
than the full professors’ cohort

Throughout the many hundreds of analyses it was repeatedly observed that full professors’ opinions regarding the
exercise of academic freedom by their peers differed significantly from assistant and associate professors’ opinions
about full professors. All ranks of faculty respondents
believed that lower-ranked faculty members were less
likely to teach courses disfavored by senior colleagues,
conduct controversial research, or whistle-blow unethical
behavior. The magnitude of the gaps separating them
from full professors was often large – a shift from belief
in doing something “never” to doing it “sometimes,” or
from doing it “rarely” to doing it “often.” However, full
professors believed that all faculty members would insist
on academic freedom far more often than did lowerranked professors, including tenured associate professors.
Compared with lower-ranked respondents, full professors
generally believed that exercising strong options, such as
confronting wrong-doers, teaching disfavored courses, or
publishing controversial findings, was more likely across
all ranks. In contrast, assistant and associate professors
believed that strong options would be exercised mainly
by full professors. Although full professors agreed with
assistant and associate professors that their rank would
be somewhat more likely to exercise academic freedoms,
they portrayed themselves as being much less likely to
exercise their academic freedoms than assistant and
associate professor respondents imagined them to be.
And full professors rated weaker options, such as ignoring
wrong-doing, as less likely to be used by everyone than did
junior colleagues. The magnitude of some of these differences was very large.
9.2. There was no support for the “post-tenure renegade
professor” hypothesis

Several commentators have claimed that, once tenured,
faculty become indifferent to the criticisms of colleagues,
work-adverse, and self-entitled even to the point of
valuing their own perquisites over the good of students
and untenured colleagues (Kimball 1990; Sykes 1988):
“Even in the better schools, a grant of tenure is often an
invitation to scale down or even retire from the arduous
business of creating knowledge” (Kimball 1990, p. 102).
“The renegade professor knows that every genuine
idea . . . is a subversive act within the academic culture”
that must be quashed (Sykes 1988, p. 264). Our study
was not designed to examine the first part of Sykes’s
claim; however, there was no support for the renegade
professor view. All faculty, including those with tenure,
were perceived as being reluctant to engage in activities
that ran counter to the wishes of colleagues. Even
tenured full professors believed their cohort would
invoke academic freedom only “sometimes,” rather than

“usually” or “always”; they chose confrontational options
“rarely,” albeit more often than did lower ranked
colleagues, and appeared more conciliatory (adapting
courses, trying to reach compromises with critics of their
research) than one might have anticipated in light of the
principles governing academic freedom. Their willingness
to self-limit may be the result of a desire for harmony and/
or respect for the criticisms of colleagues whose opinions
they value. Thus, the data did not support the depiction
of Professorus Americanus as unleashed renegade.
9.3. Full professors were not as brazen as junior faculty
believed, and lower-ranked professors were more
timid than full professors believed

Interestingly, lower-ranked faculty believed that full
professors would engage in stronger forms of expression
of academic freedom than full professors themselves
believed to be characteristic of colleagues at their rank.
For instance, for several of the scenarios, lower-ranked
respondents believed that full professors would choose
more confrontational options than full professors believed
would be chosen by their full professor colleagues.
Conversely, full professors believed that lower-ranked
professors would engage in stronger forms of academic
freedom than the latter believed was characteristic of colleagues at their rank. For example, full professor respondents often rated assistant professors a full scale point
higher than assistant professors believed their assistant
professor colleagues would act. In short, everyone
believed everyone else was braver than anyone believed
herself or himself to be.
9.4. The lure of tenure and promotion seems to have
muzzled lower-ranked professors, who were more
reluctant to report ethical misconduct and relatively
more willing to abandon unpopular teaching and
research

If such avoidant behavior ended when tenure was
awarded, it might still be cause for concern. However, as
seen, similar avoidant behavior, though at a somewhat
reduced level, was observed among tenured associate
professors, who were often reluctant to exercise academic
freedoms many years after receiving tenure. From its
genesis, tenure was intended to provide freedom to
teach and research unpopular ideas, yet associate professors in our study were almost always less likely to
insist on such freedoms than were full professors and
were closer in their ratings to untenured assistant professors than to tenured full professors. It is one thing for
an untenured faculty member to withdraw a course
because of dissatisfaction among senior colleagues; it is
another matter to observe associate professors, years
after they should have been freed from the forces of external control over teaching and research, abrogating their
academic freedom. Given that it can take 12 to 15
working years or more to become a full professor, this
“hush time” seems quite protracted. Critics have argued
the case that the academy’s system of evaluation militates
against the public interests that were enshrined in the
tenets of academic freedom, and has become self-serving
for senior professors at the expense of those below them.
The results of the present study do provide some
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support for this criticism, depicting lower-ranked professors at the mercy of senior faculty, and rendering
academic freedom a somewhat relative concept (Sykes
1988, p. 137), even if the senior professors are unaware
they exert such pressures on their lower-ranked
colleagues.
9.5. Results were consistent across academic ﬁelds,
types of institutions, and genders

Across the many hundreds of linear and logistic analyses
we conducted, the conclusions were consistent for men
and women, physical scientists, social scientists, humanists, and respondents from large and small institutions.
When differences between genders or academic fields or
institutions occurred, they tended to be small and nonsystematic. In some ways, this was the most surprising
result. It underscores the pervasiveness of the academic
culture: Being a tenured or tenure-track faculty member
is associated with a set of values and beliefs that seems
to be independent of type of institution, academic discipline, or gender, with a few exceptions that showed
rather small effect sizes. It bears noting, however, that
had we surveyed other geographic regions and other
types of institutions (e.g., religious, small low-status,
state vs. private), the results may have been less uniform.
This hypothesis will require even larger-scale efforts
than the present study to examine.
10. Discussion
It has been ninety years since the American Association of
University Professors and the American Association of
Colleges formulated the modern U.S. notion of tenure
and academic freedom in their 1915 joint statement, but,
as Fuchs (1997) has asserted, “the freedom of individual
faculty members against control of thought or utterance
from either within or without the employing institutions
still remains the core of the matter” (p. 147). In this
study, we examined the extent to which this core
aspect of tenure – freedom against control of thought or
utterance – extends to two kinds of behavior: the
freedom to teach and research unpopular ideas, and the
freedom to whistle-blow in the face of ethical misconduct.
The results of this survey of U.S. faculty at top-ranked colleges and universities, across a broad range of disciplines
and ranks, indicate that two groups of tenure-track faculty – untenured assistant professors and tenured associate
professors awaiting promotion to full professor – appear
to defer some aspects of their academic freedom, presumably out of concern that exercising this freedom might
result in negative consequences for their career advancement. The effect sizes associated with several of the findings were fairly large and reflected non-overlapping
distributions of answers between the responses of full professors and those of their lower-ranking colleagues. Substantively, this difference translates to an entire scale
point or more separating the beliefs of full professors
from those of their lower-ranked colleagues, tantamount
to a shift in central tendency from “rarely” engaging in
some behavior to engaging in it “sometimes,” or from
engaging in it “sometimes” to engaging in it “often.”
These variations strike us as large differences in group
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beliefs. If one group of professors believes their colleagues
will rarely confront wrong-doing, for example, while
another group believes they will confront it often, this
could lead to significant group differences in behavior –
even if the beliefs are ill-founded.
Although tenure and academic freedom are viewed
differently in many countries, we believe these U.S. findings will be relevant to at least some other national
systems, including the Canadian system, which shares
many of the features of the U.S. system, and the British
and German systems. For instance, the Education
Reform Act (1988) stipulated that all academics at universities in the United Kingdom whose appointments and
promotions took place after November 1987 would no
longer have tenure. The Act does not appear intended to
undermine academic freedom, however, specifying that
it “shall . . . ensure that academic staff have freedom
within the law to question and test received wisdom, and
to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular
opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of
losing their jobs or privileges” (Farrington 1994, p. 228).
Thus, in the U.K. system, the concept of academic
freedom is endorsed in the absence of tenure. And yet,
because faculty research productivity and impact is evaluated, and funding is tied to these evaluations, it is imaginable that pressures to conduct certain types of research
that are rated as more valuable may be implicit, as
various British colleagues have suggested to us. At
German universities, fixed-term assistant professors are
directly supervised by tenured full professors, who also
are the primary advisors for their habilitation project
(akin to a second doctorate). Thus, the relationship
between tenure and academic freedom is more complicated, though our U.S. findings should, if anything, be
even more salient in that country (because of the longer
wait in Germany for first tenure).
The scientific study of “academic dominance hierarchies” and other inter-group relations among faculty
members has a long tradition in the behavioral and
social sciences (for extensive review, see Becher &
Trowler 2001). Recently, commentators have noted the
growing internal hierarchies and divisions among disciplinary faculty and staff, stimulated by the fragmentation
of research arising both from the greater emphasis on
teaching needs in mass higher education systems and the
political imperatives of economy and efficiency in what is
becoming an increasingly global enterprise. Becher and
Trowler (2001) asked 220 academics from 12 disciplines
and 18 institutions in the United Kingdom and the
United States to describe their perceptions of their
employment and working conditions. Their conclusions
resound with warnings about the changing nature of
academic work and the questionable future of many
traditional academic values and practices:
The rapidly changing disciplinary fundament has had dramatic
effects on many of the longer-established as well as the newly
developed academic tribes in recent years. The demands on
permanent full-time academic staff have multiplied: Academics find they must, for example, not only generate new
courses; they must cost them, determine and stimulate
markets for them, evolve new ways of delivering them and
ensure they can stand up to hard external scrutiny. The
stress on old assumptions about the nature and organisation
of work are becoming more difficult to resist across the
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world. The impact of these extra tasks and the additional time
they involve varies with the individual’s academic rank and the
type of parent institution . . . research has shown managerialist
policies to have imposed new and less favourable working conditions, reduced the scope of individual discretion and generally tended to deskill the members of the academic profession
. . . [and] has had an impact on individuals, qualifications for
employment and for their subsequent promotion. (Becher &
Trowler 2001, pp. 17 – 19)

The present study is a scientific examination of the
innermost political workings of one of the most complex
hierarchical educational systems – namely, a study of
academic freedom, tenure, and promotion, and the disciplinary and institutional differences in their operation.
The impact of the changing roles and responsibilities of
academics documented by Becher and Trowler (2001)
may vary not only with discipline, but also with academic
rank (Slaughter & Leslie 1997), type of parent institution
(Clark 1997), and perhaps myriad personal characteristics
(e.g., gender). It may even be that tenure and academic
freedom have different meanings and realities to those
who became academics in the 1960s and 1970s than to
those who joined faculties in the 1980s and 1990s, with
the latter academics effectively joining a different profession. The design of the present study allows us to
examine, albeit tentatively, all of these claims.
In fact, in commenting on our results, one reviewer
remarked on the resemblance between the behavior of
senior faculty and that of their infrahuman cousins
described by de Waal (1998): “It’s difficult not to see
the submission of group members to the alphas at work.”
Barring other explanations that we may have overlooked,
we see it that way, too.

10.1. What other explanations are there?

We considered three alternative explanations for the differences among the three ranks of faculty. First, one could
argue, for example, that full professors may be more
emboldened to exercise their freedom to teach and
research controversial topics and whistle-blow wrongdoing, not because they are finally free from further promotion insecurities, but because they are older, wiser,
and so on. That is, their behavior has less to do with
career advancement issues than with age and experience.
Second, one could argue that full professors’ job definitions
may have been structured differently from those of younger
cohorts, leading to the differences observed in this survey.
Finally, it could be argued that non-whistle-blowing was
the result of a failure of the dilemmas to cross some subjective ethical threshold for respondents, rather than a result
of any threat of negative professional consequences in the
event that one did confront wrong-doing.
Our reason for favoring an explanation centered on the
fear of negative promotional consequences, as opposed to
the first two cohort and epochal effects, is that when we
ran the analyses using a proxy for faculty respondents’
hiring cohorts (i.e., with total number of years as a professor
used as a covariate to control for job-related expectations
that may have changed over time), we continued to
observe many of the same effects associated with rank
that were reported throughout this target article. For
example, for Question 1, three of the four sets of findings
were replicated when years as a professor were controlled

in the model. When associate professors, who had been
employed in the academy for anywhere between 3 and 30
years in our sample, were older than their cohort mean,
or when full professors (who had been employed in the
academy for between 6 and 40 years in our sample) were
younger than their cohort mean, they tended to behave
more like their respective ranks than like their hiring
cohorts or age groups. These covariance analyses support
the interpretation that the observed results have less to
do with how many years one has worked as a professor
(or the epoch during which one was hired), and more to
do with the rank one occupies (and whether further evaluations for promotion are pending).
In a related fashion, when “number of years within
current rank” was taken into account as a covariate,
there was also little evidence that older, more experienced
colleagues within a given rank were different from their
younger but same-ranked colleagues. The systematic
nature of the findings – specifically, increased insistence
on academic freedom to teach and conduct research that
coincides with increased rank, independent of age or
experience – renders alternative explanations less likely.
Similarly, the covariance analysis for the two ethical dilemmas, using both total years as a professor and years within
rank as covariates, did not alter the results from the analyses of variables for either of these dilemmas. In other
words, the senior faculty members were still more likely
to whistle-blow than were junior faculty, even when
their ages were equated (e.g., a full professor promoted
very early compared with an associate professor of the
same age and years as a professor).
Concerning the third explanation (failure of the dilemmas to cross some subjective ethical threshold for respondents), without assuming a lot of “factor X” assumptions, it
is not clear why these dilemmas did cross a threshold for
young full professors but did not cross it for same-aged
associate professors.
Given human nature, perhaps we should not be surprised to observe faculty avoiding confrontational tactics
that could jeopardize their chances of earning tenure
(in the case of assistant professors) and promotion to full
professor (in the case of associate professors). Surely,
professionals outside the academy are also reluctant
to press their freedoms and exercise their moral obligations if doing so might derail their careers. In fact, it is
possible that the professoriate is less reluctant (i.e., more
emboldened) than professionals outside the academy – an
empirical question that must await research on nonacademic professionals.
10.2. Does tenure serve its original purpose?

Tenure has been “sold” to policy makers and stakeholders
(e.g., state legislators, parents, taxpayers, university administrators, and the professoriate itself) as a means toward an
end – that of providing intellectual freedom unlike that of
almost any other profession – on the grounds that it will
enhance teaching and scholarship and ultimately contribute to the “common good” (Fuchs 1997). On the basis of
the results of this survey, critics may ask whether this
price is worth paying for the established social goods
that emanate from the current system; namely, helping
to attract a high-quality workforce, protecting faculty scholarship against McCarthy-type intrusions, and improving
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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student graduation rates on campuses with relatively
higher proportions of tenure track faculty (Ehrenberg &
Zhang 2004).
However, these social goods are counterbalanced by the
finding that assistant professors are perceived by their
colleagues to be silenced by the fear of a negative tenure
evaluation if they assert their academic freedom to teach
and research or to whistle-blow on an errant senior
colleague. In this sense, tenure could be seen as a
muzzle on those who have not yet achieved it, if only
because of their implicit belief that it will be withheld if
they do not appease senior colleagues. Once tenured,
associate professors are perceived to be somewhat more
willing to “ruffle feathers,” but not nearly as free to do so
as one might expect, given the rhetoric surrounding the
justification of tenure as a liberating force. Compared to
untenured assistant professors, associate professors with
tenure were perceived as being only slightly more inclined
to whistle-blow in the face of ethical violations, nor were
they seen as being especially willing to assert their
freedom to teach disfavored courses or research unpopular ideas if doing so conflicted with the desires of those
who will one day sit in judgment of them for promotion
to full professorship.
Thus, tenure can be described, at least in part, as a
double-edged sword: a reward so highly motivating that
it helps attract high-caliber professionals to the academy,
but also a reward so eagerly anticipated that it can at
times engender nonoptimal outcomes such as forgoing
one’s rights, freedoms, and responsibilities. As Sykes
(1988), a critic of tenure, argued: “[even though] academic
freedom is the rock on which tenure is founded, and
tenure is the heart of the academic enterprise, tenure is
also the ultimate protection from accountability.”
In view of the central role tenure has played in the evolution of academic freedom at U.S. institutions (Brown &
Kurland 1993), we can now revisit the question we set
out to address: namely, whether tenure and academic
freedom still serve the original purposes for which they
were intended and for which they continue to be justified.
For a strong tenure system to be broadly supported, it
should do more than help attract a talented workforce to
jobs that are not highly paid relative to the private sector
(after all, the United Kingdom abolished tenure for all
appointments and promotions that came after November
1987, yet it would seem that their professoriate remains
strong and vibrant); it should foster academic freedom
and flexibility, and convey to those who have it the
freedom to stand up to ethical improprieties and professional misconduct and espouse political speech that
may be unpopular among colleagues and administrators.
The findings from the present survey suggest that tenure
itself does not result in faculty members routinely teaching
courses that their senior colleagues disfavor, nor in their
conducting research that their senior colleagues dislike.
The question we ask is: What, if any, system of incentives
and accountability might work more effectively than the
current system to foster the goals for which tenure and
academic freedom were originally justified? For this question we currently have no answer as far as the original goals
are concerned, though it seems important to acknowledge
that U.S. universities are regarded by much of the rest of
the world as a success story – a desirable place to send
their talented students for advanced training. We hope
568

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6

that in our effort to improve matters, nothing impedes
the continued success of our universities in the eyes of
the world.
10.3. Caveat lector

Finally, we note that although 1,004 subjects may seem
like a large sample in the behavioral sciences, it proved
to be too small to disaggregate the three superfields
(arts/humanities, social sciences, and physical/engineering sciences) into their constituent departments because
the size of cells rapidly dwindled below that for which sufficient statistical power existed. It is conceivable that
specific fields differ in important ways that could not be
revealed here. For example, is anthropology closer to the
behavioral/social sciences than to arts/humanities? Are
some fields of biological science closer to some fields in
the behavioral sciences than to the physical sciences? Do
fine arts professors differ from humanists? Another limitation of our sample is that we confined our sampling to
the top U.S. universities and colleges. It would be of interest, for example, to compare state-supported versus
private colleges, or top research institutions (e.g., doctoral-extensive) versus lower-ranked institutions (doctoral-intensive), or religious institutions versus secular
ones. Neither did we examine geographical differences
or medical schools in which tenure has been decoupled
from salary, nor faculty working in centers, institutes, or
other locations outside of named disciplinary departments.
As such, we have no knowledge about such potential
differences. Finally, we focused exclusively on U.S. institutions, and it would be very interesting if transnational
comparative data were available.
11. Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of this survey of U.S. institutions
revealed both subtleties and surprises about tenure,
promotion, and academic freedom. Blanket criticisms of
tenure, focusing on the “unleashed monster,” received
no support. Respondents perceived senior colleagues as
moderate and ill-inclined to rush to judgment or confront
others; tenured professors were viewed as not insisting on
having their way. However, neither was support found for
glib celebrations of tenure’s sanctification of broadly
defined academic freedoms. Lower-ranked faculty
appeared “muzzled” by the fear that displeasing senior colleagues could result in denial of tenure and promotion,
and the finding that tenured associate professors were perceived as being less likely than full professors to exercise
academic freedom suggests a “hush time” lasting 10 to
20 years or more. In sum, the picture of tenure, promotion, and academic freedom in 2006 proved more
complex than many critics and proponents have
acknowledged.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We gratefully acknowledge the many insights and suggestions
given to us by seven reviewers. In addition, we wish to thank
many colleagues who read earlier versions of this target article
and offered valuable suggestions, including D. Stephen Lindsay,
Wolfgang Schneider, Lesley Newson, Li Bennich-Björkman,
Martine Powell, Maryanne Gary, Ronald Ehrenberg, David

Commentary/Ceci et al.: Is tenure justified?
Dunning, James Flynn, Maryanne Garry, Roddy Roediger,
Walter Block, Analucia Dias Schliemann, and Scott Lilienfeld.

Open Peer Commentary
Intellectual conformism depends on
institutional incentives, not on socialized
culture
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X06009137
Li Bennich-Björkman
Department of Government, University of Uppsala,
SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden.
Li.Bennich-Bjorkman@statsvet.uu.se
http://www.statsvet.uu.se

Abstract: The study by Ceci et al. shows that academic behavior
associated with the core principles of intellectual freedom is more
shaped by institutional incentives than by organizational culture. From
an organizational theoretical point of view, this is quite an unexpected
finding, not least because we do believe universities to be fairly strong
and explicit cultures that should be successful in socialization.

In their highly intriguing article, Ceci et al. ask whether tenure is
justified and investigate the topic by presenting an innovative
scenario survey to a representative sample of academics. My commentary dwells on the broader conclusions that can be drawn
from the study both politically and theoretically. Depending on
the expectations you have, the results at which the authors
arrive can be interpreted in fairly divergent directions, underpinning both a pessimistic as well as a more optimistic view with
respect to tenure. The authors themselves appear to take a
rather pessimistic stand that is primarily based on the degree of
conformism and compliance to “group-think” demonstrated in
the survey by assistant and associate professors on their way to,
or even in the possession of, tenure. Hence, no doubt the study
proves that the tenure-track system fosters academic behavior
that is far from the ideal of academic freedom, if the latter is
understood as comprising independence of mind, intellectual
courage, and nonconformism, except when the highest echelon – the full professorship – is reached. The authors are
worried that an academy that is not able to instill the norms of academic freedom beyond a minority of its professionals is in trouble.
But, as stated earlier, that depends on the expectations you have.
In contrast, I was struck by the degree to which full professors
actually were believed to act independently in the two case scenarios out of the five that specifically aimed at capturing the principles of academic freedom rather than general ethics: trying to
make public controversial research results and teaching courses
regarded for some reason as problematic among colleagues.
Not only did full professors themselves believe that faculty in
their category would behave with integrity to a greater extent
than would those in other ranks, but so did the other two categories in the study. Given the fact that universities generally
are highly hierarchical organizations, sometimes even described
in terms of being “feudalistic” and built up around networks
and small coteries of scholars fighting each other while depending strongly on in-group loyalty, it is encouraging to note that
despite such an organizational environment, nonconformism is
nevertheless an expected behavior once the institutional preconditions exist to safeguard it.
The most important finding that Ceci et al.’s study shows is
exactly this: Academic behavior associated with the core principles of intellectual freedom in the end is more shaped by institutional incentives than by direct socialization. Although junior
staff on their way to tenured positions are definitely believed

by all categories to behave in ways that can best be described
as conformist or politically correct, the study demonstrates that
this pattern of behavior fades away as dependency on colleagues
diminishes. It is not an instant break with earlier behavioral
patterns, as even tenured associate professors are believed to
succumb to external and collegial pressures to a higher extent
than could be expected, but it is a clear tendency. Interestingly
enough, this change in behavior is not believed to appear at all
to the same extent when the three scenarios focusing on more
general ethical concerns are brought into the picture. Here, all
categories of professor instead behave in a way that indicates
the existence of a negative esprit de corps: not reporting on cheating or harassing colleagues.
Paradoxically, the results lead to the conclusion that the
university system is both a weak and a strong organizational
culture. In the earlier and formative phases of an academic
career, being more or less forced into behaving in an overly
conformist way should, according to both culturalist thinking
and organizational theory, socialize persons into a behavioral
pattern that should be sticky over time. Learned behavior, on
both an individual and an organizational level, usually turns
into norms that are quite tenacious and thus hard to change.
However, that is not the case here. Although with some timelag, behaviors do change in quite a substantial manner, going
from conformist to nonconformist when the norms of academic
freedom are concerned. From an organizational theoretical
point of view, this is quite an unexpected finding, not least
because we do believe universities to constitute a fairly strong
and explicit culture that should be successful in socialization.
The study discussed here points in the direction of American universities being cultures in which double standards are upheld.
The norms of academic freedom, such as integrity, independence, and – far and foremost – nonconformism, survive on a
meta-level even after years and years of behavior by oneself
and others which does not at all live up to these norms. It is
the changes in the institutional arrangements, then – that is,
being tenured – that finally make behavior correspond more to
the meta-norms. However, though I here emphasize how important institutional incentives seem to be, this is not to deny that
socialization does play a part. The depressing results found by
Ceci et al. regarding tenured associate professors who are
believed to still behave in conformist ways, point to direct socialization effects being in play – effects that only successively
decrease.
They do decrease, however, and the arrangements liberating
the individual scholar from having to please his or her colleagues
either out of direct pressure or out of anticipation of future career
opportunities are what contribute to this change.
In contrast to the European university systems, and, in particular, the Swedish one which I know best, the American tenuretrack system strikes me as being based on a more pragmatist perception of both individual human nature and how organizations
function. Generally, individuals are group-oriented and depend
to a large extent on being approved of and liked by the group.
Even though persons attracted to an academic career may be
below average in this respect, that is, be somewhat less willing
to adapt, being active in an hierarchical organization like the university necessarily exercises a lot of group pressure. Thus, the
institutional counter-forces to fight individual and organizational
tendencies to conformism must be radical. Tenure offers a
solution. It does not solve the problem regarding conformism
on the lower levels, but, as the study shows, tenure is a result
of the effects of the institutional incentives preceding it. In the
Swedish system, the equivalent to tenure for full professors was
abolished ten years ago. The institutional incentives today are
to a large extent promoting collegial and ideological conformism,
as there are few academic positions where research is included.
Instead, research is to an absolute majority financed through
applications to external funds. In such a system, not even
the full professors can escape collegial and ideological pressures.
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Abstract: Although the target article is groundbreaking and creatively
conceived, there are troubling questions regarding its methodology and
conclusions. The sample in the authors’ study was drawn from a
popular magazine’s lists; there is no recognition of the fact that most
faculty are now off the tenure track; and comparisons are made with
the British system with no supporting data.

I begin with a disclaimer. I write from my perspective as the most
recent past president of the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP), the premier defender of tenure in the American academy.
The target article, although ambitious, groundbreaking, and
laudable in many respects, raises a number of questions about
its methodology and conclusions. Why did the authors choose
to select their sample from lists of purportedly superior institutions published in a popular magazine when they might have
sampled from a list of all the institutions in the country? The
fact that the lists are of questionable validity for judging the
quality of an institution is almost irrelevant.
The overwhelming majority of students in the United States
attend and receive their degrees from postsecondary institutions
that would never come within hailing distance of such lists. Not
only are almost two-thirds of faculty members employed in institutions that do not appear on such lists, but they are employed off
the tenure track. It would be of great interest to know how at-will
employees – which is what most American faculty now are –
would respond. Having made the choice to sample as they did,
however, the authors might have provided a list of the participating institutions without violating the anonymity of their respondents. That information would be most helpful, not only in
judging the instant article, but also in designing future studies.
It is almost always preferable, of course, to employ an experimental rather than a correlational design, and the difficulties
attendant on doing so in a study of this type need not be
catalogued here. Issues of response bias are also all too familiar.
Nonetheless, a more direct measure of faculty behavior would
seem to have been preferable, even at the cost of foregoing the
advantages of an experiment. What is the relative incidence
among tenured, tenure-eligible, and at-will faculty of actual
self-censorship in the arenas of teaching and research? What is
the incidence of overt and covert threats to academic freedom
among those groups? Of course, simply asking the obvious and
straightforward questions risks biased responses, but it might
yield more potentially useful data.
The suggestion that the tenure system, because of its high
reward value, might engender the paradoxical effect of decreasing the exercise of academic freedom must be addressed. It is not
simply the denial of a reward, as the target article suggests, but in
many instances it is the end of an academic career. One must
keep in mind the consequences of a denial of tenure, especially
in the current academic job market.
The unexpected finding that rank is a better predictor of
hypothetical behavior than tenure status is difficult to explain,
and the authors’ suggestion that age and experience or differences in professional socialization might account for it is an
attractive hypothesis.
Granted that questions regarding confronting sexual and
research misconduct are and should be of great concern to the
profession, they are not, strictly speaking, issues of academic
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freedom but, rather, of professional ethics. Nowhere, to my
knowledge, does the AAUP (or other associations, for that
matter) claim that tenure is either a guarantor or protector of
ethical behavior in situations such as those described in the
survey instrument. Admittedly, one might reasonably infer that
to be the case, but it is not ordinarily put forward as a defense
of the tenure system. As the authors opine, the reasons for
respondents’ reluctance to confront unethical behavior are probably both myriad and complex. The social and diplomatic skills
necessary to deal with errant colleagues are not ordinarily
taught as part of a graduate program.
The suggestion that tenure might not be necessary to protect
academic freedom on the grounds that tenure no longer exists
in the United Kingdom, where academic freedom appears to
thrive, is startling. That no data are provided in the target article
to reinforce the claim is problematic, but the unstated assumption
that the two systems are directly comparable is simply wrong. The
differences between the British and American university systems
are legion. The sheer size of the American academy, coupled with
its heterogeneity, is the first and most obvious. Depending on the
criteria used to identify them, there are more than 3,000 or more
than 4,000 postsecondary institutions in the United States. They
can be classified in a bewildering number of ways: by size,
purpose, method of control (public, private, for-profit, religious,
and so on), degrees granted, and so forth.
Although the AAUP would not suggest that enlightened labor
legislation or a well-negotiated collective bargaining agreement
could substitute for tenure, it is the case that most British
faculty are represented by strong unions and protected by law.
The situation in this country is that the vast majority of our
faculty members are not unionized – even when unionization
would be their preference – because they are either employed
in public institutions in states that do not permit public employee
collective bargaining, or employed in private institutions whose
faculty are effectively barred from unionizing as a result of the
1980 Supreme Court Yeshiva decision. Recall that this decision
found, most astonishingly, that the faculty of Yeshiva University
are “managers” and, therefore, ineligible to bargain collectively
under the protection of the National Labor Relations Act.
Nonetheless, I end on several positive notes. The target article
is, indeed, both groundbreaking and innovative. As is often the
case, some of the more interesting results were to be found in
the interactions rather than the main effects, and these results
should have heuristic value. It is gratifying that no support was
found for the notion that the granting of tenure turns Dr.
Jekyll into Mr. Hyde. And from the standpoint of good reporting,
I was delighted to see the distinction drawn between statistical
and practical significance – one that is too seldom made.

The economic justification for academic
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Abstract: The ocean of academic knowledge is now so wide and so deep
that university administrators must rely on the incumbents in their
departments to identify and train new hires. This is in direct contrast to a
sports team, where management can readily identify new talent. It follows
that aging academics get to enjoy tenure, whereas older athletes do not.

The target article by Ceci, Williams, and Mueller-Johnson
(Ceci et al.) makes it clear that academic tenure is not sufficient
for academic freedom. Of course, the purely logical case for
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tenure is based on necessity. Tenure is a requirement for academic
freedom because, without it, even a full professor at the end of his
or her career might be reluctant to speak freely. But if tenured
academics are not speaking out then, as Ceci et al. suggest, we
need to ask whether there are other justifications for the practice.
Some critics of academic tenure argue that it is unjustified,
pointing to the protection it gives unproductive older scholars.
These critics seem to think that a university should be run
more like a professional sports franchise. Like a sports team, a
university department has a fixed number of positions (“slots”)
that must be filled. In athletics, this means that every season
each incumbent athlete is held to the standard of his potential
replacements: past glory counts for little once current performance begins to decline.
A good university will also try to hire and retain the very best
young talent, but old professors linger on – in some cases long
past the time when a fresh new face would have improved overall
quality. It is not academic freedom that is wanting, but academic
performance. Why should this happen? If the goal of academic
tenure is to generate unfettered research and teaching, and if we
are not getting much of this (as the target article suggests), then
why are universities not organized more like sports teams?
The answer is unlikely to be that the training period of a professor is particularly long, or that it requires exceptional dedication, or that it is undertaken with a low probability of success.
Athletes too must assign their youth to focused study for little
or no remuneration and with no guarantee that their efforts
will ever help them earn a living. Neither is it clear that an
academic has more to lose if he or she is forced to give up his
or her job late in life. Athletes love their work and often have
very few skills to bring to the outside labor market.
Ceci et al. also suggest that academic tenure might be compensation for low pay. Athletic salaries are high, but this was not true
before television, and it is still untrue in the less popular sports.
Poorly paid athletes do not get tenure – they find other work
once their athletic careers are over. And, although it may be
true that the productive period of an academic’s career is
longer than that of an athlete’s, this would explain only why
the average academic career is relatively long, not why older
professors are never fired.
So why is it that academics are anointed with tenure but
athletes are doomed to fight (and eventually lose) a battle for
positions on the team? The economic explanation does not rely
on academic freedom. It depends on the critical importance to
the organization of hiring the best talent and the relative difficulty
of observing potential performance (Carmichael 1988). Athletic
skill is comparatively easy to judge, and management is better
than most at identifying the best young players. In a successful
university, it is the incumbent professors in a department who
choose whom to hire. Given the vast and expanding state of
academic knowledge, these are the only university employees
in a position to judge the potential of candidates.
With time, of course, the research and teaching productivity of
all faculty becomes easier to observe. So, in principle, the dean
could fire the weakest faculty member in a department and
then accept the advice of those remaining on whom to hire.
But suppose you were working at a university that had this
policy: you would understand that everyone in academe eventually sees their performance fall as they age, and that, as the
knowledge frontier expands, each generation of scholars has a
head start on the previous one. So you would know that if you
identified the best candidates to hire, there would come a time
when your performance would fall below that of the younger
people in your department. In this context, would you ever recommend the hiring of someone you expected to be better than
yourself? Equally important, perhaps, would you ever pass on
to a brilliant young colleague the specialized knowledge you
have gained from years of professional experience?
Tenure is not just about academic freedom, which is the
hypothesis challenged by the target article. Tenure is also

required if incumbent professors are going to identify candidates
who might turn out to be better than them, and if they are going
to help these young scholars by passing on their accumulated
knowledge. Like the academic freedom argument, this claim is
based on necessity – tenure on its own may not be sufficient
for good hiring. But without it, the university would lose something valuable: the input of its incumbent scholars to the hiring
and training process.
This view of tenure is consistent with some other aspects of academic life. Young professors are often hired on “tenure track”
appointments, meaning that their tenure decision will depend
on their individual performance only, not on their performance
relative to that of their colleagues. This fosters collaboration
among young scholars and allows them to participate in tenure
and hiring decisions. As well, since faculty have no input to
personnel procedures in other departments, administrators can
provide incentives by letting entire departments compete for
resources. Among economists this idea is sometimes expressed
as: “Good universities don’t support their bad departments. And
bad universities don’t support their good departments.”
The economic justification for academic tenure depends critically on the value of the information provided by incumbent professors. If management can evaluate potential new hires, as it can
in high schools, community colleges, and perhaps some teaching
universities, then there are no good economic arguments for
tenure. In these cases, especially if there is no compelling argument based on protecting freedom of expression, we should let
management hire and fire under the same legal constraints as
in any other industry.
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Abstract: Ceci et al. draw conclusions that are inaccurate, analyze and
report results inappropriately, fail to translate their scale into policyrelevant terms, and draw overly strong conclusions from their single
study. They also attribute all the ills of academic appointments to
tenure, and ignore problems with other aspects of the system. Their
conclusion that tenure is not supported is at best premature.

Ceci et al. contend that the practice of tenure is not supported by
its limited impact on judgments by faculty members that their
colleagues would intervene in certain academic controversies
or ethical violations. But the application of scientific psychology
to such policy issues as tenure is valid only if the research
adheres to methodological criteria that ensure the legitimacy of
the empirical conclusions, and policy implications respect the
complexity of the societal system to which scientific findings
are applied. Ceci et al. are to be challenged on both grounds.
Ceci et al.’s major conclusions are sometimes inaccurate. In
section 9.1 of the target article, they assert that “Untenured
assistant professors and tenured associate professors believed
their cohort was less likely to insist on academic freedom than
the full professors’ cohort.” This is incorrect for the scenarios
that directly concern academic freedom. Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that the perceived likelihood of professors at their own
rank teaching a controversial course as planned is lower for assistant professor judgments (M ¼ 3.0) than for associate and full
professor judgments (M ¼ 5.0 and 5.0, respectively). Figure 5
demonstrates that the perceived likelihood of professors at
their own rank submitting unpopular research is much lower
for assistant professors (M ¼ 3.3) than for associate and full
professors (M ¼ 6.0 and 6.3, respectively).
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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These inaccurate conclusions are anticipated by Ceci et al.’s
unclear analysis and presentation of results. The authors never
report actual comparisons corresponding to the preceding
conclusion and confuse target and respondent rank in several
places. For instance, in section 5.3 they write, “all expressed
the belief that full professors would be more likely to confront
a wrong-doer . . . however, the magnitude of this difference was
rather small – only .3 to .4 of a scale point separating full
professors from associate and assistant professors.” But the qualification concerns respondent rank and the initial claim target
rank, which actually differs by over 1.0 unit between assistants
and fulls and over .5 units between associates and fulls (see
Fig. 3 of the target article). And, in section 4.2, Ceci et al.
report that, “the likelihood of teaching the course as planned
. . . was believed to be much higher if the faculty member in
the dilemma was described as a full professor than as an associate
or assistant professor [both Fs(2, 904)  108, p , .0001,
v2 ¼ .193].” What the two Fs represent is ambiguous (numerator
degrees of freedom are 1 for pairwise comparisons), and this
pattern only occurs when averaging across respondent rank
rather than focusing on faculty judgments of their own rank. Furthermore, it tells little about the more relevant contrast between
assistants and the two tenured ranks.
Ceci et al. report statistics on the significance and strength of
their findings, but fail to translate their scale into meaningful
terms for policy. The critical question is: What proportion of
tenured and untenured faculty would act in accord with academic
freedom? The answer to this question requires some threshold be
applied to Ceci et al.’s scale to produce the desired proportions. To
illustrate, assume normal distributions with Ms of 3.0 and 5.0 (the
values obtained for assistant and tenured ranks for teaching controversial courses as planned) and standard deviations (SDs) of
1.5. With a low threshold of 2.5, 63% of the non-tenured group
and 95% of the tenured group would teach the course as planned – an increase of 32% or 51% more faculty. A moderate
threshold of 4.0 produces percentages of 25% and 75%, a difference of 50%, representing 200% more faculty. A higher threshold
of 5.5 gives values of 5% and 37%, a difference of 32%, representing 673% more faculty. Most proportions, except those for low
thresholds at which virtually all faculty members teach the
course as planned, represent real improvements in the reported
manifestation of academic freedom upon receiving tenure. The
basic lesson is that nothing substantial can be derived from the
original scale without assumptions associated with thresholds for
the critical actions of faculty – something Ceci et al. failed to do.
Other methodological shortcomings include the use of elite
faculty who may be less concerned about job security than less
privileged faculty, the reporting of effect sizes without acknowledging that small effect sizes are sometimes associated with
“robust” effects, failure to conduct contrasts that allow attribution
of variability to separate tenure and final rank effects, expecting
tenure to be a panacea for all possible influences on academic
expression (e.g., concerns about appointment to full professorship, which is a separate issue), and describing their research
as “an experimental study of faculty beliefs” when the only true
experimental manipulation is faculty rank in the scenarios.
One important methodological and policy limitation is the lack
of replication. Ceci et al. are to be commended for taking a first
step towards the empirical study of tenure, but it is just a first
step. Scientific models tend not to become well-founded on the
basis of one study, in part because of every study’s inevitable
flaws. Later studies tend to be stronger and more comprehensive,
hence providing a sounder foundation for a scientific model and
ensuing policy implications.
In extending their conclusions to policy, Ceci et al. wrongly
attribute all ills of academic appointments to tenure, when in
fact tenure is just one element in a complex system. Tenured
faculty do not have “appointments for life” and can be terminated
for inadequate performance (not just egregious misconduct).
Termination may only be rare because of the extremely lengthy
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educational and appointment procedures that precede tenure,
or because of inadequacies in the administration of university
faculty rather than as a result of tenure per se. Tenure can
hardly be blamed if administrators choose to not monitor faculty
performance, not provide corrective feedback, and not undertake
demanding legal requirements for termination similar to those
used in comparable professions (e.g., medicine, law).
Ceci et al. also largely ignore the financial and related implications of removal of tenure. The financial implications of lowering
university job security could be substantial if universities want to
attract strong faculty. This could even extend to serious financial
implications for termination if strong faculty members began to
demand the kinds of contracts that see senior administrators in
business receive extraordinary financial settlements when relieved
of their positions. Or, university administrators overly concerned
with finances may choose to refuse such requests, resulting in
compromises to quality that could be difficult to document.
In conclusion, Ceci et al.’s study does not support the conclusions they draw, nor would those conclusions alone, even if
valid, be sufficiently strong to support their policy implications
for tenure. Further research and well-founded theorizing are
required.
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Abstract: Tenure is designed to protect the academic freedom of faculty
members by insulating them from arbitrary dismissal by administrative
authorities external to their community of scholars. Therefore, the
target article’s focus on constraints that derive from peer pressures and
academic politics is misplaced, rendering the results of the survey
irrelevant to the issue of the value of tenure.

Ceci et al.’s conclusions stand or fall on the validity of their
measuring instrument. They claim to have assessed the faculty’s
willingness to insist on the exercise of their academic freedom by
determining the extent to which faculty members at different
career stages are willing to insist on teaching a course unpopular
with their senior colleagues, or to publish a similarly troublesome
article. These may very well be interesting data, but they have
nothing to do with the value of tenure in ensuring that freedom.
The target article fails to distinguish between interference with
academic freedom by forces external to the academy and inhibitions of faculty freedom that derive from interactions within a
community of scholars. Tenure is designed to address the
former sources of pressure: It shelters faculty from the predilections of legislators, governors, university presidents, and boards of
trustees. Tenure cannot affect the group dynamics that operate
within a community of scholars. Tenure, as Finkin (1996, p. 3)
notes, is the assurance, following a probationary period, that
“the professor can be discharged only after a hearing before
his, or her, academic peers.” That is, tenured faculty can only
be dismissed for “just cause” and following “due process.” Dismissal is an administrative act, and thus tenure protects against
actions by entities or persons in the chain of command, from
the president of the United States, down. Tenure, however,
does not and cannot insulate faculty members from the constraints of academic politics. The target article demonstrates, at
best, the existence of such social pressures, but it provides no
useful data reflecting on the value, or effectiveness, of tenure.
The survey administered by Ceci et al. does indicate that at
different stages of one’s academic career, one is more or less
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sensitive to the views that prevail in one’s community. In any
community, some individuals acquire influence that derives
from their record of achievement and their long experience, as
well as from their evident ability to influence the views prevailing
in the community or from the strength of their personality. Does
one really need a major survey to determine that such social
dynamics exist?
The point is that adjustments made within the community of
scholars are not instances of a failure of tenure to protect academic freedom because these pressures are not exercised by a
force external to the scholarly community. Had they really
been concerned with academic freedom, Scenario 1 in the
survey should have asked about Professor B who is considering
teaching a new course which “a number of legislators (or the
chair of the board of trustees, or the editorial page of the local
paper)” frown upon, rather than whether “several of B’s senior
colleagues frown upon” this course. The former is a question
concerned with academic freedom, the latter is not.
The actual version of this scenario that is used is a matter of
group dynamics within the independent community of scholars.
The pressures created by my colleague’s views are not different
than those exercised by members of peer review groups,
journal editors, and the audience attending my colloquia. That
the more senior the faculty members, the more they are
immune to such pressures, is not really all that surprising and
has little to do with the value of tenure.
It is inherent in the nature of the academic enterprise that, as a
collective, we impose quality control over the curriculum. If I
undertake to teach a course on the foundations of cognitive
neuroscience, I will be derelict in my duty if I devote my lectures
to a brilliant analysis of the symbolism in Hamlet, or a detailed
examination of Garrigle’s analysis of “the influence of T. S.
Eliot on Shakespeare” (Lodge 1995). My colleagues, and the
chair of my department, may well frown upon my antics; my
decision to comply with their guidance would not be a violation
of my academic freedom.
My colleagues may frown upon the teaching of phlogiston
theory or creationism. Such strongly held scholarly views may
very well turn out to be wrong, as knowledge is in a constant
state of flux. The dynamics in the battle of ideas, however unpleasant and wrong they may prove to be, are natural concomitants of
scholarship; and they are not, as the target article demonstrates,
immune to peer pressure and to influence by seniority.
The forces against which tenure protects are those revealed by a
survey of public opinion about colleges and faculty, conducted
under the auspices of the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) (Smallwood 2006). The results are somewhat
troubling to those concerned with academic freedom. While it is
encouraging to learn that “80 percent agreed that ‘the best way
to ensure academic excellence is to make sure politicians don’t interfere with research in colleges and universities’” (Smallwood 2006,
p. A1), it is disconcerting that 38% of the respondents did not
agree that “professors who oppose the war in Iraq should be
allowed to express antiwar views in the classroom.” And 63% said
that public universities should be able to dismiss professors “who
join radical political organizations like the Communist Party.” This
is but a small sample of the results of this very rich survey – a survey
that revealed considerable distrust of the academy by conservatives,
who tend to worry about the “liberal bias” of professors.
In this climate, the tenure system remains a bulwark protecting academic freedom. There is a long, sorry record of legislators,
trustees, presidents, and other public officials either dismissing,
or trying to dismiss, members of the faculty who articulate
views that challenge the prevailing orthodoxy. As Rudolph
(1962) notes in his masterly history of American colleges and
universities, the history is that of
the battle between the past and the present in American
higher education, a battle between certainty and uncertainty,
between absolutism and relativism, between revealed truth
and science. (Rudolph 1962, p. 481)

Academic freedom is continually endangered by faith-based
thinking that cannot tolerate the scholarly approach which
assumes that every assertion is subject to doubt. The target
article, by redefining the nature and purpose of tenure, is not
serving the cause of academic freedom.
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Abstract: Academic opinions are irrelevant to the value of tenure.
Facts are relevant, and the facts are that tenure protects some
academics from losing their jobs because they communicate unpopular
information, and that some untenured academics do lose their jobs
because they communicate unpopular information.

Ceci et al. have used a research method to study only what the
method allowed them to study, have over-valued the information
it produced, have misinterpreted the data they did collect, and
have ignored relevant information that is available to anyone
who reads a newspaper or surfs the Web.
The authors’ survey research, however, was precise. They
surveyed academics’ opinions about what some hypothetical
other academics might or might not do in situations requiring
them to say or do unpopular things, and then they associated
those opinions with both the respondent’s and the hypothetical
target academic’s rank. The simplest way to explain what Ceci
et al. found is to say that, on average, everyone who responded
to their survey, regardless of academic rank, thought that more
senior and higher-ranked academics, in particular associate and
full professors with tenure, were more likely to teach politically
unpopular courses, to do unpopular research, or to blow the
whistle on academic miscreants, than were less senior untenured
assistant professors.
But that’s it.
The authors interpreted their sample survey of opinions as a
quest for “data illuminating the extent to which tenure and academic freedom serve their original purpose. . . . [W]e conducted
the first survey of faculty opinions about whether tenure continues to promote ‘honest judgment and independent criticism,’
key elements of academic freedom” (sect. 1.1, para. 3). The
assumption that “academic opinion” can determine “whether
tenure serves its original purpose” was never justified – and is
not justifiable.
Ceci et al. draw a conclusion that is contradicted both by the
opinions they surveyed and by the facts. They write, “The findings from the present survey suggest that tenure itself does not
result in faculty members routinely teaching courses that their
senior colleagues disfavor, nor in their conducting research that
their senior colleagues dislike” (sect. 10.2, para. 4; emphasis in
original). Their own survey shows that respondents thought
that the academics least likely to teach disfavored courses or do
disapproved research were hypothetical non-tenured assistant
professors, and the most likely were tenured professors, with
tenured associate professors in between.
The opinions Ceci et al. collected and tabulated have nothing
to do with the social or political value or importance of tenure.
The costs and benefits of tenure are not calculated in units of
opinion but in units of action. The unknown cost of tenure is
the hypothetical existence of some unstated number of lazy
or superannuated professors who collect their salaries while
doing very little or nothing at all. The known benefit of
tenure includes the ability of academics to use its protection
to fight off the pressure to fire them when they present
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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opinions or data that influential people or groups in society do
not like.
J. Phillipe Rushton, a psychology professor at the University
of Western Ontario, was able to resist the pressure to fire him
over an allegedly racist theory that he proposed at a scientific
meeting. The pressure was generated by a media campaign,
and it was inflamed by the premier of his province and by
administrative other ranks within his own university faculty.
He kept his job because he had tenure and because his university president supported him (Horn 1999, pp. 330– 31; Rushton
1998).
Nancy Oliveri, an untenured University of Toronto medical
researcher affiliated with Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children,
was fired from both her university and her hospital positions
after publishing drug trial medical findings that embarrassed
Apotek, the company that sponsored the trials. Her findings
also embarrassed the university, which was negotiating with
Apotek to endow a multimillion-dollar biomedical research
building. Dr. Oliveri’s case became a public cause célèbre, and
she was finally reinstated by both the university and the hospital
(Oliveri Symposium 2004).
The argument for tenure is succinct. On the one hand, the
tenured professor who publishes unpopular ideas may suffer
social, political, and personal persecution and may be threatened
with other unpleasant consequences, but his or her tenure keeps
at least one bad thing from happening: He or she does not lose his
or her job. On the other hand, a researcher or professor without
tenure will be sacked if his or her unpopular ideas offend, for
whatever reason, the university administration or public or
private powers with influence on the university. These facts are
worth more than any number of opinions, no matter how carefully collected.
A counter-argument is that tenure artificially protects people
in the upper echelons of academia. The result is that lowerlevel untenured academics such as sessional lecturers and assistant professors suffer because the accumulated aggravations that
an administration cannot vent against its senior academics will
be discharged against its lower-level employees. Therefore,
either everyone or no one should have tenure. This is a bad
argument.
It is unreasonable to extend tenure, which is a conditional
guarantee of permanent employment, to probationary employees. No rational organization (excluding, for example, fraternities, Al-Qaeda, and the Ku Klux Klan) would offer a promise
of permanent membership to beginners. The new academic
simply might not work out. Most North American universities
use the transition between assistant and associate professor as a
decision point for dropping or keeping an academic. It is an
obvious place to make the decision that John or Jill has enough
talent to make us want to invest in his or her career as a professional academic, and in the interest of protecting his or her
freedom of inquiry we will also endorse that decision with
tenure. Tenure means only that we cannot dismiss John or Jill
without cause, and that we specifically cannot dismiss him or
her for reporting unpopular ideas, teaching a controversial
course, or whistle-blowing on an academic miscreant.
Ceci et al. cite articles and books that report on academics
who were dismissed or threatened with dismissal because of
their opinions or their research. Then they justify their own
work by writing that “it is curious that there exist no data illuminating the extent to which tenure and academic freedom
serve their original purpose. To examine this question, we conducted the first survey of faculty opinions about whether tenure
continues to promote ‘honest judgment and independent criticism,’ key elements of the essence of academic freedom”
(target article, sect. 1.1, para. 3). The data, which they choose
to ignore, are right in front of them. Opinions do not “[illuminate] the extent to which tenure and academic freedom serve
their original purpose.” Facts do. The facts are clear, but
Ceci et al. apparently did not notice this, because they
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conclude on the basis of their opinion survey that “tenure
itself does not result in faculty members routinely teaching
courses that their senior colleagues disfavor, nor in their
conducting research that their senior colleagues dislike”
(sect. 10.2, para. 4; emphasis in original). Of course tenure by
itself does not produce any of those things; it just protects
the people who do produce them.
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Abstract: The exceptional importance of the Ceci et al. study for
the debate over tenure is noted, particularly the perceived importance
of academic rank relative to tenure status. Beyond the significance of
academic freedom lie important issues of the costs and benefits of
tenure that now need to be addressed in equally rigorous research
involving extensive, detailed consideration of actual cases.

There are many ways to consider the question “Is tenure justified?” Ceci et al. have reported one ingenious approach, a tour
de force, dizzying in its statistics and complexity of interpretation,
and it is the most important study of the issue in decades. Like
any great science, it raises almost as many questions as it
answers, but it brings a vast amount of fresh data and thinking
to the table.
Tenure is a peculiar quality of academia. It has recently been
replaced by renewable contracts at a few universities, and some
universities have even offered to “purchase the tenure” of some
tenured faculty. Job security outside academia is sometimes
almost as strong as tenure, however, such as in some government
agencies or union shops. Labor and employment laws can help
with job security, but little equals the job security of academic
tenure, especially concerning freedom of expression.
Tenure has positive and negative features for grantors. It can
help recruit and retain desired faculty, and it can allow for
more precise long-range staffing plans. However, a negative
feature of tenure is the drag on innovation and growth provided
by “dead wood” – tenured professors who do little scholarly work
post-tenure and who are nearly impossible to get rid of. Few
workplaces provide such sinecures, and the question of
whether tenure is justified must, of course, go beyond academic
freedom. It must involve finances and taxpayer dollars (taken
from taxpayers without such job security), as well as the
problem of ensuring innovative, productive, and up-to-date
scholarship.
Ceci et al. have helped redefine our perception of academic
freedom, to some extent unlinking it from tenure and linking it
more to rank, with full professors, the alpha rank, standing in
contrast to the other ranks studied; the completed academicians
versus the still-incomplete academicians.
Why is tenure important? People speak out on all sorts of controversial topics in our argumentative society, and standing
behind all of us is the First Amendment. Most academic disciplines have few extremely controversial or politically or valuescharged issues. Most scholarship even in the social sciences
involves little earth-shaking controversy. It is usually straightforward technocratic parsing of variance. Little social science
scholarship rises to the level of “offense” at any professorial
rank – tenured or not – and some work that could give offense
is based on bias or weak scholarship, such as holocaust denial;
that should be dealt with as a faculty competence question.
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We should hope for some amount of controversial, risk-taking
scholarship. In fact, we have too little of it, despite the tenure
density on American campuses. Does risk-taking scholarship
need tenure to support it? Having spent a career studying
risk-taking, I am struck by how major risk-takers in many areas
do not take their risks from comfortable, secure platforms but
are often functioning in uncertainty, in situations of change,
growth, and challenge. Tenure can work against such conditions.
Systematic research on pre-tenure versus post-tenure innovation and scholarly risk-taking is needed. The protections of
tenure fall mostly on political or values issues, which arise
rarely on most campuses. Is an expensive system like tenure
appropriate for such rare events? Most university scholarship
does not rise as far or even come close on the scale of controversy
to what one finds by running one’s remote through television talk
shows or on the Internet in a society cathected on controversy
and extreme behavior.
So what does tenure achieve that is positive, other than provide
some job security and occasionally protect a professor from his or
her critics or bosses?
Ceci et al. have opened the closet door on the justifications for
tenure. All sides of the debate need a full airing and even more
data. A much wider range of institutions needs to be studied. For
their study Ceci et al. used “top-ranked institutions,” but tenure
is probably less important there than in lesser schools, where excellence and independence may be less valued and where there is a
weaker history of free expression. These would be the type of
schools frequently seen on the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) censored list. In the elite schools, it could be
argued the faculty are more widely employable and mobile and
are thus less concerned over tenure and job security. Perhaps assistant/associate professors in such elite schools regard the ultimate
achievers there, the full professors, as great individuals, with their
independence not achieved by mere tenure alone, which might
be in accord with some of Ceci et al.’s results.
If hypothetical scenarios were to be used in any future
research, I would argue for a wider range of examples and for
asking respondents whether they have actually seen a comparable situation. However, we cannot justify or condemn tenure
on the basis of hypothetical scenarios. Ceci et al. have brilliantly
placed the debate over tenure under scientific scrutiny, yielding
provocative results that we can build on. But we must now move
toward an equally thorough approach based on real cases –
actual records of tenure protection, or lack thereof, in academic
freedom or ethics deliberations – examining such factors emphasized by Ceci et al. as rank, tenure status, gender, academic
discipline, as well as type of institution. This should involve the
analysis of costs and benefits of tenure, hypostatizing the ideas
from Ceci et al. in concrete cases.
Some attempts have been made at examining actual cases, but
most are limited to specific disciplines, or are dated or not extensive or sufficiently detailed. Such research on actual cases would
be difficult, probably requiring substantial access to university
records, which could be protected, and with non-disclosure
agreements between parties. Most universities have grant auditors, as do most funding agencies. If such records could be
reviewed where whistle-blowing had occurred, some real cases
of rank and tenure effects could be examined. Court records
might also be helpful, as might face-to-face interviews with
parties. Detailed case studies might be undertaken of similar
departments (e.g., psychology) from dissimilar universities (e.g.,
Ivy League universities vs. small, religious colleges). Detailed
data-based comparisons could be done of academic freedom
issues and examples found from both before and after the 1940
AAUP Statement of Principles, expanding Slaughter (1980)
(see target article, sect. 1).
In conclusion, Ceci et al.’s study should now be followed up
with systematic studies of real cases bearing on tenure protections, examining the costs as well as benefits of tenure wherever
possible.
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Abstract: The fact that a right is unlikely to be exercised by most members
of a group does not mean it has lost its social and justice-defending utility.
Current attitudes can be revealed by a questionnaire, but the value of a
tradition must be assessed in the light of history. Historically, academic
freedom and tenure are inseparable and mutually reinforcing.

Ceci et al. provide a model of what a questionnaire can reveal,
and what it reveals is disturbing and important. However, I
believe they are mistaken in thinking that they have tested the
traditional case for tenure and found it wanting, and therefore,
that a reappraisal is necessary. The authors provide an excellent
historical review of cases in which academics have been menaced
for unpopular views and then, without any analysis of that historical record, assume that it is trumped by a survey of current attitudes. Their strongest point is made in passing and it is an appeal
to history; namely, that the United Kingdom has shown that academic freedom can be separated from tenure. That statement
requires careful scrutiny.
The following are some fundamentals about what things safeguard a right. The exercise of a right is most secure if (1) it is
explicitly acknowledged (preferably in law) and has an institutional protection, and (2) that institution is entrenched in a
long-held and deeply internalized tradition. I assume that we
value people speaking out on issues of moment, even if what
they say is deeply unpopular, and that we believe justice requires
that they not be punished for doing so.
The fact that academic freedom/tenure gives academics special
protection in providing this public good may outrage equity
(whistle-blowers ought to have the same protection and so forth),
but this does not make the tradition of tenure any less valuable.
Better that some can speak out without penalty than none.
Thanks to Ceci et al., we know that many current academics do
not appreciate the role of tenure in safeguarding the right of
dissent, and by implication, most of them are unlikely to exercise
that right. But a questionnaire provides only a snapshot of the
present. Has the situation ever been different? Perhaps only a
small minority of academics has ever had the intellectual independence and courage to say unpopular things that they felt
needed saying. Nonetheless, people like Jensen and Rushton
and Levine and Brand have spoken out. That they needed
some kind of protection is self-evident: Brand lost his post,
Rushton had to ward off a call for his dismissal by the prime minister of Canada, Levin effectively lost his first-year logic course;
and how safe would Jensen have been had not academic
freedom/tenure been alive at Berkeley? What have the current
views of academics to do with what we see here? Even if
tenure does not motivate most current academics to speak out,
it may be essential to those who do.
Ceci et al. point to the United Kingdom as a case in which
tenure is not guaranteed but academic freedom is, and that
raises a fundamental question: Does the combination of the two
(tenure and academic freedom) provide a protection that a guarantee of academic freedom alone does not? My reading of the historical record is that the U.S. academic community knows very well
that it is subject to temptation and, therefore, has self-imposed a
restraint: tenure virtually forecloses the option of discharging an
academic who makes his or her university unpopular. That institutional restraint is deeply grounded in a historical tradition of
respect, thank heaven, because traditions are priceless things
that can not be created by fiat. I vividly recall the first time I
was discharged because of my politics (I was deemed to be too
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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friendly to blacks in the South). The university president opened
the interview with a broad smile and the words, “Now, of course
you have never been granted tenure.” Even he, a former
highway commissioner whose highest ambition was to become
governor, was aware of a traditional restraint on his behavior.
In my opinion, despite what exists on paper, universities in the
United Kingdom in fact protect tenure more effectively than universities in the United States do. I know of no cases at leading universities in the U.K. where academics of long standing have been
let go, except under circumstances that would have equally applied
to tenured U.S. academics. However, even if the U.K. is embarking on an experiment of academic freedom without tenure, let us
wait a generation to assess the results. In theory, of course, you can
give academic freedom all sorts of institutional safeguards other
then tenure – the right to go to an ombudsman if you feel your
politics were a factor; the right to representation by an attorney;
complex procedures of due process – but none of these protections can match tenure in terms of being hallowed by tradition.
Traditions, of course, can be slowly undermined by the erosion
of the depth of feeling that sustains them. One would expect
that the erosion would affect academics last. Ceci et al.’s study is
a wake-up call: Rights unappreciated are an endangered species.
In sum, tenure may not motivate, but that does not render
palatable the consequences of its demise. Questionnaires
cannot substitute for what can be known only by analysis of
the historical record. Academic freedom and tenure need
each other, and both need academics who are immersed in the
tradition that sustains them.
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Abstract: The original purpose of tenure has become clouded by the
process by which it is granted. In New Zealand, tenure and academic
freedom are separate, with academic freedom protected by legislation.
Clearly, tenure is neither necessary nor sufficient to protect academic
freedom. Individuals and universities must do more to guard academic
freedom in order to encourage, nurture, and protect it.

Our initial objective was to provide an international perspective
on the concept of tenure and to evaluate the extent to which
the issues surrounding it are academically universal. But in
reading the target article by Ceci et al., we discovered a need
to re-evaluate the importance of the freedoms that tenure was
originally designed to protect. In our view, the original intention
of tenure has become clouded by issues related to the process by
which it is achieved, and in attempting to gain tenure, many
academics may have forfeited the very privilege that tenure
was designed to protect.
In providing our “international perspective” on the issue of
tenure and academic freedom, we should first come clean.
Although our first (and only) academic positions have been in
New Zealand, we were both brought up in the United States,
and we received our doctoral and postdoctoral training at American universities. Furthermore, we both maintain strong research
links with colleagues in the United States, and we have watched
members of our cohort (and now our own students) undergo the
probationary period that sometimes leads to tenure in the U.S.
There are some major differences in the university systems in
the United States and New Zealand. For example, in contrast to
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the U.S. where universities can be public or private, all universities in New Zealand are institutions that are owned by the
Crown. Funding for New Zealand universities is provided by a
combination of government funds and tuition. Academic
appointments in New Zealand begin with a probationary period
that lasts 3 to 6 years. At our university, the tasks that must be satisfied during the probationary period are clearly outlined in
writing at the time of hiring, and the candidate is evaluated
annually on progress toward those goals. Furthermore, the candidate is provided with support designed to maximize the
chances of success, including access to mentorship and to
special research funds. He or she is also encouraged to attend
special seminars designed specifically for tenure track staff on
issues related to teaching, research, graduate supervision, grant
writing, and all of the other tasks that an academic is expected
to perform. In New Zealand, the probationary period is looked
upon not only as a test period for the candidate but also as a
period during which the university helps the candidate master
the skills necessary for a successful academic career; by the
end of the probationary period, no one is surprised by the
outcome.
In contrast to tenure in the United States, the job security that
comes with confirmation in New Zealand is somewhat limited.
The Individual Employment Agreement for academic staff at
our university states that:
The employment of any employee whose appointment has been confirmed may be terminated by either party upon 6 months’ notice. A
confirmed appointment shall be considered permanent subject to satisfactory performance until the employee’s normal retirement date
unless the employer finds it necessary to terminate the appointment
for reasonable cause.
(http://www.otago.ac.nz/humanresources/payscales/index.html)

Thus, confirmation in New Zealand does not necessarily lead
to permanent job security, nor does it confer any special protection of academic freedom.
How then, is academic freedom protected in New Zealand? It
turns out that, here, academic freedom is enshrined in legislation. The Education Act of 1989 specifies that universities
accept the role of critic and conscience of society and that academic freedom is to be preserved and enhanced. As defined in
the act, academic freedom includes the freedom to question
and test popular wisdom, put forward new ideas and state controversial or unpopular opinions, and regulate the subject matter
that is taught (http://educationcounts.edcentre.govt.nz/publications/downloads/oecd-thematic-annexes.pdf). Thus, in New
Zealand, tenure and academic freedom are separate, and academic freedom is protected by a different mechanism.
Let us now return to the issue from Ceci et al. that we found
most disturbing. We were struck by academics’ answers to question 4: Willingness to publish unpopular research. Although rank
was potentially a better predictor than tenure, at all ranks individuals reported that they would sometimes fail to exercise their fundamental academic freedom to publish unpopular research. This
finding raises a fundamental question: Although tenure was originally designed to protect academic freedom, is it a necessary or
sufficient condition?
The New Zealand situation illustrates that tenure is not always
necessary to protect academic freedom; but we would argue that
legislation in New Zealand, like tenure in the United States, is
also not sufficient. The results of Ceci et al. clearly show that
other pressures from within the university, such as relative
rank and risk for subsequent promotion, are strong forces that
sometimes silence academics. Unfortunately, these forces are
not restricted to the university. Pressures from outside can also
alter the probability that academics will exercise their privilege
to challenge conventional wisdom. In a series of articles published in the New England Journal of Medicine, some academics
have raised concerns that data or opinions that are contrary to
existing beliefs or that do not support particular financial inter-
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ests often face legal, administrative, and political attacks from
outside the university (e.g., Drazen 2002; Nathan & Weatherall
2002). The authors of those articles noted a worldwide trend in
which legitimate public debate has been stymied by administrative or legal adjudication. The end result has been to keep investigators tied up with a range of tasks that ultimately silence
academic discourse. Furthermore, harassment of some academics in this manner makes other academics think twice
before tackling controversial topics. Unfortunately, even full professors with tenure are not immune to these effects (Loftus &
Guyer 2002; Tavris 2006).
In conclusion, we believe that universities must jealously guard
academic freedom; but to do this, they will need to go beyond
tenure as the only protective mechanism. In addition to protecting
academic freedom, universities must also actively foster debate
and nurture (rather than punish) those individuals who take
part in the process. Universities must send a clear message to academics of all ranks and tenure status that challenging conventional
wisdom is not only acceptable, but it is encouraged. In our view,
academic freedom is not only a right, it is a responsibility.
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Abstract: Why are U.S. academics, even after tenure and promotion, so
timid in their exercise of academic freedom? Part of the problem is
institutional – academics are subject to a long probationary period
under tight collegial control – but part of the problem is ideological. A
hybrid of seventeenth-century British and nineteenth-century German
ideals, U.S. academia – and the nation more generally – remains
ambivalent toward the value of academic freedom, ultimately inhibiting
an unequivocal endorsement.

What is perhaps most surprising about Ceci et al.’s study of the
relationship between academic rank and attitudes toward “academic freedom” is not its findings but the apparently primitive
state of empirical research examining the matter. Moreover, contrary to the authors’ suggestion, the United States, although
perhaps the nation most ideologically committed to tenure as a
vehicle for promoting academic freedom, does not have an
especially coherent normative justification for the practice. As
in so many other matters, the United States filters aspects of
the British and German experience through its own distinctive
history. The result is a lively mélange of competing notions that
render the concept of academic freedom “essentially contested.”
Ceci et al.’s findings themselves are predictable: Tenured full
professors are more comfortable challenging the words and
deeds of their colleagues than are academics who have yet to
complete either the tenure or the promotion process, with all
ranks turning out to be more timidly disposed than any of
them had imagined. Surprisingly, Ceci et al. do not draw the
most obvious conclusion to explain this result; namely, that in
American universities, tenure and promotion are subject to relatively strong collegial oversight for a relatively long period. The
pressure to conform to local norms is thus unusually strong,
especially in the run-up to a tenure decision, and it has lasting
effects on the candidates. (This policy also affects the examination of doctoral dissertations, the fate of which is almost
always determined in-house.)
From a European standpoint, the United States is striking in
the weight accorded to a candidate’s local public relations. The

good will of tenured and promoted members of a candidate’s
department is essential for success, as higher levels of academic
administration tend to respect the judgments issued at lower
levels, unless circumstances clearly indicate otherwise. The
hiring of even full professors in the United States is treated as
primarily a departmental, rather than a university, appointment.
Issues captured by the phrase “team player” can easily eclipse
whatever merits a candidate brings as an individual. Moreover,
a consequence of the relative autonomy enjoyed by U.S. academic departments is that their members are more preoccupied
with boundary maintenance. Thus, every prospective tenure
candidate raises the spectre of opportunity costs; namely, the
other possible candidates one might hire – and who might be a
better fit – if this one is denied tenure.
The solution would seem to be simple: Refer tenure and
promotion decisions to a higher level of the university, and over
a shorter period of time, to remove local prejudice and inhibit
the formation of conformist attitudes. For example, the probationary period for regular academic staff in the United Kingdom
has been traditionally only 3 years, not 6 or 7. The several levels
of promotion are still based on inter-departmental competitions,
where the frame of reference is the overall contribution to the
university and the candidate’s discipline, not specifically the
well-being of his or her department. To be sure, the United
Kingdom has drifted over the past two decades toward a more
U.S.-style system, but this has happened for reasons unrelated
to academic freedom.
On the one hand, longer probationary periods allow more
discretion for administrators to reconstitute academic units to
fit changing market conditions. On the other hand, a stress on
departmental cohesion is more likely to generate a distinctive
“research culture,” which is a key indicator in national academic
performance measures.
The large question that looms behind Ceci et al.’s findings is
whether academics are themselves the best guarantors of
academic freedom. Given the self-organizing origins of the
American Association of University Professors, the answer may
appear to be obviously yes. However, Germany under the
Second Reich provides an alternative precedent. Academic
freedom in this context was not simply a specialised version of
free speech but a guild privilege of a certain profession not
enjoyed by society at large. Corresponding to such privileges
were obligations, not least of which was to publicize one’s research
in the classroom and the wider society. Moreover, academics
could legally criticize state policy by invoking the spirit of the
“nation” that may have temporarily eluded the politicians. But
could academics be trusted to administer their own delicate
position? The answer was no, as academics were as self-serving
as anyone else. Here the higher-education minister, Friedrich
Althoff, did all he could to control the hiring and promotion of
professors, typically by preventing the formation of local academic
dynasties through nationwide competitions. The “Althoff system,”
although irritating the likes of Max Weber, is largely credited with
having propelled Germany to scientific preeminence in the years
leading up to the First World War (Spinner 1993). The mere
reinforcement of local norms was insufficient for academic
advancement: Ambitious academics had to strike out in innovative
ways that appeared to promote the national interest.
America’s constitutionally devolved educational authority
renders a homegrown version of Althoff highly unlikely, except
perhaps at the level of state university systems. However,
Althoff indirectly throws light on a fundamental ambivalence about the U.S. commitment to academic freedom.
As Ceci et al. rightly observe, attacks on academic freedom
from both the political right and left have often centred on the
anticipated consequences of taking seriously what academics
have said. In the German context, this would be a problem
only if a professor threatened national security or, more immediately, abrogated students’ freedom to learn. (David Horowitz’s
campaign to have U.S. universities adopt an “academic bill of
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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rights” taps into this latter sentiment.) However, the more vague
but pervasive American challenges to academic freedom hark
back to the campus-based setting of the original colleges (modelled on Oxbridge) that anchor so many normative intuitions
about university life in the United States, regardless of
institutional foundation (Fuller 2002, pp. 220– 25). These intuitions, epitomized in the legal expression “in loco parentis,” are
most clearly manifested in what is often praised as the pronounced pastoral side of American university life. But it may
also be that this residual idea of the university as the extended
family (i.e., “alma mater”) may also encourage an overprotective
self-censorship that ultimately undermines an unequivocal
defence or exercise of academic freedom.
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Abstract: We do not dispute the findings of Ceci et al.’s study, though
they are based on survey research which does not always reflect reallife experiences. We report on cases we have defended on the basis of
the tenure system, few of which mirror the situations reported in the
target article. We end with a strong defense of the tenure system in the
modern university.

Surveys, although valid, do not always mirror real world events.
Our comments reflect our experiences as officers of the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP). As with First
Amendment cases, most tenure and academic freedom issues
usually hinge not on the dramatic, but rather, on the finer
points involved.
We stress that rank and tenure do not protect professors from
intimidation, loss of salary, or exclusion from positions of power,
even after years of service. Rather, tenure offers protection
against arbitrary or politically motivated termination of professors. The cases with which we have dealt rarely concerned intimidation of junior faculty or whether junior professors felt free to
teach a controversial course – the scenarios investigated by Ceci
et al. Rather, the typical AAUP cases involve intimidation of all
ranks by administrators, who now include chairpersons. In this
the old adage about power corrupting seems to have played
out. Is a tenured professor absent without leave and subject to
sanctions if he is invited by the king of Spain to deliver a presentation and does so despite chairperson warnings not to leave
campus, even if he makes arrangements for covering his
classes? Can a chairperson routinely visit a tenured professor’s
class without complaints having been made to support such overseeing? Can a chairperson arbitrarily require a senior tenured
professor to live within 50 miles of campus even if the professor
never misses a class or meeting, despite the absence of a university requirement addressing residency? These examples are the
types of issues that we have been called upon to defend against.
The image of the post-tenure renegade professor is likely overblown, as reported in the target article. We have not encountered
the person described. The few who approached this mold
included: (1) a tenured assistant professor who professes creationism in his classes under the protection of academic
freedom; (2) a professor who feels free enough to speak out
and challenge authority when deemed necessary; and (3) a
chair with a meager publication record who was promoted to
full professor because, as a tenure committee member put it,
“People like him.” This particular chairperson has a record of
intimidating a female full professor in his department – someone
who has routinely been challenged, even by junior members of
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the department without intervention by the chairperson, for
simply following university regulations which go against the
wishes of the chairperson and his other male colleagues.
Despite the AAUP, there are few such professors at most institutions in the academy.
The administrators in each of these cases were chairpersons.
Our senior administrators at Wichita State University have
seen merit in AAUP policies, though department chairpersons –
several of whom were the targets of unfair chairperson
practices before they themselves became chairpersons – have
not. Chairpersons have routinely characterized grievance
procedures as interfering with their authority. AAUP visibility
is generally less now than in past years across the academy. For
example, junior faculty seem more interested in achieving their
tenure records; of course, they always turn to the AAUP when
they are the targets of administrative wrongdoings! This situation
reflects the nature of contemporary universities. As is the case
with the AAUP, industrial unions also feel their diminished
influence. Ceci et al. alluded to these generational workplace
differences.
However, although Ceci et al. found that tenure does not
necessarily result in the teaching of unfavorable courses by
junior faculty, this only reflects a survey shortcoming: the
authors address inflexible questions and situations. Tenure
does not give professors the right to refuse to teach the curriculum of a department and instead teach courses less valuable to
the departmental agenda. However, a chair may assign any
faculty member to teach any course whether that person is as
qualified as more senior members of a department interested
in the course. This, again a real-life situation, is related to the
question addressed by Ceci et al., but in a way that their
survey cannot discern. Again, the power of the new role of “the
chair as administrator” is revealed: Administrators are loath to
question or challenge one of their own. In our experience, it is
typical for chairperson salaries to rise faster than those of even
senior faculty, regardless of academic and professional merit.
We end with a strong defense of the tenure system, as it serves
to protect the most important aspect of academe: academic
freedom. Much criticism of tenure often reflects a poor
understanding of the protections it affords. There is no inherent
protection of professors who cease to perform as professors.
Pressures can be brought to bear that might force their
resignations or, hopefully, encourage them to resume their productivity: salary, course loads, and so on. Of course, ethical
lapses are not defensible under the protection of tenure,
though they are often difficult to prove. We underscore that the
events which led to the birth of the AAUP and the development
of the concepts of academic freedom, as well as the development
of the tenure system, are still in place, necessitating vigilance by
the professorate and protection of this important right of the
academy (see American Association of University Professors
2006). This is reflected by a recent incident in Colorado, referred
to by Ceci et al., and another case in which funding was denied to
a scientist who supported evolution (Hoag 2006). This is precisely
the situation that led to the establishment of the AAUP.
We believe that in concluding “tenure itself does not result in
faculty members routinely teaching courses that their senior
colleagues disfavor, nor in their conducting research that their
senior colleagues dislike” (target article, sect. 10.2, para 4; emphasis in original), Ceci et al. miss a major point of the tenure system.
Tenure provides a way for professors to feel free to teach their
expertise and to voice their opinions on issues and matters of
concern to the academy, even when this runs counter to institutional policy. It protects against malicious termination, while
offering a way to rein in those who do not competently meet
professional standards. Unfortunately, it also serves to protect
mediocrity: There are antifeminists, holocaust deniers, and
creationists on campuses from Wichita States, Northwesterns,
and Harvard Universities alike. It is of interest to note that a
recent survey conducted by the AAUP found that most
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Americans support the idea of tenure, though they may not fully
understand it (Gross & Simons 2006).
One final note: While it is cute of Ceci et al. to refer to de
Waal’s work with apes, it is, of course, completely irrelevant.
Although some animal behavior is indeed quite similar to that
of our own, ideas such as tenure and academic freedom are
totally human concepts, and we can learn little about such behavior by studying nonhuman animals, even our closest relatives,
the chimpanzees. We say this with some authority, as one of us
is a comparative psychologist.
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Abstract: This commentary discusses several problems with the
target article by Ceci et al. First, the results admit of an alternative
interpretation that undercuts the conclusion drawn. In addition, at a
number of points, the research should be supplemented by examining
situations in which there is no tenure-granting policy. Finally, 60% of
the questions are concerned with whistle-blowing, but the issues
involved in such cases make them much less relevant to the assessment
of tenure than the authors suppose.
Under this administration there has been an unprecedented interference in scientific processes, and President Bush has directly avoided
implementation of a law designed to guarantee scientific independence.
One of his 750 “signing statements” bypassed implementation of the
law. . . . It is good for academics and scientists to speak out forcefully –
which, unfortunately, most of them are reluctant to do.
— Jimmy Carter (2006)

Discussions of tenure often proceed by anecdote or imprecise,
general impressions. For example, college presidents may complain of “lazy, incompetent” faculty who “ruin” their campuses
but cannot be removed (Fogg 2005). Given the ease with
which such charges can be made, Ceci et al. are to be applauded
for undertaking a serious empirical study of a major issue regarding tenure, that is, the relationship between tenure and the exercise of free speech. Nonetheless, the study falls far short of their
goal of casting doubt on whether tenure does effectively protect
free speech in the academy.
One problem is that the experimental results admit of a very
different interpretation; namely, that tenure does allow a
genuine independence of inquiry from political pressures external to the professorate, if not in other cases. The authors report
themselves puzzled by why a significantly higher number of
respondents marked “the strongest answer” in Question 4 (thus
indicating that controversy does not impede research);
however, Question 4 was the only question not explicitly concerned with reactions among one’s colleagues. Thus, the difference in that response may well be explained just by the
contrast between external pressure and that which comes from
the possibility of upset or angry senior colleagues.
Such independence from external pressures is often regarded
as the central point of tenure. As Jonathan Knight of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has remarked,
tenure allows colleges “to provide the best education to students
‘by ensuring to faculty they need not be worried about outraged
trustees or legislators . . . if they want to explore controversial
notions’” (quoted in Fogg 2005). Perhaps, as President Carter
laments (in the epigram quoted at the beginning of this

commentary), too few faculty are actively speaking out in
support of unfettered research, but the authors’ work indicates
that faculty view one another as largely politically autonomous.
Another problem is the absence of any investigation of what
happens in institutions which do not grant tenure. It is clear
now that with some topics, such as evolution and stem cell
research, both teaching in schools and research elsewhere have
been seriously affected by government pressure; we also have
recently seen efforts to override or even suppress scientific
research in federal institutions on matters such as “Plan B” birth
control (Harris 2005) and climate warming (Revkin 2006). Quite
severe restrictions on government funding of artistic expression
are also well known (Dubin 1993). It appears, then, that not
only are faculty prepared to exercise their independence, but
also that research agendas can otherwise be adversely affected.
Among the pressures on the professorate that are external to
the faculty, some become embodied in the institution. Lawrence
Summer’s resignation as Harvard’s president and the withdrawal
of the first-choice presidential candidate at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, (Rainey 2006) reflect the desire trustees
can have to prioritize supposed organizational skill over scholarly
goals, as well as the fact that tenured faculty may be prepared to
speak out against resulting decisions that are thought to subvert
academic values. I was, in fact, president of a faculty senate at the
end of a troubled administration, which ended after a very negative faculty climate survey. Given the reactions that came from
the board of regents, the main city newspaper, and many
others, it is reasonable to conclude that tenure had a very important role for those transmitting the news of widespread faculty
disapproval.
Part of what can lead faculty to oppose administrators is the
perception that heavy influence is being exerted in areas involving teaching and research, where the administrators have little
understanding. For example, a university administrator with
the central goal of increasing grant revenues may bring considerable blind pressure to bear on the content of research – and do
so without even any clear understanding of the difference
between clinical and theoretical inquiry. Tenure can certainly
play an important role in protecting research and teaching.
The strong “independent” response to Question 4 can be seen
as even more significant when we notice that three of the five
questions have to do with reporting colleagues for malfeasance.
Whistle-blowing is not invoked in the usual defenses of tenure,
and there are good reasons why it should not be part of a test
of the success of tenure granting. There are both societal and
institutional factors working against reporting colleagues.
Among other things, several careers can be pointlessly
damaged or even ruined if the whistle-blower gets it wrong.
Given the relative faculty freedom from external demands,
what should we make of a reluctance to teach courses that
senior faculty disapprove of? This is a difficult issue, because it
is not clear that junior faculty would generally be well advised
to choose their courses independently of more senior views.
Equally, it is unclear how to assess the authors’ conjecture that
the lure of tenure is silencing junior faculty. It is a causal hypothesis, while the survey just gives us correlations. At a
minimum, comparative research should be done between
tenure/tenure-track faculty and similar teachers, researchers,
and writers or artists not in such positions.
Another strong reason for looking at institutions that do not
grant tenure is that the very fact of generations of scholars
having had tenure in institutions that do grant it may have
created a fairly open academic atmosphere in those places.
Instead of indicating that tenure does not support freedom of
expression, the responses on the survey could mean that faculty
members generally do not feel compromised enough for there
to be a significant payoff in angering colleagues. In this regard,
it is unfortunate that many of the authors’ examples are drawn
from political correctness battles. It is my own judgment that a
number of the instances mentioned are not cases of responsible
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academic research. For example, the assertion that homosexuals
do not generally have children appears questionable (Editors of
Advocate [2006]) – but an adequate argument for my general
assessment would certainly exceed the limits imposed here.
NOTE
Carter (2006) cites Drew (2006).
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Abstract: Ceci et al.’s (2006) findings remind us that tenure rarely
serves its intended purpose. I argue that tenure often fails in part
because many faculty members possess an insufficient appreciation for
the heuristic value of controversy in science and other disciplines.
Using two case examples from clinical/personality psychology, I show
how controversial positions can draw sharp criticism while facilitating
scientific progress.

Ceci et al.’s (2006) findings remind us of a sobering fact: the
institution of tenure, although designed primarily to safeguard
unpopular positions (Menand 2001), frequently fails to serve its
intended purpose. Here I offer one partial explanation for their
results, namely, many academics’ insufficient appreciation of
the heuristic value of controversy. In the interests of space, I
focus on scientific controversies, although most of my conclusions apply in equal force to other domains of academia
(e.g., humanities).
As a collection of fallible human beings, the scientific community is subject to the same social psychological processes, such as
groupthink, confirmation bias, and ingroup – outgroup bias, that
can impede decision-making in other groups (Rosenwein 1994;
Shadish & Fuller 1994). In reading Ceci et al.’s (2006) findings,
it is difficult not to be reminded of the classic work of Schachter
(1951), who asked groups of nine participants to discuss the
most appropriate disposition for “Johnny Rocco,” a juvenile
delinquent. The potential interventions for Rocco ranged from
extremely harsh to extremely lenient. The group member who
advocated for a position diametrically opposed to the majority
(the “deviant”) was disliked the most, and was peremptorily
ignored by other group members following unsuccessful efforts
to “set him straight.”
To the extent that Schachter’s (1951) findings extend to the
Ivory Tower, there are ample grounds for concern. The history
of science teaches us that controversies can play a valuable role
in facilitating progress. Many mainstream scientific positions
began as fringe views that were initially repudiated by the
majority (Shadish et al. 1994), with Wegener’s theory of continental drift and Alverez’s more recent theory of an asteroidal
cause of the extinction of dinosaurs (Rosenwein 1994) being
paradigmatic examples. Even controversial positions that are
substantially incorrect can facilitate scientific progress by
forcing researchers to rethink their cherished assumptions and
adduce more compelling evidence for their assertions.
Moreover, researchers who advance minority positions may,
like Schachter’s deviates, be shunned by many of their colleagues. Yet some may make significant scientific contributions.
In their psychological analysis of Apollo moon scientists,
Mitroff and Fitzgerald (1977) found that that a subgroup of
what they termed “Type I scientists” (scientists who relished
theoretical speculation) were regarded by their peers as controversial, even abrasive. Yet these individuals were the most likely
to be rated by these peers as among the most valuable scientists
in the Apollo program. Their colleagues’ comments about them
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are illustrative: “They are examples of the lunatic fringe”; “X
and Y make people extremely mad but they also spur them on.
They are the creative vanguard” (Mitroff & Fitzgerald, p. 665).
We can appreciate the heuristic value of controversy in science
by examining two prominent controversies in my own field of
clinical/personality psychology. Both controversies have proven
valuable for scientific progress, although many colleagues criticized the scholars who instigated them for fomenting unproductive debates.
After examining numerous studies of personality trait
measures, Mischel (1968) concluded that the prevailing view of
traits as pervasive, cross-situationally consistent dispositions
was unwarranted. For a decade or more, Mischel’s review
threw the field of clinical/personality psychology into disarray
by raising serious questions concerning the predictive utility of
widely used trait measures. Following several thoughtful critiques (e.g., Bem & Allen 1974; Block 1977; Wachtel 1973), the
challenges raised by Mischel were largely resolved by Epstein
(1979), who found that trait measures can exhibit predictive
utility for behaviors across situations, but only when these behaviors are aggregated into stable response classes. That is, traits
are often helpful for predicting long-term behavioral trends,
but are rarely helpful for predicting isolated behaviors.
Some accused Mischel (1968) of cultivating a straw man
debate or “pseudocontroversy” (e.g., Carlson 1984) that did
little to advance the field’s conceptualization of traits. Nevertheless, as Kenrick and Funder (1988) observed, Mischel’s anti-trait
position, although too extreme in certain respects, exerted a salutary impact on psychology. His trenchant critique prompted
many trait researchers to reevaluate their fundamental assumptions, leading them to adopt a more nuanced view of the crosssituational consistency of behavior.
Thirty years later, Rind and colleagues provoked an even more
incendiary controversy by reporting the results of a meta-analysis
concerning the relation between self-reported child sexual abuse
(CSA) and adult psychopathology (Rind et al. 1998). Drawing
on a quantitative synthesis of 59 studies on over 15,000 college
participants, Rind et al. found that across 18 symptom
domains, the correlations between CSA and later maladjustment
were uniformly weak, with rs ranging from .04 to .13. Rind et al.’s
results and conclusions contradicted widely held views regarding
the ubiquity of CSA’s negative sequelae. Not surprisingly, they
were roundly denounced by academics (e.g., Spiegel 2000),
radio talk show hosts (e.g., Dr. Laura Schlessinger), a past
president of the American Psychiatric Association, and, in a
bizarre twist, both houses of the United States Congress
(Lilienfeld 2002; Rind et al. 2000). Some of Rind et al.’s critics
went so far as to contend that their findings should never have
been published. Although several criticisms of Rind et al.’s
analyses, such as the authors’ exclusive reliance on nonclinical
samples and on self-reports of CSA (e.g., Ondersma et al.
2001), raised reasonable questions, most others were easily
rebutted (Rind et al. 2001).
Despite – or perhaps because of – the acrimonious controversy it engendered, Rind et al.’s (1998) meta-analysis has
prompted a reexamination of the etiological role of CSA in
models of psychopathology. In the wake of their findings, some
authors have issued renewed calls for attending to the importance of resilience in adjustment to trauma (Sommers & Satel
2005; Wright et al. 2005). Still others have begun to examine
the causal role of CSA using genetically informative designs,
such as studies of monozygotic twins discordant for a history of
CSA. This research suggests that CSA probably increases risk
for subsequent psychopathology, but perhaps only when the
abuse involves direct genital contact (Kendler et al. 2000).
I would be remiss not to mention one critical caveat. Science is
an inherently conservative enterprise in which most unconventional views are initially regarded with skepticism (Merton
1942). This feature of science is not entirely irrational, because
most neoteric ideas have yet to accumulate a track record of
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corroborated predictions (Raup 1986). Moreover, most novel
scientific explanations, especially those that contradict
well-established paradigms, are probably wrong (Sagan 1995).
Nevertheless, the scientific community must walk a fine line
between harboring legitimate doubts toward controversial
ideas, which is justified, and dismissing them out of hand,
which rarely is (see Beyerstein’s [1995] distinction between
methodological and pathological skepticism).
Scholars who generate controversies in journals or classrooms
can often expect to encounter resistance, and at times even stiff
opposition, from colleagues. As a consequence, an undetermined
number of academic scientists may shy away from unpopular
stances, particularly in the early stages of their careers. In the
long run, this suppression of controversy is likely to be detrimental to scientific progress. One suspects that if more academics
were intimately familiar with the history of scientific controversies, they would be more willing to brook, and even actively
embrace, their gadfly colleagues. In turn, more faculty
members might feel free to pursue the controversial lines of
inquiry that tenure ostensibly guarantees.

Tenure is a necessary – not a
sufficient – condition for controversial
research
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Abstract: The Ceci et al. article is consistent with tenure being a
necessary condition for controversial research. In the absence of tenure,
as in the United Kingdom, professors have been fired and suspended
for politically controversial issues. There are a variety of reasons why
tenure does not ensure that professors will engage in controversial
research, including career interests and the desire to be liked.

I am not really surprised by the findings of the study, but I do
question whether the results imply that tenure should be abolished. It seems obtuse to use the finding that assistant professors
are often silenced by the fear of a negative tenure evaluation to
come to the conclusion that tenure does not result in advertised
benefits. On the face of it, there is the opposite implication:
Tenure is a necessary condition for engaging in controversial
research.
It is also obtuse to use the finding that associate professors are
only marginally more likely to “ruffle feathers” as an argument
against tenure. Obviously, promotion is also a resource that is
dependent on an evaluation process, so it is not surprising that
people without tenure and full professor status would be less
likely to rock the boat. In order to make a convincing argument
against tenure, one would have to show that full professors
would be just as likely to engage in controversial research
whether or not they had tenure – that tenure is a necessary condition for engaging in controversial research. This was not tested
in the present study and it could not be tested in the United
States. However, tenure in the United Kingdom has been
abolished, and the authors note that, “after all, the United
Kingdom abolished tenure for all appointments and promotions
that came after November, 1987, yet it would seem that their professoriate remains strong and vibrant.” However, Chris Brand
was dismissed from his position at the University of Edinburgh,1
and Frank Ellis has been suspended from the University of
Leeds,2 both for reasons related to the issue of race differences
in intelligence. Such examples surely serve to intimidate
professors engaged in research that touches on issues related
to current political orthodoxy.

In fact, as the authors themselves note, professors in the
United Kingdom are evaluated for their research, and it is easy
to imagine that professors wanting positive evaluations would
not want to offend their colleagues. The strength and vibrancy
of the British professoriate is thus unlikely to extend to controversial issues that conflict with the ideologies of university administrators. The pitfalls of lack of tenure can also be seen in the case
of Andrew Fraser of Macquarie University in Sydney.3 Fraser,
who was on a one-year pre-retirement contract, was suspended
from teaching after making comments on race differences in
intelligence and criminality.
The most parsimonious interpretation of the data is that professors will not engage in controversial research if it will impact
negatively on evaluations, either for tenure or promotion. The
findings of this study are consistent with supposing that tenure
is a necessary condition for doing controversial research. They
also show what we already know – that tenure is not a sufficient
condition for doing research or teaching ideas that depart from
current orthodoxy. The fact is that tenure is only one of many
resources that academics value that may be endangered by
displeasing the powers that be. The authors mention valuing
harmony and avoiding criticism from respected colleagues, but
engaging in controversial research may mean no more invitations
to deliver papers at other universities or important conferences. In
fact, controversial professors may not be able to publish their work
at prestigious academic or commercial presses. (Indeed, Chris
Brand’s book, The g Factor, was “de-published” by John Wiley
after it had been on sale for six weeks in the UK, and Deakin University refused to publish Andrew Fraser’s peer-reviewed article
on race differences.) Or they may even have difficulty getting
their work published at all. They will not be invited to the good
parties, or get nice summer fellowships, or get asked to serve as
dean or in a future administration in Washington. Or maybe
their sources of funding will dry up. As a professor commenting
on the lack of academic debate over a recent paper by John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) and Stephen Walt (Harvard),
critical of the Israel Lobby, noted: “People might debate it if
you gave everyone a get-out-of-jail-free card and promised that
afterward everyone would be friends” (in Fairbanks 2006). Professors who engage in controversial research know they are
“going to jail,” but with tenure, at least it’s not hard time.
NOTES
1. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Brand.
2. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/4838498.stm.
3. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Fraser_(academic).
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Abstract: The target article by Ceci et al. provides some interesting
results regarding how faculty might react to difficult social dilemmas,
but it has little to say about tenure and its effect upon academic
freedom. This comment discusses briefly what we know about tenure,
and employment protection more generally, and why it may be in a
university’s best interest to hire tenured faculty. The comment
concludes by pointing out that the results make a rather useful
contribution regarding the difficulty of eliciting information on
malfeasance in organizations, an area of enormous importance. For
example, the results may help us understand why the government has
introduced rewards for the reporting of fraud under the whistleblowing provisions of the Federal Claims Act.

Ceci et al.’s Abstract for the target article concludes with the
statement, “These findings challenge the assumption that
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tenure can be justified on the basis of fostering academic
freedom, suggesting the need for a re-examination of the philosophical foundation and practical implications of tenure in today’s
academy.” Although the findings reported in this article provide
some interesting results regarding how faculty might react to difficult social dilemmas, the results have little to say about tenure
and its effect upon academic freedom. I comment briefly on
the results and then discuss what we know about tenure, and
about employment protection more generally. Finally, I point
out an area in which the article makes a rather useful contribution regarding the efficacy of the whistle-blowing provisions
under the Federal Claims Act in the United States.
In terms of the scientific contribution of the results, the
authors report how responses to hypothetical situations vary
with the rank of the respondent: assistant, associate, or full professor. By comparing the results from assistant professors (who
are not tenured) with those of full professors (who are usually
tenured), the authors hope to see how tenure affects “academic
freedom.” As a matter of fact, full professors are not always
tenured (at least two colleagues in my department are untenured
full professors), and hence the relationship between rank and
tenure status is a correlation. More generally, the status of full
professor at a research university, in addition to being correlated
with tenure status, is also correlated to many other attributes,
including research ability, salary, outside income, and overall
productivity. The point is that although the survey provides
information regarding how faculty of different rank respond to
a social dilemma, it is impossible to causally attribute these
responses to the institution of tenure. Teasing out the difference
between correlation and causation is an extremely difficult task
that is one of the major research areas in modern applied
social sciences (see Angrist-Krueger [1999] for an excellent
discussion of the issue).
Second, the target article is beautifully written, but at the cost
of making some misleading statements. It is rather inaccurate to
say that, “Tenure is said to represent the crown jewel of academic
life.” Although some individuals might make this statement, it is a
rather simplistic and inaccurate description of the employment
relationship at a modern research university. Siow (1998) provides a wonderful review of the institution of tenure, including
a careful discussion of its costs and benefits. He mentions the
argument of academic freedom, but finds no evidence that this
explains the historical evolution of the institution of tenure.
More generally, tenure is an example of the more general class
of employment contracts that raise the cost of dismissing a
worker, but it is inaccurate to claim that it provides complete
job security.
One of the reasons that tenure survives is because most universities are very stable entities, and hence there is little benefit from
having a large amount of staff turnover. Once a faculty member has
demonstrated competence in their field, then, normally, there
would be no reason to dismiss them as long as they perform
their duties. Should the university have to shut down a program,
then the staff in that program would lose their positions, even if
they were tenured. Moreover, under American employment law,
tenure is not an employment guarantee. Rather, were a tenured
employee to be unjustly dismissed, the standard remedy would
be compensation equal to the harm suffered (though in some
rare cases where the university is clearly at fault, and the harm
to the employee very high, reinstatement may be used, as in
Silva v. U. of New Hampshire (1994) 888 F. Supp. 293).
The authors write as if the “crown jewel” of academic life
has no benefit for the university. In fact, there are many benefits
to providing increased job security to individuals. First, as
Carmichael (1988) shows, tenure creates incentives for faculty
to make decisions that are in the interests of the university – if
anything, tenured faculty are likely to be reluctant to act in
ways detrimental to their own institutions, since tenure is only
as good as the institution that grants it. Second, Ransom (1993)
finds that research output is the major avenue by which faculty
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gain real salary increases over their careers. Hence, in the
absence of tenure, faculty would spend even less time engaged
in teaching and administration, to the detriment of the functioning of the university. This may explain why tenure protects
individuals from wrongful dismissal as long as they discharge
their administrative and teaching duties. Employment at will
might achieve this; however, as Ehrenberg et al. (1998) show,
one would then have to compensate individuals with higher
salaries.
One might argue that universities already do this because they
hire inexpensive, untenured adjunct professors to cover many of
their courses. On average these faculty members are of lower
quality than tenured faculty (Ehrenberg & Zhang 2005). This
may explain why many universities freely hire tenured faculty
rather than rely solely upon untenured adjuncts. In particular,
it is reasonable to suppose that these universities wish to
provide the highest quality education possible given their
budget constraints. Therefore, the authors need to carefully
explain how the public interest would be advanced by restricting
freedom of contract through the abolition of a university’s right to
offer employment contracts with tenure.
Let me comment briefly on the results themselves. Regarding
Question 1, on unpopular courses, as I have mentioned, tenured
professors are contractually obligated to carry out their teaching
duties, and hence tenured faculty do not have the right to teach
unpopular courses. Normally, teaching assignments are done in a
collegial fashion. Yet, the university, as represented by the
senior faculty responsible for setting the teaching matrix, has
the right to ask faculty to teach any course consistent with their
employment contract. Should they refuse, they could be
dismissed, even if they have tenure. Regardless of tenure
status, faculty members are employees of the university, and as
such they have certain obligations to perform their duties in a
responsible manner. Many universities may be lax in their oversight of faculty, but that is a managerial issue, rather than one of
academic freedom.
There is a real issue concerning the extent to which a faculty
member may express unpopular views in a popular (large)
class. However, the current survey instruments do not address
this question.
In this regard, Questions 2, 3, and 5 are not about academic
freedom per se, since these infractions could lead to a tenured
professor being dismissed. Rather, they address the issue of
whether or not individuals in a small community would be
willing to “blow the whistle” on their colleagues. Fraud and inappropriate behavior are serious issues in all large organizations,
and much of it goes unreported. It is an important policy question
to understand the conditions under which this information is
likely to be reported and acted upon. The results of Ceci et al.
suggest that lower-ranked individuals are less likely to act upon
such information, though in many cases they may be quite knowledgeable regarding infractions occurring at the workplace. It
would have been interesting to know how secretarial staff
would respond to such questions, and how their responses vary
with their own tenure.
In order to help uncover fraud in government procurement,
the Federal Claims Act has a whistle-blower provision that provides financial compensation (up to a million dollars in some
cases) to individuals who find and report fraud against the government. Several university hospitals, where faculty members
have actively (and in some cases for little financial gain) participated in defrauding the government, have been successfully prosecuted under this program. The fact that individuals need to be
highly compensated to report acts of malfeasance indicates that
the problem of free speech in organizations goes far beyond
the right to have an unpopular opinion and is, at best, only tangentially related to the issue of academic tenure.1 Rather, we
conclude that tenure may be justified, not on the grounds of academic freedom, but because it lowers the cost of hiring highly
skilled faculty.
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NOTE
1. Certainly, tenure is not necessary for individuals to report malfeasance. See Couzin (2006) for a discussion of a recent case in which
several graduate students, at great personal cost, reported fraud committed by their supervisor.
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Abstract: Does tenure serve its original purpose of promoting freedom of
inquiry for academics in teaching and research? It seems not. Of concern
is the finding that achieving tenure does not translate into a significant
increase in exercise of freedom of inquiry either in teaching or
research. Why? Promotion evaluation for associate professors by their
senior colleagues has a continued inhibiting effect.

The target article by Ceci et al. addresses an important issue
facing higher education today. What are the consequences,
good and bad, of the tenure system for faculty, the institutions
they serve, and society in general? The authors review some of
the concerns currently being expressed by critics of tenure in
academe, and give several cogent examples of challenges to the
system and academic freedom coming from both the political
right and the political left. As example of the former, the right,
are outcries for the firing of Ward Churchill, a tenured ethnic
studies professor at the University of Colorado who called some
victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks “little Eichmanns” in an
online essay; example of the latter, the left, are demands for job
termination for several professors (Arthur Jensen, J. Philippe
Rushton, Richard Herrnstein, and Charles Murray) who advocate
a strong heritability component for human intelligence. At present
a battle exists, with supporters and opponents of tenure trying to
influence university policy committees (e.g., at the University of
Colorado–Bolder), legislators, and members of the public.
Ceci et al. suggest that a neglected topic in this debate is the
question whether tenure and academic freedom serve their original purpose of promoting freedom of inquiry for academics in
teaching and research. The authors’ survey of 961 professors
from 50 top-ranked colleges and universities looked at this
issue with some interesting results. It would have been nice,
however, to see a similar sample from smaller and lesserranked schools, of which there are a large number in the
United States: Are the tenure and promotion criteria and practices comparable? If they are not (e.g., less demanding tenure
and promotion evaluations or more collegiality among ranks),
then these findings may be somewhat limited.
On the positive side, the full professors in the study showed no
strong tendency of becoming, in their beliefs of their colleagues,
a “post-tenure renegade professor,” that is, confrontational,
demanding his or her way, and unwilling to compromise. If this
is accurate, as studies of behavioral forecasting, personal biases,
and social psychology show – people tend to predict the behavior
of others quite well – then some criticism of tenure and
promotion may be dampened by this finding. I will say, though,
that in my 30 years as an academic, I have experienced on
several occasions what could be called the Dr. Jeykll and Mr.
Hyde effect: a quiet, respectful, nonconfrontational junior colleague transformed at tenure – but most often with promotion
to full professor – into a self-centered, combative, nonconciliatory alpha beast, who often will scare the hell out of very junior
or new faculty with the consequence of severely diminishing
their willingness to assert their rights of academic freedom
(e.g., teach or conduct research not approved by senior faculty
or speak in favor of controversial positions).

Perhaps the most important finding in Ceci et al.’s study
involves the very limited “freeing” effect tenure produces relative
to promotion to full professor. This is clearly seen in the similarity
between the responses of tenured associate professors and those
of the non-tenured assistant professors on issues regarding
reporting ethical misconduct and abandoning unpopular (to the
senior professors) teaching and research activities. Ceci et al.
characterize the assistant and associate professors’ timidity, compared to full professors’ attitudes, as an abrogation of the former’s
academic freedom, and I would agree. One could sympathize
with assistant professors facing both tenure and promotion evaluations (and a degree of unfamiliarity and inexperience regarding
their academic roles), but what about the tenured associate professors? Why are many of them not as assertive as their full
professor colleagues regarding activities relevant to academic
freedom? The answer is that, as they say in the military, rank
has privileges. No one in the military would consider it a good
career move to criticize or oppose the wishes or feeling of
those higher in rank tasked with his or her evaluation and promotion – it would be viewed as career suicide. Not to suggest that
academe is a quasi-military hierarchy, but the social dynamics
(academic freedom be damned) appear similar. The sad fact is
that, as the authors recognize, it may take 10 to 20 years for a
professor to reach full professorship, and their data suggest
that during that critical period of professional development and
accomplishments, full exercise of academic freedom is likely
not to occur because of evaluation/promotion considerations.
The cost of this dampening effect is what concerns me most.
What innovative, creative, groundbreaking, and yes, controversial
research (e.g., stem cell) and classes are shelved by those academics facing the 10 to 20 years of review and evaluations
leading to the Holy Grail of full professorship at their institution?
Steve Ceci and I did a controversial 2-year study of the peerreview process in prestigious psychology journals (Peters &
Ceci 1982) while we were still non-tenured assistant professors.
Our study received much publicity (e.g., from Behavioral and
Brain Sciences and from Science), and we received over 1,000
supportive letters from colleagues in the United States and
Europe, but our senior, tenured colleagues were very critical of
our work, with some characterizing it as “juvenilia” unworthy of
serious study. A nasty tenure battle subsequently occurred for
one of us, with the peer review study cited as being “unprofessional” and a reason for nontenure. Fortunately, more reasoned
heads prevailed, but the point had been made: Academic
freedom is not a given for junior faculty. Displease those
senior colleagues evaluating you at great risk to your career. I
would have thought then, 25 years ago, that the awarding of
tenure would change one’s outlook regarding academic freedom
and opportunity; but experience, and now the empirical findings
of Ceci et al.’s work, have tempered that view considerably.

Tenure as a necessary but not sufficient
requirement for academic freedom
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Abstract: Although the job security afforded by tenure is one important
factor in deciding whether or how to exercise academic freedom,
professors must weigh a number of other important career goals that
constrain their choices. This multiplicity of goals, combined with
concerns about career mobility, may help to explain the differences
Ceci et al. observe between professors at different ranks.
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Ceci et al. have found that faculty believe full professors would be
more likely than assistant or associate professors to exercise academic freedom in potentially risky ways, whereas tenure is a
relatively unimportant factor in deciding whether or how to act.
To help explain why the boundary between associate and full professors may be more important in these cases than the boundary
between tenured and untenured individuals, we emphasize that
faculty members pursue multiple goals (e.g., achieving job security, increasing pay, attaining promotions and higher status,
improving working conditions) and that tenure, although important, addresses only job security. Moreover, this security exists only
at one’s current institution. Even discounting the choice or need
to relocate, professors who exercise the academic freedom provided by tenure may jeopardize other important career goals.
By questioning whether tenure continues to serve its intended
purpose, Ceci et al. have essentially argued that tenure is not
sufficient to ensure academic freedom. We do not disagree with
this assertion, but we propose modifying it: Tenure is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for academic freedom.
Assuming that professors’ behavior – in the aggregate, not in
each instance – is strategic and rational, it can be used to understand faculty members’ goals and motivations. It would be naive
to assume that maintaining current employment status is the sole
concern. Professors would exercise without fail the academic
freedom provided by tenure only if they were indifferent to the
consequences of their actions in every area but job security.
Some instructive parallels exist between professors and another
group of professionals granted life tenure: federal judges.
Political scientists have noted that federal judges, while enjoying life tenure, are not immune from external pressures and
consider factors beyond law and conscience when rendering
judgments. Their rulings hold consequences for the ability to
advance to higher-status judicial posts, to run successfully for
political office, to earn pay increases, and so forth; less tangible
factors, such as prestige and recognition by peers, may also
motivate judicial decision making (Baum 1994; Cohen 1991).
Thus, life appointment to the bench does not prevent rational
judges from considering how other individuals may respond to
their decisions.
Likewise, rational faculty members – tenured or not – should
consider how colleagues, administrators, students, and others
might view their behavior. Like judges, professors are motivated
by career ambitions. In academia, attaining the rank of full professor is not the only way to increase one’s status. Some faculty
members aspire to work at a more prestigious institution,
whereas others seek positions of academic leadership or administration, including department chair, dean, provost, or president.
Like the federal judiciary, academia is a small world. Even across
disciplines or institutions, individual reputations are often well
known or easily discovered. For example, a faculty member on
a search committee might contact an old friend from graduate
school who has worked closely with an applicant. For an academic determined to move up his or her self-defined career
ladder, rational behavior is that which does not alienate one’s
colleagues. As technological advances facilitate the flow of
information, managing one’s professional reputation becomes
more important. Accordingly, faculty might be expected to take
fewer professional risks.
Professors also pursue other tangible goals, such as increased
pay, sabbatical leaves, research grants, and larger office or lab
space. Some of these can be attained through promotion or
moving to a new institution. However, even within academic
ranks at the same institution, subjective assessments of faculty
performance influence salaries and professional perks. Professors
desire the respect of their colleagues and a collegial working
environment, and they may wish to be elected or appointed to
leadership positions that include important committees. Attaining these goals requires being concerned with more than job
security as well as carefully managing the impressions formed
by others.
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Colleagues may or may not react favorably to a professor
who acts assertively to exercise and defend academic freedom.
The disciplinary and institutional cultures shaping one’s work
environment, especially the value assigned to dissenting voices,
no doubt vary considerably. Whenever a professional risk is
taken by exercising academic freedom, tenure protects against
the most severe sanction: dismissal. Nonetheless, other factors
mitigate against the full exercise of academic freedom. Accordingly, tenure may be a necessary but not sufficient requirement
for academic freedom.
Even if one accepts this conclusion, an important question
remains: Why did Ceci et al.’s respondents believe that full professors would be more likely to exercise academic freedom than
assistant or associate professors? We offer two speculations. First,
exercising academic freedom may place both untenured assistant
and tenured associate professors at greater risk than full professors of being deprived of limited resources or being given
unpleasant work assignments. Within and between departmental
units, full professors tend to wield more power than assistant or
associate professors. Second, when making decisions regarding
potentially aversive confrontations with colleagues, full professors may give less weight to career mobility than assistant or
associate professors. Whereas tenure supports academic
freedom at the institution that grants it, developing a reputation
for being confrontational – whether reasonably or unreasonably – may constrain one’s job prospects at other institutions.
Even with a solid record of achievements and a good reputation,
career mobility generally is poorest for full professors. Except
when special knowledge, skills, or experience are required,
most academic institutions are reluctant to hire at the full
professor level when there is an abundant supply of professors
who can be hired less expensively at the assistant or associate
level. Thus, we are not surprised to observe negligible differences
in the anticipated exercise of academic freedom between untenured assistant professors and tenured associate professors, as
these individuals often have better career mobility than full professors. Ceci et al. may have focused too narrowly on professors’
desires to achieve tenure and promotion at their current institutions as the primary factor in their deciding whether or how
to respond to threats to academic freedom.

Testing tenure: Let the market decide
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Abstract: Tenure debates and disputes are often irresolvable because of
the complex and multivariate nature of contractual relationships between
faculty and administration, and the nuanced and varying beliefs about
tenure held by the professoriate. The Ceci et al. study leads this
commentator to suggest a simple solution – allow individual institutions
to define the parameters of tenure according to their unique core values.

Pepperdine University is a private religious school affiliated with
the Church of Christ. When I matriculated in 1974, Pepperdine
was extremely conservative – politically, religiously, and socially.
Politically, the administration had ties to the Republican Party –
President Gerald Ford spoke there, as did the physicist Edward
Teller on the validity of Mutual Assured Destruction as a Cold
War strategy. Religiously, my professors were Christians, and
twice-weekly chapel attendance was required, as was a set of religion courses. Socially, student activities were closely monitored,
with dancing prohibited and opposite-sex dorm-room visits
forbidden. However, as I was a born-again Christian riding the
wave of an inchoate evangelical movement, this was exactly
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what I wanted in a college. As a paying customer, my needs were
well met by Pepperdine.
Today, however, although I remain fiscally conservative, I am a
nontheist, a social liberal, and a public intellectual critical of religious extremism and excessive intrusion of religion in American
public life (see Shermer 1999; 2004; 2006; as well as Skeptic
magazine, of which I am the founding editor). Pepperdine
would never hire me today, but what if they had before I bifurcated down this rather divergent intellectual path, and then used
my position as a platform for converting conservative Christian
students into liberal nontheists? If students and their parents
complained that they were not getting what they paid for (in
2006, tuition was in excess of $40,000), should the Pepperdine
administration have the option of terminating my employment?
In my opinion, yes; in the opinion of all of my professor friends
and colleagues whom I queried (both those with and those
without tenure, and even one of my old Pepperdine professors),
no. Their reasoning is that academic freedom trumps institutional needs, and the opportunity for faculty growth is more
important than student preferences or collegiate predilections.
The results of my informal survey – conducted in preparation
for an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) conference on
tenure and academic freedom in which I defended the right of
the University of Colorado to fire Professor Ward Churchill for
stepping beyond the bounds of his duties as a college professor
when he penned an essay that equated the victims of 9/11 to
“little Eichmans” – fall squarely in the range of responses offered
by the professoriate surveyed by Ceci et al. Tenure, although
flawed and in need of minor modifications, is rarely abused and
is necessary to protect intellectual freedom in the academy.
There are two levels of analysis considered here in testing
tenure: descriptive and proscriptive. The Ceci et al. article is primarily descriptive and metadescriptive – what professors believe
about tenure, and what they believe other professors believe
about tenure. Although there are limitations to such self-report
data (well outlined by the authors), the methodology offers
important insights into beliefs that Frank Sulloway and I
employed in our study of religious beliefs; for example, why
people believe in God and why they think other people believe
in God. As we noted in our own caveat, “we are not so naive as
to think that people have complete access to their internal states
that translate as fully accurate reasons for belief. However, in
the spirit of recognizing that the observable level of behavior is
a meaningful one for humans, we feel that one way to shift from
the observable to the unobservable is to simply ask people why
they believe” (Shermer & Sulloway, in preparation). What professors believe about tenure and why, and what they think other
(higher or lower ranked) professors believe about tenure and
why, across a wide range of hypothetical scenarios, is crucial information in shifting the discussion from the descriptive to the proscriptive; in this case, the study by Ceci et al. reveals that extreme
attitudes (positive or negative) toward tenure are not common in
the academy, and that recommendations of change must be made
within certain modest boundaries in order to be adopted.
Having taught as an adjunct professor at three different colleges in the course of twenty years (Glendale College, California
State University Los Angeles, and Occidental College) before
embarking on a career as an independent researcher, writer,
and editor, one solution occurred to me after reading the Ceci
et al. article: Let the market decide; that is, allow individual
institutions to define the parameters of tenure according to
their unique core values. For example, if Pepperdine University
is offering their customers (parents and students) a conservative
Christian learning atmosphere, and as one of their professors
I was purposefully undermining that mission through social activism inside and outside the classroom, then by all means the
administration should do what it needs to do to preserve the
integrity of the university’s core values, even if that means
firing me. By contrast, Occidental College, which is well-known
as a far left-leaning institution (I kept my fiscal conservatism to

myself when I taught there), can market to its potential customers that it fosters a liberal secular learning atmosphere. An
extreme religious fundamentalist professor thumping a Bible
on campus might reasonably be considered polluting this
campus atmosphere.
On the other hand, if an institution is willing to tolerate some
deviance from its foundational norms as part of an intellectual
diversity program, then contracts with faculty should specify
such deviance parameters; where a contract cannot anticipate
specific instances of parameter violations, conflicts can be
resolved through institutional arbitration. In neither example is
an all-encompassing rule about tenure – enforced through
state or national teacher unions or courts – necessary or even
possible. The problem in the case of Ward Churchill and the
University of Colorado, as with so many tenure disputes, is the
difficulty involved in attempting to apply a single overarching
principle to a system as complex and multivariate as the
academy. A simple solution, then, is to retain the spirit of
tenure across the academic board, while allowing each institution
to define tenure within the parameters of its own core values.
This market solution elegantly addresses the problem of grafting
a general principle onto an extraordinarily varying human
institution, a problem well captured by that sage dispenser of
pop philosophy, Yogi Berra: “In theory there is no difference
between theory and practice. In practice there is.”

Put tenure in today’s social context
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Abstract: Tenure should not be judged on its ability to promote whistleblowing. Because the process of getting tenure may weed out those who
might later need it, reform is called for. Reform of tenure must take into
account not only the Salieri-effect, but also Thomas Kuhn’s popular
philosophical attack on independent thought and the tendency towards
the use of minimal standards, resulting from the professionalization of
research, to block work which is more than minimal. Reform of various
institutions to encourage autonomy is needed so that those who receive
tenure use it for its intended purpose.

The target article’s interesting survey of opinions about the
effectiveness of tenure displays the limitations of the hoped-for
impact of tenure on the willingness of professors to be independent. By putting significant pressure on junior professors
to conform, tenure can even hinder rather than promote
autonomy. In fact, it tends to quickly weed out those who might
later use it well. It has also failed to promote whistle-blowing by
protecting whistle-blowers. But this failure should not be held
against tenure, as it was not designed to serve this purpose.
The challenge to improve the conditions of autonomous
scholars and to encourage others to become so has to be seen
against a background of various forces working against
independence. The authors ignore this shifting background by
portraying the problem of furthering independence as being
clear-cut because virtually all thinkers support independence.
Not so. Thomas Kuhn and his followers have mounted a powerful
attack on autonomous research (Kuhn 1962; cf. Bailey 2006).
The authors seem to expect that, as autonomy increases, so
does whistle-blowing. But this need not be the case: Independent
thinkers do not need to see policing their colleagues as their
responsibility. The authors mention the thesis that a significant
number of tenured professors do not bother with research or
serious teaching and are lax in their standards of behaviour,
because they cannot be held accountable. However, the
authors do not test this hypothesis. Rather, they ask whether
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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tenure is perceived as increasing the willingness of professors to
be whistle-blowers. The former question is of concern for the
appraisal of tenure, but the latter is not. It may be interesting
to know whether the desirable result of encouraging whistleblowing is produced, but it should not be put under the rubric
of encouraging independence, as the authors put it. Institutions
set specific tasks for individuals (Wettersten 2006). The tasks
that the institution of tenure sets for professors are those of engaging in independent teaching and research. The control of professorial behaviour poses tasks for quite different institutional
arrangements – if needed: better reviews of output, clearer
administrative standards and enforcement procedures, and
better financial monitoring. The results of the target article
indicate that professors tend to pass problems of unacceptable
behaviour on to the administration, that is, to department
chairpersons. This seems quite reasonable and has nothing to
do with independence, as the authors indicate.
The professionalization of research has led to the application
of minimal standards, which tends to hinder good research. In
the nineteenth century, Charles Babbage bitterly complained
that membership in the Royal Society did not depend on
having made any scientific discovery: Distinguished people
could simply purchase membership (Babbage 1830). But, then,
membership in the Royal Society did not by itself grant intellectual status. Membership only showed an interest in natural philosophy, which is admirable. This meant that the task faced by
members was to achieve status by making real contributions.
However, this had an unintended and desirable consequence:
Minimal contributions were of little interest, so there was real
competition to make significant discoveries and reward – social
recognition – for those who did.
Babbage wished prospective members to achieve status by
making real contributions to science. He was quickly successful:
Research became a profession, and membership in research
organizations or the attainment of professorships was enough
to achieve status. This, however, had an unintended and undesirable consequence: Status could be achieved by meeting the
minimal standards for membership. This is the case today,
especially when one is seeking tenure.
The use of minimal standards has its own logic. Minimal standards have a strong tendency to become maximum standards
because any research that goes beyond them runs the danger
of violating them (Wettersten 1979). Thomas Kuhn’s praise of
normal science is an example. Conformity with a paradigm represents a minimal standard. Any really challenging and interesting work will violate this standard and thus will probably be
rejected as substandard.
Traditionally, tenure has been viewed against an idealized
version of a community of scholars that requires protection
from outside interference in their pursuit of truth. Admirably,
the authors contribute to a more realistic picture by indicating
how pressure from colleagues to conform can limit research – a
phenomenon which has been studied and given a name, the
Salieri-effect, by Joseph Agassi (see Agassi 1981). Just as Salieri
is reputed to have blocked the career of Mozart in order to
preserve his own status, senior colleagues tend to block, underestimate, and discourage junior ones who might outshine them.
There are stunning exceptions, such as Planck’s encouraging
Einstein, and, Agassi suggests, Einstein’s encouragement of
Davisson and Germer, but these are apparent exceptions.
After the professionalization of research, a need arose to
protect the “invisible college” – the community of scholars
united only by their interest in the truth – and the tenure
system was introduced to that end. This end is still a worthy
and pressing goal (Agassi 2003), but more study is required to
examine how professionalization has changed the internal community of scholars and how it can be made more democratic
(Wettersten 1993). New teaching methods that encourage autonomy are called for (Wettersten 1987b; 1987c), and new strategies
for preserving autonomy need to be developed (Wettersten
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1987a). In order to correct the worse cases of punishing autonomy and to lessen the pressure to conform, institutions are
called for which seek to help outsiders in trouble, whether they
are young or old, accomplished researchers or beginners; institutions that will take care to avoid the Mathew effect – the rich
get richer (Merton 1973) – which ruined the positive effect of
well-meaning institutions such as the McArthur Fund. The
misuse of minimal standards needs to be combated by encouraging those who pose new problems and set new desiderata for
solutions. When autonomy is more highly valued and when
more individuals are autonomous, tenure will continue to serve
a modest purpose. In the meantime, we need to institute more
education for autonomy.
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Abstract: In our target article, we took the position that
tenure conveys many important benefits but that its original
justification – fostering academic freedom – is not one of
them. Here we respond to various criticisms of our study as
well as to proposals to remedy the current state of affairs.
Undoubtedly, more research is needed to confirm and extend
our findings, but the most reasonable conclusion remains the
one we offered – that the original rationale for tenure is poorly
served by the current system as practiced at top-ranked
colleges and universities.

R1. Introduction
As Victor Nell (2006) recently remarked, “Publishing in
BBS is not for the faint-hearted” (p. 246). It forces
authors to justify their assumptions, double-check their
data, and defend each claim, no matter how reasonable
it seemed to them. In response to the description of
our study and its findings, several commentators expressed
the view that the study either was not needed because the
results were predictable, or that our interpretation of the
data missed the mark, or that our exposition was
muddled. We discuss each of these claims in turn.
At the outset, we wish to express our gratitude to
these 19 commentators for their thoughtful and thoughtprovoking insights. They raised a number of issues we
had not anticipated, detected mistakes in our reporting
of a few statistics, and posed alternative explanations that
seem reasonable to us. As will be seen, we accept many,
though not all, of their points. However, we stand by our
conclusion that the original justification for tenure does
not appear to warrant its current justification. None of
the concerns raised diminish this interpretation, and in
fact several of them actually amplify it, as we show below.
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To recap our principal findings, on the basis of more
than 1,000 analyses, including extensive post hoc tests
and logistic regressions that we alluded to but did not
report (because of limitations placed on the size of the
article), we repeatedly found that assistant professors
rated their own cohort as less likely to insist on academic
freedom and less likely to engage in strong forms of
whistle-blowing than they believed associate and full professors to be. The latter two ranks also expressed the belief
that assistant professors would be less likely to do these
things. Further, we typically found that associate professors rated their own rank as less likely to insist on academic freedom and whistle-blowing than they believed
to be true of full professors. This last finding calls into
question the original justification for tenure because promotion to full professor rather than the awarding of
tenure was the event that most liberated faculty from
pressures to refrain from academic freedom and whistleblowing. Notwithstanding the criticisms, challenges, and
questions posed by the commentators, we stand by these
conclusions, although we are the first to acknowledge
that more research is needed to extend our findings and
perhaps even alter them.
R2. Criticisms and concerns
R2.1. Criticism 1: The ﬁndings have little or nothing
to do or say about the value of tenure

Buck, Donchin, Donderi, Jacobson, and others argue
that our findings have little to say about tenure’s value.
In their words: “[the results] have nothing to do with
the social or political value or importance of tenure”
(Donderi); “questions regarding confronting sexual and
research misconduct . . . are not, strictly speaking, issues
of academic freedom, but, rather, of professional ethics.
Nowhere, to my knowledge, does AAUP (or other associations, for that matter) claim that tenure is either a guarantor or protector of ethical behavior in situations such as
those described in the survey instrument”(Buck); “The
target article demonstrates, at best, the existence of
social pressures, but it provides no useful data reflecting
on the value, or effectiveness, of tenure” (Donchin);
“60% of the questions are concerned with whistleblowing, but the issues involved in such cases make
them much less relevant to the assessment of tenure
than the authors suppose” (Jacobson, Abstract).
Granted, tenure has many positive aspects, such as
those we mentioned in our target article, including its protection against McCarthy-type intrusions into research, its
usefulness in attracting a quality workforce, and its positive
effects on students attending institutions that are more
tenured. In our article, we cited research by our Cornell
colleague, Ron Ehrenberg (Ehrenberg & Zhang 2004),
showing higher graduation rates at institutions with
higher proportions of tenure-track faculty. For example,
other factors held constant, a 10-percentage point increase
in the percentage of part-time faculty not on tenure track
is associated with a reduction in the graduation rate of
2.6 to 4.0 percentage points among students; and a 10%
increase in the proportion of full-time faculty not on
tenure track is associated with a reduction in the
graduation rate of 4.4 percentage points. These are
genuine benefits of tenure, and we acknowledged them

in our article, along with several other genuine benefits.
Our goal was not to gainsay these and the other very real
benefits associated with tenure, but to ask whether the
original justification for tenure – that it fosters academic
freedom – can be currently justified. That several
commentators took us to task for what they perceived to
be our anti-tenure bias suggests that we unsuccessfully
represented our position. We never sought to claim
tenure is worthless, only that it falls short of its original
justification.
Hence, in discussing our results, we argued that the
value of tenure’s many benefits needs to be judged in
terms of its costs, such as reduced institutional flexibility,
maintenance of some faculty who are not productive
researchers or effective teachers, and, in light of the
present findings, reduced likelihood that assistant and
associate professors will exercise the academic freedom
that tenure was supposed to promote, out of a seeming
belief that its exercise will result in denial of tenure or
promotion to full professor. Thus, our conclusion was
that although we see many benefits to tenure, its original
justification – fostering academic freedom – is not one
of them and should not be looked to for its current justification. Clearly, this conclusion provoked strong reactions
in some commentators. This is understandable given that
it is a topic that many feel passionately about, and given
the number of commentators who have played longstanding professional roles in organizations such as the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP).
However, regardless of whether anyone agrees with us
on this point, we should not be accused of ignoring
tenure’s many demonstrated benefits.
Donchin claims that faculty willingness to teach unpopular courses and conduct research on unpopular topics
has nothing to do with the value of tenure in assuring
academic freedom: and that we failed to distinguish
between interference with academic freedom by forces
external to the academy and the internal forces that
derive from interactions among scholars. In his words,
“Tenure is designed to address the former . . . It shelters
faculty from the predilections of legislators, governors,
university presidents, and boards of trustees.” Because
the revocation of tenure is an administrative act,
Donchin argues that tenure is not meant to insulate
faculty from academic politics. In response, we note that
if tenure were designed solely to shelter faculty from external forces, then we would agree with Donchin’s argument,
as well as with Jacobson, who makes a similar argument
(claiming that the willingness of our respondents to
choose the strongest option for Question 4 was because
this option did not involve internal pressure, but only
external political pressure, which Jacobson argues is the
heart of academic freedom). However, from its inception
in the United States, tenure was conceived as a means of
protecting scholars from both internal and external
forces of pressure and coercion. Ever since its enshrinement in the AAUP’s (1940) Statement of Principles (see
American Association of University Professors 1940),
tenure has continuously been justified on the basis that a
lifetime appointment ensures that professors’ pursuit of
truth will be unhindered by pressures both internal and
external to the academy (e.g., Byse & Joughin 1959;
Fuchs 1997; Huer 1991). Indeed, in their commentary,
Greenberg & Billings draw on thirty years of experience
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2007) 29:6
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as officers of the AAUP, during which a large – if not the
largest – number of tenure and academic freedom
abridgements emanated not from external forces but
from internal ones, such as department chairpersons
who dictated what colleagues could and could not do
(e.g., be absent from class to give a talk elsewhere). If
tenure is supposed to insulate scholars from internal
forces, then the present results indicate that it is not perceived by respondents as doing a good of job of it.
Relatedly, Donchin and others question whether the
fact that senior colleagues are more immune to internal
pressures is relevant to discussions about the value of
tenure. We think it is. If a cost–benefit analysis of tenure
is undertaken, then surely it is relevant that on the cost
side, some undetermined number of junior colleagues
find themselves muzzled by the fear of not getting
tenure. We readily agree with Donchin and others that
tenure may serve a valuable purpose in insulating faculty
from external pressures. (We say “may” because we have
no data one way or another. But it is an interesting research
question that we hope will be explored.) And we also agree
with Bennich-Björkman’s belief that the American
tenure system may be superior to its alternative in Sweden.

R2.2. Criticism 2: Tenure is a necessary but
insufﬁcient condition

A number of commentators expressed the view that
although tenure by itself may not prod faculty to exercise
academic freedom, it is nevertheless a necessary
precondition for doing so (MacDonald, Ruscio &
Kelly-Woessner). This is an appealing stance, save one
inconsistency: In countries that do not have formal
tenure or which have limited job security that may be
terminated for whatever the institution regards as
“reasonable cause,” academic freedom can still be
ensured by other means, such as union contracts, legislation, and so on. Thus, we agree with those who acknowledge that tenure is not sufficient to guarantee academic
freedom, but we go a step further and ask whether it is
even necessary. If countries without tenure, such as New
Zealand, can manage to guarantee academic freedom
(see Franz & Hayne), then what necessary role is left
for tenure to play in fostering academic freedom? As
noted above, we discussed in our target article other
benefits of tenure, such as higher graduation rates on campuses comprising tenured faculty, the ability to attract a
talented work force, and so on, and these are important
benefits. However, in terms of its original justification,
tenure may be neither necessary nor sufficient.
Flynn makes an important related point: Even if most
academics never speak out on controversial issues, the
few who have the courage to do so are protected by
tenure – at least more than they would be in its absence.
This strikes us as a reasonable argument, one that we find
compelling, but it is also an argument that could be
informed by empirical research to determine its validity.
We hope that such research materializes in the future,
though it deserves noting (as we mention below) that
tenure has not protected some faculty from attack and
job termination.
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R2.3. Criticism 3: Alternative explanations of the data

Ruscio & Kelly-Woessner and Farley list other factors
that deserve empirical study, such as whether full professors are more likely to exercise freedom because their
prospects for career mobility are less (thus, they can be
confrontational because no one will bad-mouth them to
a search committee for a job elsewhere, as there are few
jobs at their level). Although we agree in principle with
these commentators, we have one niggling doubt: Why
wouldn’t associate professors be just as likely to exercise
their academic freedom, given their limited career mobility? After all, how many job ads are there at the associate
professor level? Not many – probably no more than there
are for full professors. If an institution has permission to
search for a tenured person, it may be more apt to go
after a well-known full professor who is already a star
than after an associate professor who is seen as a rising
star. Our own institutions only rarely permit us to search
for tenured scholars at either the associate or full professor
rank, but when we are permitted to do so, we have always
hired a full professor. If you check out the available job
ads, we believe that you too will discover that that there
are as few associate professor openings as full professor
ones, and if we are correct, then Ruscio & KellyWoessner’s proposed explanation falls short of the mark.
Donchin likens our vignettes to illegitimate demands
by faculty. He states: “If I undertake to teach a course
on the foundations of cognitive neuroscience, I will be
derelict in my duty if I devote my lectures to a brilliant
analysis of the symbolism of Hamlet.” Although we agree
with this analysis, it misses our point. Our survey questions
had nothing to do with teaching or publishing material that
was illegitimate or beyond the training of the faculty.
Rather, our central finding was that junior faculty were
less willing than senior faculty to exercise their right to
teach and publish (and whistle-blow) about matters that
were within their ken, such as publishing a controversial
paper in their area or teaching a disfavored course in
their discipline.
Fuller asserts that we ignored the most obvious conclusion to explain our results: “namely, that in American
universities, tenure and promotion are subject to relatively
strong collegial oversight for a relatively long period. The
pressure to conform to local norms is thus unusually
strong.” He proposes shorter tenure and promotion timelines, with reviews performed at a supra-departmental
level. This strikes us as an ineffective strategy for two
reasons. First, most U.S. university reviews are already
multi-step processes, starting at the departmental level
but requiring formal additional review and approval
at usually two supra-departmental levels (college and
provost). So Fuller’s argument seems a bit of a stretch,
particularly with regard to doctoral in-house examinations.
Two of us, who have completed graduate degrees in
England (SJC, KMJ), are quite aware of the pressures to
stay in the good graces of one’s supervisors. Second,
by casting our results in terms of adherence to “local
norms,” it shifts the discourse from what is essentially a
fear of personal retribution at the hands of a wronged
party (i.e., a senior colleague on whom one blows the
whistle) to a claim of local community norms for silence
and cover-ups that we doubt can account for all of the findings. In fact, we suspect that the prevailing norms for some
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of the question domains actually are tilted in the opposite
direction to Fuller’s assumption. Specifically, local norms
would seem to favor whistle-blowing, publishing disfavored papers, and teaching unpopular courses. We
grant that if assistant professors thought that they might
lose their job by teaching an unpopular course or reporting
sexual harassment by a senior colleague, they would refrain
from doing so. But this runs counter to prevailing norms in
the sense that when a junior colleague keeps something to
herself (e.g., knowledge of sexual harassment by a senior
colleague), it is not because she feels that divulging such
harassment goes against local norms (it does not), but
rather, because she fears that the harasser will exact a
pound of flesh if he gets the chance. This does not seem
to us to be a matter of “conforming to local norms.”
R2.4. Criticism 4: Results are unsurprising

Several commentators expressed the view that our findings
were predictable (e.g., Fuller, Shermer), and two went so
far as to opine that the study was hardly needed (Clark,
Donchin). On the one hand, we agree that some of our
findings were unsurprising. For example, we anticipated
that very few professors would fit the media depiction of
the “renegade professor,” and this turned out to be the
case. Nor were we surprised to find that assistant professors believed their rank to be reluctant to exercise
academic freedom if it meant angering senior colleagues.
This, too, turned out to be the case. However, we were
quite surprised by the finding that tenured associate professors were not only less likely than tenured full
professors to believe their cohort would exercise academic
freedom, or to whistle-blow ethical misdeeds, but also that
they overpredicted full professors’ ethical behaviors, just
as much as full professors overpredicted theirs. We were
really stunned at the magnitude of some of these effect
sizes – they were huge. In short, we think that an accurate
summary of the results is that they were an amalgam of
predictable and unpredictable findings.
As far as whether a study was necessary to document
what some felt was a highly predictable finding – that
faculty at different stages of their career are differentially
sensitive to the views in their community – it is our view
that we benefit from empirical support for such assumptions. After all, history is littered with the carcasses of
false beliefs and assumptions that at one time seemed
self-evident but which turned out to be unsupported by
systematic empirical research.
Finally, we wonder why, if these outcomes are so predictable and unsurprising, there is silence in the academy
about junior colleagues’ reluctance to exhibit the same academic freedom that full professors exercise? Surely, some
degree of surprise will be engendered upon learning of
these findings; the alternative is that there has been a
conspiracy of silence among senior faculty. Happily for
us, many commentators appeared to share our view that
many of the results were surprising and “intriguing.
unexpected” (e.g., Bennich-Björkman, Buck).
R2.5. Criticism 5: Sampling and methodological
limitations

Buck, Farley, Peters, MacLeod, and others expressed
concerns about sampling and methodological issues.

Concerning sampling, Buck, Farley, and Peters noted
that we did not sample from a list of all institutions in
the country, choosing instead to sample solely from a list
of the top-ranked 50 colleges and top-ranked 50 universities, and that we failed to consider that faculty from
elite institutions may be less concerned about job security,
thus possibly resulting in smaller effect sizes (Farley). As
Buck and others noted, small colleges are far more likely
to have large portions of their faculty “at will,” that is, not
on tenure track. Buck aptly captured our dilemma during
the planning stage when she noted that almost two-thirds
of faculty members are employed in institutions that do
not appear on our list. Precisely. We needed faculty
members who were on the tenure track to determine
whether tenured associate professors were more similar
to tenure track assistants or tenured full professors. We
agree with Buck that it would be interesting to look at
faculty employed off the tenure track as well, but it was
beyond our resources to examine that contrast here. We
certainly agree with MacLeod that full professors are not
only tenured but are higher paid, better researchers,
more productive, more likely to serve as outside consultants, and so on, all of which makes it difficult to disentangle
tenure from other characteristics that could affect the
results. Our covariate analyses were designed to rule out
some of these attributes (years within rank, years since
Ph.D. that may proxy for things like salary), but they are
highly imperfect, and we readily accept MacLeod’s point.
Finally, MacLeod raised a cautionary note about the possibility that some full professors may have been untenured.
It is possible that a very small number of full professors
were untenured (we were able to check on most, but not
all), but if so, then including their responses could not
have altered the results. As reported, we re-ran the analyses for the six associate professors who could possibly
have been untenured, and the results were unchanged.
Thus, the contrast of greatest interest to us depended on
tenured and tenure-tracked faculty answering our vignettes, and such faculty are more in evidence at ranked colleges and universities than at unranked ones. If the faculty
members in our sample of ranked colleges were less concerned about job security than were faculty at less elite
institutions, they nevertheless exhibited weak academic
freedom and whistle-blowing beliefs about their colleagues. To the degree that faculty in our sample are less
concerned about job security, it would serve to underestimate the main effects we reported because untenured
faculty at less elite institutions could be expected to behave
even more weakly.
This was a first effort, and we could not begin to address
the tremendous diversity that exists among colleges and
universities (2-year, 4-year, doctoral extensive, doctoral
intensive, religious, secular, private, public, different
geographic regions, different national systems, etc.).
There were three reasons we decided to constrain our
sample to the top-ranked colleges and universities – which
constraint, as Buck notes, is akin to excluding two-thirds
of U.S. faculty.
First, both size and type of institution (small liberal arts
colleges vs. large research universities) is a contrast others
have identified as a fruitful source of differences in attitudes governing tenure and academic freedom. Therefore,
at the start we knew that the size of the institution was an
important variable we needed to examine.
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Second, during the planning stage, we became aware
that many small colleges had insufficient numbers of
faculty members at each rank and within each of the 18
disciplines to permit reliable sampling. The colleges that
did have all 18 disciplines as well as multiple faculty
members at each rank within each discipline were
usually the better known, more elite schools on the list
we used. Many small colleges had so few faculty
members that when we tried to come up with three full
professors, three associate professors, and three assistant
professors in each discipline, we were thwarted. Many
had departments with only two to four total full-time
faculty members, thus obviating stratified sampling. In
contrast, the top colleges tended to have larger faculties
and many more of the disciplinary departments we
studied. Hence, if we wanted to study the difference
between small and large institutions, comparing professors
in all three ranks, even the small colleges we selected had
to be of a relatively large size among small institutions.
The third reason we studied ranked colleges is that
many small, unranked colleges have little or no experience
with federal grant officers on their campuses, thus making
it unrealistic to ask faculty members there whether a
typical colleague would report infractions to the resident
grant officer. In the planning stage of this research, we
discovered that many small colleges do not even have
research expectations for their faculty, at least not as the
term “research” is understood in Carnegie 1A institutions,
and few of them have resident federal grant officers,
thereby rendering our questions unfamiliar, if not
irrelevant.
In the Discussion, we noted that ranked small colleges
and ranked research universities can be further broken
down by factors such as religious versus secular, public
versus private, and even by geographical region.
However, exploring these possible predictors was
beyond our resources, although we agree with Peters
and others that examining such contrasts could be very
interesting. Of course, these limitations in our sample
were explicitly mentioned in the target article.
In sum, the contrast between small colleges and large
research universities was, as already noted, motivated by
prior work showing differences. However, we could not
expand on this contrast without greatly expanding the
size of our sample. We assumed that if faculty willingness
to engage in controversial research and express controversial opinions is abridged at these larger institutions, then it
is at least as likely to be abridged at smaller ones.
R2.6. Criticism 6: Conclusions are
sometimes inaccurate

Clark raised four technical points that we briefly address
here: First, he argued that the likelihood of submitting
unpopular research is much lower for assistant professors’
judgments of their own rank (M ¼ 3.3) than comparable
values for associate and full professors (M ¼ 6.0 and 6.3,
respectively). Although we take his point, the mean he
reports for assistant professors rating other assistant professors’ willingness to publish unpopular research is not
3.3 but is 4.9, as can be seen in Figure 5. So assistant professors were less likely to submit unpopular research than
were associate professors (M ¼ 6.0) and full professors
(M ¼ 6.3), but the difference is not as large as Clark
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suggests. Second, he notes that, in section 5.3, we
confuse target and respondent rank in several places. In
that section we did indeed transpose the target and
respondent, as Clark perceptively noted. We did not
catch this transposition even though the difference is
quite visible in Figure 3. In fact, it is even larger than
we reported in the sentence. Thus, the suggestion that
we overstated the findings because the opposite is true is
unwarranted.
Third, Clark noted that the degrees of freedom associated with one of our tests were ambiguous. The test in
question is the F-test for the main effect of questionnaire
type in our “Questionnaire –Field – Institution –Rank
Anova” for Question 1, option 2. The words “both Fs,”
rather than “F,” refers to post hoc tests for this Anova
that were originally intended to be part of the manuscript
but that were deleted during editing to meet the length
requirements of the journal. Therefore, the F-test given
is for the main effect of questionnaire type, as indicated
by the beginning of the sentence. The thrust of Clark’s
point seems to be that this particular use of the F-test indicates that we chose to average across rank of respondent
and report the main effect across all respondents rather
than reporting it only for each rank of respondent for
their own rank. Given that we explicitly stated we were
doing this for this particular analysis (as we were reporting
a main effect), this criticism does not reach very far. Similarly, the commentator states that he missed in this section
an analysis of the difference between assistant professor
and the two tenured ranks. We addressed this in the subsequent paragraph (see also nonoverlapping confidence
intervals around means); post hoc tests indicated that the
differences between full professors and assistant professors, full professors and associate professors, and associate professors and assistant professors were all significant.
Fourth, Clark noted that Figure 2 in section 4.2 shows
that the difference between questionnaire types only holds
when collapsing across rank of respondent – not when
each rank only considers its own rank. However, in the
section just after this, we reported the significant interaction effect between rank of respondent and type of
questionnaire, which accounts for this fact. Thus, despite
Clark’s error detection efforts, for which we are grateful,
in actuality they either amplify our claims or are not
errors at all.
Clark also disagreed with our claim that untenured
assistant professors and tenured associate professors
believed that their cohort was less likely to insist on academic freedom than was the full professors’ cohort.
Although he is correct that Figures 1 and 2, illustrating
data for Question 1, reveal that the likelihood of teaching
a controversial course is the same for associate and full
professor judgments of their ranks (Ms ¼ 5.0 and 5.0),
such results were an exception to a general trend found
across many comparisons. For Questions 2, 4, and 5,
assistant and associate professors rated themselves as
significantly less likely to confront a senior colleague
concerning misappropriation of grant money, less likely
to confront a senior colleague concerning falsification of
data, and less likely to engage in publishing controversial
research than the full professors rated their own rank to
be on these behaviors. In sum, although Clark noticed
some mistakes in our figures, the general patterns of our
results still hold.
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R2.7. Criticism 7: Behavioral measures
are superior to opinions

Donderi, Buck, Donchin, and others asserted that a more
direct measure of faculty behavior would have been preferable to the opinion data we collected – even if it meant
replacing the experimental design with a less potent
design. There is no reason why others cannot collect behavioral data, which could prove to be quite interesting, as
Farley noted as well. Unlike Farley, who appreciated the
data we collected while advocating for behavioral data to
supplement it, Donderi chided us for allegedly conflating
opinion data with fact data. By facts, Donderi means
actual cases of dismissal or threatened dismissal, which he
argues are the real data of interest. In contrast, he also
argues that opinion data from a survey such as ours are irrelevant to the issue of tenure. Why does Donderi believe
that faculty opinions are irrelevant? We would argue that
opinions, or, more precisely, junior colleagues’ beliefs
about senior colleagues’ opinions, are extremely important.
Imagine a young assistant professor who has knowledge of
sexual harassment by her colleague with one of his students.
If the assistant professor believes that her senior colleagues
will be supportive of her whistle-blowing, then she may
disclose what she knows. Otherwise, she may not. This is
the kind of data that Donderi argued is uninteresting. We
leave readers to judge the merits of his stance.
R2.8. Criticism 8: We have a negative bias
against tenure

One commentator felt we opted to “interpret benefits of
tenure in a negative manner, specifically, as lower ranks
being muzzled rather than as tenure liberating contentious
ideas” (Clark). This commentator asserts that “it is unclear
what outcome would have been interpreted by Ceci et al.
as supporting tenure.” Contrary to this assertion, we were
entirely open to finding strong support for tenure’s original
justification: If tenured associate professors’ ratings were
similar to those of tenured full professors, we would have
interpreted this as supporting tenure’s original justification.
Buck commented that tenure denial “is not simply a denial
of a reward, as the target article suggests, but in many
instances the end of an academic career.” We agree, but
this only serves to strengthen our argument because tenure
is so desirable a reward that it can cause non-optimal behavior, including the deferral of rights and responsibilities.
Ending a career certainly qualifies as the kind of institutional
incentive that can cause one to abrogate rights and resist
whistle-blowing. Finally, Greenberg & Billings argued
that tenure ensures academic freedom, and in service of
this assertion, they cited cases they encountered as officers
of the AAUP. With the exception of the case about the professor who taught creationism, none of the examples they
accused us of ignoring have anything to do with academic
freedom (e.g., requiring faculty to live within 50 miles of
campus). Thus, it is not clear to us what they base their
endorsement of tenure upon.
R2.9. Criticism 9: Several of the questions we asked
were not fair tests of academic freedom

Four commentators (Buck, MacLeod, Jacobson,
Wettersten) expressed varying levels of concern about

the nature of three of the questions we asked. For some,
this appeared to be a minor point, but for others it
emerged as a major complaint about our methodology.
First and foremost, we did not include the questions
concerning whistle-blowing because of a belief that
tenure has been justified on the grounds that it promotes
ethical behavior, but rather, in order to examine whether
tenure might undermine such behavior. We explicitly
stated that the whistle-blowing questions were added to
our survey to determine whether the tenure and promotion process has negative effects that extend beyond
academic freedom – to instances of failing to report
ethical misconduct, for example.
Jacobson’s concerns about our questions were of a
different nature. She remarked that “it is unfortunate
that many of the authors’ examples are drawn from
political correctness battles . . . not cases of responsible
academic research.” But academic freedom is not
limited to so-called responsible academic research. It is
supposed to protect faculty speech and writing in all
appropriate situations – not only when it is deemed by
someone to be “responsible.” Is Jensen’s and Rushton’s
research on the heritability of racial differences in intelligence “responsible”? It depends on whom you ask. But
academic freedom was conceived to protect them regardless of one’s opinion about whether one regards it as
responsible. Judgments about what is and is not responsible are at the precipice of a slippery slope. As Lilienfeld
argues, “even research that is substantially incorrect can
facilitate scientific progress by forcing researchers to
rethink their cherished assumptions and adduce more
compelling evidence for their assertions.”
R3. Proffered remedies
A number of commentators proposed means of remedying the situation (Shermer, Carmichael, Fuller,
Wettersten). Carmichael provides an interesting economic rationale for tenure: If senior professors are to hire
younger professors who, if well-chosen, will eclipse them
in research and teaching, then the senior professors must
be protected with tenure or they cannot be expected to
hire the best candidates. As intriguing as we find this suggestion, if the sole justification for tenure is to encourage
senior faculty to hire the best young candidates, then
there exist far less expensive means for doing this than
providing lifetime job security. For example, senior faculty
from other universities could be asked to rate the applicant
pool, much the way they are called upon to act as external
reviewers to rate candidates for tenure and promotion from
peer institutions. Identifying the best young candidates in a
peer institution’s job pool would thus pose no risk to them.
Or professional societies could step up to the plate and
rate new doctoral graduates along multiple teaching
and research dimensions, to aid hiring decisions.
Carmichael’s analysis leads to the expectation that
faculty in universities or even entire countries that once
had tenure, but no longer have it (e.g., the U.K.), have
been released from the fear of hiring young faculty who
will eclipse them. Given how many other characteristics
of such institutions would have changed with the tenure
policies, it is undoubtedly very difficult to answer such a
question.
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A very different proposal was made by Shermer, who
suggested that each institution be allowed to define
tenure within the parameters of its local core values. In
principle, we are not opposed to such a proposal, but we
wonder about the myriad complexities that might emerge
from its practice. For example, some of the examples
described by Greenberg & Billings based on their experience as officers of the AAUP (e.g., a professor being absent
without leave, or a chairperson making uninvited visits to a
professor’s classes in the absence of student complaints)
are not tied to core values, so how would the market take
care of such situations? Such surveillances are not part of
anyone’s employment contract or of the core values
Shermer has in mind, so they would have to be dealt with
ad hoc. Still, Shermer makes an intriguing case for a
market-based approach.
R4. Conclusion
In conclusion, the fact that senior colleagues are perceived
as being more willing to resist pressures and to exercise
academic freedom is pertinent to discussions of the
value of tenure. If a cost – benefit analysis of tenure is
undertaken, then it is relevant to include, on the cost
side, some undetermined number of junior colleagues
who feel muzzled by the fear of not getting tenure and
promotion if they resist internal pressures.
We agree with MacDonald, Flynn, and others who
point to cases in which tenure protected someone doing
controversial research from dismissal. But perhaps the
issue is not whether in very rare cases (like that of
Christopher Brand and Frank Ellis in the U.K.) the
absence of tenure renders one vulnerable to job termination, but rather, as Farley prefers, what the overall
cost-benefit ratio associated with tenure is. That is, how
much good does it do to protect the handful of researchers
doing controversial research versus how much does it
muzzle those who wish to possess tenure but currently
do not? If we confine the discourse to rare anecdotes,
then we can easily dredge up cases of professors who
have been attacked for doing controversial research even
though they have tenure (see Tavris [2002] for a description of the lawsuits, threats of job termination, and
career disruption experienced by tenured full professors
Elizabeth F. Loftus and Melvin Guyer for publishing
their exposé research).
In sum, tenure conveys many benefits, but it may be
neither necessary nor sufficient to justify its original rationale, that of fostering academic freedom. No comment or
criticism offered by the 19 commentators has vanquished
this bottom line.
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